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Abstract 
 
This report explores the forces of change which will influence the competitive environment of the 
wind turbine industry over the coming decade. It further explores the strategic consequences of such 
change for wind turbine manufacturers and investigates possibilities for adaptation, pre-emption and 
early warning. In the somewhat experimental approach to strategic foresight adopted in this thesis 
involves the following steps: 
 
Firstly, a number of variables and interrelationships considered relevant to strategic decision-making 
in the context of the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry are made explicit through 
the construction of an integrated conceptual model (ICM). The ICM is constructed on the basis of 
strategic theory and a survey of industry literature, covering analysis, empirical measurements, 
observations and assessments about the current structure of the competitive environment. 
Secondly, expectations and principal questions about the development of the competitive 
environment over the coming decade are identified through in-depth interviews and assessed on the 
basis of current empirical evidence and historical precedence. The ICM subsequently forms the basis 
against which the impact of these changes upon the competitive environment is systematically 
explored. 
Thirdly, a number of strategic groups are identified among the business models of current wind 
turbine manufacturers. The consequences of the known forces of change are explored for each 
strategic group along with possibilities for adaptation, pre-emption and early warning.  
 
On this basis, the report concludes that wind turbine manufacturers face a number of very diverse 
strategic challenges over the coming decade. The report concludes that several options are available 
to all types of manufacturers, both in terms of adaptation in defence of status quo, pre-emption to 
influence developments, and exit, should all else fail. The central determinant of the range of 
possibilities open to wind turbine manufacturers over the coming decade is the early recognition of 
the forces of change and their strategic consequences. 
 2 
Acknowledgements 
 
The author would like thank the industry participants and observers of the wind turbine industry, who 
freely and openly lend their time and expertise to this project. Also, the Department of Technology 
Scenarios at Risø National Laboratory deserves my gratitude for inspiring colleagues and a unique 
working atmosphere in which this project was created. My supervisors Tyge Kjær, Cynthia Lea Celin 
and Bent Søndergård likewise deserve thanks for their effort, enthusiasm and ability to motivate my 
efforts. I owe a special thanks to my girlfriend Kristel for patiently sitting through endless speeches 
on the nature of the geeky topic of strategic foresight. Last, but not least, I thank Hari Seldon for 
inspiring these thoughts in the first place. 
 
Morten Wied 
 
 3 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION, SCOPE & OBJECTIVES.................................................................................5 
1.1 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES .......................................................................................................................................6 
CHAPTER 2: APPROACH & METHODOLOGY..................................................................................................8 
2.1 STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING.............................................................................................................................8 
2.2 THE ROLE OF LEARNING AND EXPERIENCE ...........................................................................................................9 
2.3 THE INHERENT UNCERTAINTY OF COMPLEX PROBLEMS .....................................................................................11 
2.4 CONSEQUENCES FOR STRATEGIC FORESIGHT .....................................................................................................16 
 
- Part I - 
CHAPTER 3: UNDERSTANDING COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENTS..........................................................18 
3.1 THE SCHOOLS OF STRATEGY ..............................................................................................................................18 
3.2 MAKING THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS EXPLICIT ................................................................................................21 
3.3 FROM WORDS TO DIAGRAM ................................................................................................................................30 
3.4 FROM THEORY TO EMPERY.................................................................................................................................32 
CHAPTER 4: THE COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT OF THE WIND TURBINE INDUSTRY..................33 
4.1 THE WIND TURBINE INDUSTRY ...........................................................................................................................33 
4.2 GROUNDING THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS .........................................................................................................35 
4.3 THE FIRST FORCE: THE THREAT OF NEW ENTRANTS ...........................................................................................36 
4.4 THE SECOND FORCE: THE INTENSITY OF RIVALRY..............................................................................................38 
4.5 THE THIRD FORCE: THE COMPETITIVENESS OF SUBSTITUTES..............................................................................39 
4.6 THE FOURTH FORCE: THE BARGAINING POWER OF BUYERS................................................................................43 
4.7 THE FIFTH FORCE: THE BARGAINING POWER OF SUPPLIERS................................................................................45 
4.8 THE STRUCTURE OF THE WIND TURBINE INDUSTRY ............................................................................................48 
CHAPTER 5: BUILDING AN INTEGRATED CONCEPTUAL MODEL .........................................................50 
5.1 THE INTERCONNECTEDNESS OF THE STRUCTURAL FORCES.................................................................................50 
5.2 ANALYSING THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTEGRATED CONCEPTUAL MODEL...........................................................54 
 
- Part II - 
CHAPTER 6: PREDETERMINEDS - WHAT WE KNOW (WE THINK) WE KNOW ...................................59 
6.1 WHAT IS PREDETERMINED?................................................................................................................................59 
6.2 IDENTIFYING PREDETERMINEDS .........................................................................................................................59 
6.3 THE FIRST FOLD .................................................................................................................................................61 
6.4 THE SECOND FOLD .............................................................................................................................................68 
6.5 THE THIRD FOLD ................................................................................................................................................71 
6.6 THE FOURTH FOLD .............................................................................................................................................75 
6.7 SUMMING UP: THE ANTICIPATED STRUCTURE OF THE WIND TURBINE INDUSTRY................................................78 
CHAPTER 7: CRITICAL UNCERTAINTY - WHAT WE KNOW WE DON’T KNOW .................................80 
7.1 WHAT IS CRITICALLY UNCERTAIN? ....................................................................................................................80 
7.2 IDENTIFYING CRITICAL UNCERTAINTIES.............................................................................................................80 
7.3 GROWTH – STABILITY, FLUCTUATION OR STAGNATION? ...................................................................................81 
7.5 THE FIRST CANONICAL VARIATION: THE IMPACT OF LOW INDUSTRY GROWTH...................................................85 
7.6 THE SECOND CANONICAL VARIATION: THE IMPACT OF HIGH INDUSTRY GROWTH ..............................................87 
7.7 NEW COMPETITORS: COOPERATION OR ANTAGONISM? ......................................................................................87 
7.8 THE THIRD CANONICAL VARIATION: THE IMPACT OF A HIGH THREAT LEVEL .....................................................90 
7.9 THE FOURTH CANONICAL VARIATION: THE IMPACT OF A LOW THREAT LEVEL ...................................................91 
 
- Part III - 
CHAPTER 8: STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES - ADAPTATION & PRE-EMPTION....................................92 
8.1 ESTABLISHING A TYPOLOGY OF STRATEGIC GROUPS ..........................................................................................92 
 4 
8.2 THE FULL-LINE DIFFERENTIATOR .......................................................................................................................95 
8.3 THE NARROW-LINE INDUSTRIALIST....................................................................................................................97 
8.4 THE SELECTIVE MARKET SPECIALIST..................................................................................................................99 
8.5 THE STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE FORCES OF CHANGE ..........................................................................100 
8.6 PRE-EMPTION: FORTIFICATION, MOBILITY OR EXIT? ........................................................................................106 
CHAPTER 9: DEEP UNCERTAINTY - WHAT WE DON’T KNOW WE DON’T KNOW...........................109 
9.1 WHAT IS KNOWN, AND WHAT IS NOT................................................................................................................109 
9.2 MONITORING AND EARLY WARNING ................................................................................................................109 
CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS & PERSPECTIVES ........................................................................................111 
10.1 ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTION ..........................................................................................................111 
10.2 PERSPECTIVES................................................................................................................................................112 
BIBLIOGRAPHY & REFERENCES....................................................................................................................114 
APPENDIX A: VARIABLES, TERMS & DESCRIPTIONS ..............................................................................119 
1. DETERMINANTS OF THE THREAT OF NEW ENTRANTS ..........................................................................................119 
2. DETERMINANTS OF THE INTENSITY OF RIVALRY ................................................................................................124 
3. DETERMINANTS OF THE COMPETITIVENESS OF SUBSTITUTES .............................................................................127 
4. DETERMINANTS OF THE POWER OF BUYERS .......................................................................................................130 
5. DETERMINANTS OF THE POWER OF SUPPLIERS ...................................................................................................134 
APPENDIX B: RELATIONSHIPS........................................................................................................................138 
APPENDIX C: INTERVIEWS – CONSIDERATIONS, INTERVIEWEES & QUESTIONNAIRE ..............140 
 5 
Chapter 1: Introduction, scope & objectives 
 
At a glance it becomes evident that the history of the wind turbine industry has indeed been a bumpy 
ride down the learning curve. From the meagre beginnings spurred by growing environmental 
concerns and the first oil crisis in the mid 70s, to the internationalising, maturing and consolidating 
industry we see today. The history of the industry has claimed its casualties. Only few of the 
pioneering manufacturers made it this far, and those that did have undergone drastic change along the 
way in response to an even more drastically changing competitive environment. 
 
The early competitive environment of the late 70s and early 80s was characterised by radical 
innovations and frequent technological failures as a wealth of turbine designs competed for small 
national niche markets in Europe and North America. Technological dead ends put an end to many 
early pioneers. The development of a technological standard in the form of the so-called ‘Danish 
concept’ caused a major upheaval in the competitive environment. It resulted in a technological 
shakeout in the young industry and only few of the original pioneers persisted. The competitive 
environment again changed dramatically in 1982, with the introduction of the Californian Production 
Tax Credit (PTC), causing an unprecedented increase in demand, which forced the wind turbine 
industry to expand and internationalise overnight. In this turbulent period, rapid up scaling was the 
key source of cost reductions and turbine concepts became obsolete at an unprofitable rate, eating 
into margins in spite of the booming turnover1. The expiration of the PTC in 1987 and the subsequent 
collapse of the Californian market caused a third major change in the competitive environment. 
Rapid decline in demand instantly resulted in overcapacity, intense competition and low profitability. 
Bankruptcy and major structural changes followed, as the industry adjusted to the demands of a 
much smaller market. The fourth major change occurred during the mid 90s with the emergence of 
Germany and Spain as large European markets for wind turbines along with rapid increases in 
industry concentration as new and old competitors merged into fewer and larger manufacturers2. The 
competitive environment of the wind turbine industry of today is global, highly concentrated and 
characterised by intense rivalry among the remaining manufacturers3. 
 
The history of the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry has been a history of 
surprise and constant change. Every major shift has lead to disaster for those who were unprepared. 
Looking ahead, it is evident that the future of the competitive environment of this industry will be no 
less interesting than its turbulent past. New and powerful competitors have recently made entry into 
                                                 
1
 Kjær 1988:20 
2
 Skytte et al 2004:120-131 
3
 Lewis & Wiser 2005:9 
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the maturing industry and others are likely to follow. New global markets are opening in Europe, 
Asia, Australia and the Americas, and technological breakthroughs set new standards for size, 
capacity and location of turbines, on- as well as offshore4. As ever, the future of the wind turbine 
industry remains uncertain and seems to confirm the conclusions of Keith Suter, stating that the 
future comes about through either disaster, drift or design5. Disaster in the form of major surprises 
and shakeouts, drift in the form of constant adaptation and catching up to seemingly unpredictable 
developments, and design in the form of conscious pre-emption and planned change. The key 
question faced by wind turbine manufacturers today is in many ways the same as it has been 
throughout the history of the industry: what future to design for and what are the opportunities for 
design? 
1.1 Scope and objectives 
The idea of controlling and adapting to future industry developments through foresight is not new. 
The new wave of planning and business theory emerging after the Second World War spurred the 
adoption of ‘Corporate Planning’ in many industries in the 50s and 60s. This approach was mainly 
based on time-series extrapolation of current trends into the medium- and long-term future. The 
relative economic stability of the 1960s, combined with the deceptively accurate mathematical 
outputs made Corporate Planning seem reliable. The limits of this approach became apparent in the 
more turbulent 70s, where ‘Scenario Planning’, aimed at exploring and anticipating a range of 
diverging eventualities, replaced the predict-and-control paradigm of Corporate Planning. Led by 
successes in the oil industry, this approach was adopted in a wide range of industries throughout the 
decade. The use of Scenario Planning receded in the 80s after the death of Herman Kahn, the founder 
and forceful proponent of the method. Simultaneous failures in the field of simulation modelling, 
most famously exemplified by the Club of Rome’s World3 Model, meant that planning horizons of 
many industries shrank from as much as a decade in the 70s to less than a year. In spite of several 
methodological advances in the field of foresight, this trend has largely persisted up until today6. 
 
The problems of obtaining knowledge about the future have been enduring and the future of many 
industries remains woefully uncertain. In this respect the wind turbine industry is no exception. From 
the viewpoint of strategic foresight, the wind turbine industry exemplifies all the major problems and 
dilemmas contained within this field. Given the current situation of the industry, it is clear that long-
term decisions and strategic commitments must be made in spite of increasingly uncertain future 
competitive conditions. In this sense, the problem of obtaining reliable intelligence about future 
                                                 
4
 DWIA 2006 
5
 Quoted in Bell 2003:109-110 
6
 See Mercer 1998:41-42, RAND 2003:11-36, Bell 2003:6-58, Sherdan 1998 and Wack 1985 
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developments is as relevant today as it has been throughout the history if the industry. This report 
aims to explore the possibility of extending the panning horizons of the wind turbine industry - 
asking what lies ahead in a structured and explicit manner. Rephrasing this question, this report 
explores the strategic challenge of avoiding disaster by moving from drift to design through 
answering the following research question: 
 
What forces will shape the competitive environment of the global wind turbine industry over the 
coming 10 years and what will be the strategic consequences for wind turbine manufacturers? 
 
In this thesis I aim to construct an experimental conceptual model of the variables and 
interconnections considered relevant to long-term strategic decision-making in the competitive 
environment of the wind turbine industry. This model will form the basis, against which the strategic 
consequences of both anticipated and unexpected eventualities can be explicitly and consistently 
explored, making possible pre-emption, adaptation and early warning over the time horizon of a 
decade. The 10-year time horizon investigated in this report was chosen somewhat arbitrarily. On the 
one hand, it is a future time period in which historical precedence suggests that the competitive 
environment is likely to change significantly. On the other hand, it is short enough to be 
meaningfully investigated while remaining strategically relevant to decisions made in the present – 
or so I will argue. The competitive environment is understood here in the broadest sense of the word, 
as the business environment with which wind turbine manufacturers interact competitively in order 
to earn a profit in excess of the cost of capital. Strategic consequences thus include both the 
consequences of changes in the competitive environment upon the success of strategic choices, but 
also the consequences of changes in the competitive environment imposed by strategy itself. 
 
 8 
Chapter 2: Approach & methodology 
 
The research question guiding the efforts made in this report is clearly a difficult one to answer. As it 
is evident from the turbulent history of the wind turbine industry, a decade is a long time. A key issue 
in this report is whether such a question can even be answered in any meaningful way. Although the 
question of the strategic consequences of long-term change may be difficult to answer, it is in many 
ways an unavoidable question. Competitors in the wind turbine industry are faced with this question 
in one form or another, and are forced to answer it as best they can, and have been, throughout the 
history of the industry. This chapter will be concerned with the theoretical basis of strategic foresight 
and its role in strategic decision making. 
2.1 Strategic decision-making 
Decision-making is by its very nature a forward-looking activity. Any conclusion reached, and any 
action taken, based on such conclusions, naturally relies on assumptions about the future of the 
system in which the decision will play out as well as the change induced by the decision itself. When 
these assumptions are correct, action leads to desired results. When they are not, the unexpected 
occurs. The validity of assumptions made about the future therefore lies at the core of the success of 
any decision. This is particularly true about strategic decisions. Strategic decisions are set apart from 
other kinds of decisions in ways that make the formulation of accurate assumptions about the future 
particularly vital – and particularly problematic.  
 
Strategic decisions are important; they involve a significant commitment of resources and they are 
not easily reversible7. Strategic decisions are concerned with the long-term direction of an 
organisation and the scope of its activities8. Here, long-term is understood as the horizon at which 
many things are likely to have changed9. Assumptions upon which strategic decisions are based must 
therefore be valid over long periods of time. Because of the irreversibility of strategic commitments, 
invalid assumptions lead to irrecoverable losses. Perhaps because of the principal nature of strategy, 
there are numerous definitions of the term. In the broadest sense of the word, Johnson & Scholes 
(2002) defines strategy as follows: 
 
 “Strategy is the direction and scope of an organization over the long-term, which achieves advantage for the 
organisation through its configuration of resources within a changing environment and to fulfil stakeholder 
expectations.10” (Emphasis in original) 
 
                                                 
7
 Grant 1998:14 
8
 Johnson & Scholes 2002:4 
9
 Godet 1994:6 
10
 Johnson & Scholes 2002:19 
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In other words, strategic decisions are the major decisions in the lifetime of an organisation. Strategic 
decisions define the organisation for what it is, and orchestrate all subordinate decisions towards 
common strategic objectives. Avoiding disaster by moving from drift to design is about strategic 
choice. In this sense, the role of strategic decisions moves beyond mere adaptation to current and 
future conditions, towards conscious pre-emption to promote desired future states and to avoid 
undesirable ones. But what future should the organisation design for itself, and what are the disasters 
to be avoided? 
 
Wind turbine manufacturers are firms. This basic fact makes answering the above questions very 
simple. In the end, any business must design a future for itself in which it earns a rate of profit in 
excess of its cost of capital. Any future in which this basic premise is not fulfilled will eventually 
lead to disaster11. There are two principal types strategic decisions that must be made to meet this 
fundamental criterion: corporate strategic decisions, concerned with selecting an attractive industry 
in which to compete, and business strategic decisions, concerned with how to compete in the 
selected industry12. As the focus of this report is the competitive environment of the wind turbine 
industry, I will emphasise the role of business strategy rather then corporate strategy. As a 
consequence, I will not be concerned with the question of whether or not to compete in the wind 
turbine industry as opposed to other industries, but with the question of how to compete in the wind 
turbine industry once the first decision has been made. 
 
From the point of view adopted in this report, strategic decision-making is the process of moving 
from drift to design, whereby disaster can be avoided. Any wind turbine manufacturer is forced to 
make strategic decisions about how to achieve competitive advantage – consciously or not. As we 
have seen, all such decisions rely on assumptions about the future competitive environment of the 
industry. Strategic success is determined by the validity of these assumptions and the way these are 
translated into strategic choice. In this sense, the answer to the research question is the formulation of 
a set of valid strategic assumptions about the future competitive environment of the wind turbine 
industry. This raises the question of how such assumptions are formed. 
2.2 The role of learning and experience 
Assumptions about the future competitive environment are ultimately the product of experiences 
gained and lessons learned in the past. New experiences lead to revised assumptions on which 
decisions are based. Following Sterman (2000), this process can best be described through the 
concept of feedback. 
                                                 
11
 Grant 1998:19 
12
 Grant 1998:52 
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Through the process of single loop learning, information about the state of the real world system13 is 
compared to various strategic goals. Discrepancies are perceived between desired and actual states, 
and actions are taken that (are believed to) cause the 
real world system to move towards the desired state (see 
figure 2.2). If these initial decisions do not close the gap 
between the desired state and the real world, the process 
iterates around the loop again and decisions are 
revised14.  In this sense, learning is a process of 
continuous feedback. 
 
Single loop learning is the simplest form of learning, and it represents the decision-making processes 
associated with drift as opposed to design, as it involves no strategy formulation in the complete 
absence of long-term assumptions about the future state (or states) of the system. Design, successful 
or not, involves assumptions to be made about the future and action to be taken upon these. In this 
view, assumptions, and the way these come about, can best be understood through the concept of 
mental models. Sterman (2000) defines mental models in the following way: 
 
“[…] the term “mental model” includes our beliefs about the networks of causes and effects that describes how a 
system operates, along with the boundary of the model (which variables are included and which are excluded) and 
the time horizon we consider relevant – our framing and articulation or articulation of a problem.15” 
 
When making decisions, our mental models govern the way we apply decision rule and policy to 
information about the world, as we perceive it16. As opposed to single loop learning, this is a two-
way process, in which information feedback about the world fundamentally alters our mental models 
through double loop learning (see figure 2.2). When double loop learning occurs, our assumptions 
                                                 
13
 Although much of this discussion is beyond the scope of this report, the term ‘real world’, as it is used here, refers 
to the implicit assumption that a system of causes and effects exist independently of our perception of it. The term is 
thus used as an ‘opposite’ to perceived models; mental, conceptual, mathematical etc. 
14
 Sterman 2000: 15 
15
 Sterman 2000: 16 
16
 At this point, it is necessary to develop a more precise terminology of systems. Following Fahey et al (1998:141), 
a system can be defined as a set of two or more interrelated elements of any kind. To further specify this definition I 
will use the term variables to describe the elements of a system. Following Neuman (2000:17), variables are defined 
by their ability to change between two or more values when influenced by other variables in a system. At any given 
time, the values of a variable are called its attributes. The interrelationships between variables consist of causal links 
through which a change in the attributes one variable directly causes a change in the attributes of another. Systems 
are thus composed of a network of causal links connecting their constituent variables (Sterman 2000:139). In this 
sense, strategic assumptions about the future are ultimately about the number of variables, physical, economic, 
technological or otherwise, and the interconnections between them, which we consider relevant to strategic decision-
making. 
 
 
Real world 
Information feedback Decisions 
Figure 2.1: Single loop learning 
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about the world are revised in the sense that the same information input yields a different set of 
assumptions and lead to revised decisions. The 
rate of learning, and thereby the future validity of 
assumptions drawn from experience, is 
determined by the effectiveness of double loop 
learning. The effectiveness of each of the links 
shown in figure 2.2, determines how fast we cycle 
around the two loops relative to the rate at which 
changes in the real world render our existing 
assumptions obsolete17. Herbert Simon recognises 
the central role of mental models in strategic 
decision-making, stating that: 
 
“The intended rationality of an actor requires him to construct a simplified model of the real situation in order to 
deal with it. He behaves rationally in respect to this model, and such behaviour is not even approximately optimal 
with respect to the real world. 18” 
 
The validity of strategic assumptions, and thus the foundation of rational action, is determined by the 
ability of actors’ mental models to mimic the operation of the real world system - a process whose 
importance cannot be overestimated. Diverging mental models are the source of heterogeneous 
outlooks upon, and expectations about, the future. Industry actors are only behaving rationally with 
respect to their mental models. But why is it so difficult to foresee the future state of the real world 
system and make accurate and homogeneous strategic assumptions? 
2.3 The inherent uncertainty of complex problems 
The problem of making accurate strategic assumptions over long time horizons falls into the class of 
problems known in decision science as complex problems, also termed wicked problems. The 
challenges posed by complex problems are well known in many areas of science. They have been 
encountered and described in various fields, such as systems theory (see Sterman 2000 and RAND 
2003), theoretical math (see Casti 1990), futures studies (see Bell 2003), sociology (see Neuman 
2000), game theory (see Camerer 2003) earth sciences (see Sarewitz et al 2000) and strategy (see 
Mercer 1998 and Heijden 1996). Consistent with this significant body of literature, it is possible to 
outline the major sources of uncertainty, connected to complex problems in strategic decision-
making: 
                                                 
17
 Sterman 2000: 18 
18
 Herbert Simon quoted in Sarewitz et al 2000:301 
Figure 2.2: Double loop learning 
Real world
Information feedbackDecisions
Strategy, structure,
decision rules
Mental models of
real world
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• Combinatorial complexity: Perhaps the most visible source of uncertainty encountered when 
making strategic assumptions is the accelerating rate of change and the increasing complexity 
in the environments surrounding decision-makers today. When making strategic decisions, a 
very large amount of variables must be considered at multiple levels of aggregation and over 
long time horizons. This gives rise to, what in systems theory is known as, combinatorial 
complexity. This type of complexity arises from large numbers of variables and 
interconnections in open systems19 - in other words, most of the real world. 
• Dynamic complexity: Strategic assumptions must include both the consequences of changes 
in an increasingly complex environment upon the success of strategic choices, but also the 
consequences of changes in the environment imposed by the strategy itself. In this sense, 
strategic assumptions must include several feedbacks between the strategy and the 
environment in which it is to play out. These feedbacks give rise to dynamic complexity, 
which can arise from relatively simple systems with low combinatorial complexity. The term 
dynamism accounts for the types and rates of change which can occur within the system 
regardless of the number of variables20. When feedback occurs, an initial change in a variable 
is fed back to itself through a number of mediating variables in a system. The initial change 
is then either balanced out or reinforced through the loop21. Through feedback, even very 
small changes in a variable can have a massive impact upon the state of the system as a 
whole. Vice versa, large changes in a variable can be completely absorbed by the system. 
This is also known as “policy resistance” (see Richardson 1991). The concept of positive and 
negative feedback will be further elaborated in Chapter 3. 
• Chaos: A third source of uncertainty connected to strategic decision-making is chaos, also 
known as sensitivity to initial conditions. Chaos arises from the effects of multiple feedback 
loops causing dynamic complexity as described above. Because of feedback, however, even 
very small initial changes can be reinforced through the system causing radical shifts. This 
makes the exact initial condition of the system very important when attempting to foresee 
future outcomes. Strategic decision-making requires accurate assumptions about the current 
state of the situation. Even the smallest discrepancy between assumptions about the current 
state of the system and its actual state can multiply over time, making predictions about the 
future state of the system obsolete22. 
• Self-altering prophecy: The fourth major source of uncertainty is well known in the social 
sciences, studying sentient agents such as humans, organisations and societies. This is the 
                                                 
19
 Sterman 2000:21 
20
 Fahey et al 1998:140 
21
 Sterman 2002:12 
22
 Casti 1990:53-76 
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problem of self-fulfilling or self-negating prophecies. These are situations in which the 
prophecy itself alters the conditions under which it is made23. This is particularly relevant in 
strategic decision-making where predictions made by a competitor might cause others to 
behave differently than they would otherwise have done, because of the prediction. This 
phenomenon is especially well established in game theory (see Camerer 2003). 
 
Following Krauss (2005), complex problems set themselves apart from the problems often studied by 
conventional science24 in that it is not possible, in advance, to definitively determine the relevant 
number of variables to consider - and thus the boundary of the system. Likewise, it is not possible to 
definitively determine the dominant relationships between the variables in the system - and thus the 
structure of the system25. Logically, this gives rise to two forms of ambiguity: 
 
• Ambiguousness of boundary: The choice of the boundaries of a system determines what part 
of the real world is considered to be inside the system and what part of the real world is left 
out. The competitive environment of the wind turbine industry is an open subsystem, 
intricately connected to political systems, environmental systems, technological systems, etc. 
Any definite boundary drawn around such systems is entirely artificial and subjective. 
 
• Ambiguousness of structure: Ambiguousness of structure refers to uncertainty about the 
variables, parameters and relationships that are used to describe a given phenomenon within 
the chosen boundaries of that system. Uncertainty about the structure of the system implies 
that several, equally legitimate, although partial, interpretations of the relevant relationships 
within the real world system can exist. 
 
In reality, the strategically relevant boundaries and structure of the system constituting the 
competitive environment of the wind turbine industry are in a constant state of flux and cannot be 
permanently pinned down. As described in section 2.2 above, assumptions about the relevant 
boundary and structure of such systems are based on mental models built from past experiences with 
the operation of the system. The accuracy of these assumptions depends upon the speed and 
effectiveness of double loop learning, relative to the rate at which changes in the real world system 
render existing assumptions obsolete. As a consequence, there exists a plurality of different, equally 
legitimate and plausible perspectives on both the boundary and the structure of real world systems 
                                                 
23
 Bell 2003:229 
24
 Conventional sciences is understood here as reductionist positivism. 
25
 Krauss 2005:24-25 
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considered relevant to strategic decision-making and thus, when facing complex problems the 
following considerations apply26: 
• There is not one problem, but a tangled web of related problems; 
• The underlying processes interact with one another in some sort of hierarchy; 
• The dynamics of the systems studied are not necessarily regular, but are characterised by 
synergistic and/or antagonistic relationships, indirect relationships, long delay periods 
between cause and effect, thresholds or non-linear behaviours; 
• The issues lie across or at the intersection of many disciplines, i.e., it has economic, 
environmental, socio-cultural and political dimensions; 
• There are a number of different equally legitimate and plausible perspectives on how the 
problem should be conceived. 
 
It is clear that any assumption about the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry a 
decade from now will be subject to the major sources of uncertainty described above. This does not, 
however, mean that everything is equally unpredictable. Following Krauss (2005), a continuum 
containing several categories of uncertainty can be identified based on our knowledge (or ignorance 
as it may be) about the future operation of the system in which strategies are meant to play out: 
 
 
Figure 2.3: The levels of uncertainty (adopted from Krauss 2005:27) 
Determinism refers to the situation in which everything is known exactly and with absolute certainty, 
while statistical uncertainty describes the situation in which there exist solid grounds for the 
assignment of discrete probabilities to each of a well-defined set of outcomes. Potential outcomes 
can be described as a finite set of discrete outcomes or a single continuous range of outcomes. 
Scenario uncertainty describes the state where all of the possible outcomes are known, but where it is 
acknowledged that there is no reliable basis for the assignment of probability distributions. 
Recognised ignorance describes the state where there are neither grounds for the assignment of 
probabilities, nor even the basis for defining a complete set of potential outcomes. Total ignorance is 
the other extreme opposite from determinism on the scale of uncertainty, to the extent that it is not 
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even known that knowledge is lacking27. In this view, uncertainty is a synonym for ignorance of the 
operation of the real world system. 
 
Although these categories appear discrete, it is important to note that they are arbitrary points on a 
fluid continuum from absolute certainty to complete and unrecognised ignorance and thus total 
uncertainty. To the far left of the spectrum, we find what is often known in scenario planning as 
trends, constants or predetermineds. These can be slow-changing phenomena such as the growth of 
populations, constrained situations in which there is a limited number of outcomes, processes 
already in the pipeline such as the age of a 10 year old two years from now, or inevitable collisions 
such as the steady depletion of a finite resource28. Deterministic events, or events characterised by 
statistical uncertainty, can thus be defined as future events determined by a known number of 
variables whose future values can be assessed in the form of probabilities. 
 
Scenario uncertainty is often termed critical uncertainty. Big strategic questions often fall under this 
category, as the vital importance of the question is often known, or at least knowable, but the answer 
is not29. Events characterised by scenario uncertainty can be defined as possible future events 
determined by a known number of variables but where the future values of these are unknown. 
 
While some level of prediction or at least anticipation is possible in the case of statistical uncertainty 
and scenario uncertainty, this is not the case for recognised and total ignorance. The information is 
simply not in existence in the present. RAND (2003) uses the term deep uncertainty to describe the 
characteristics of such events30. While our ignorance about these events is partially recognised, it is 
impossible to assess the extent of our ignorance31. Events characterised by ignorance can be defined 
as future events determined by an unknown number of variables whose future values are equally 
unknown. 
 
Based on this understanding of uncertainty, our ignorance about the future is not total. Our ability to 
make valid strategic assumptions about the future state of the real world system becomes a matter of 
degree, determined by our knowledge about the variables that condition the outcome of future events. 
As we extend the time-horizon, more and more events flow to the right along the continuum; from 
statistical uncertainty to scenario uncertainty, towards various levels of ignorance. In reverse, as we 
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progress toward a future point in time, more and more events will move left from scenario 
uncertainty to statistical uncertainty while the events we are ignorant about will gradually be revealed 
to us as key strategic questions in form of scenario uncertainties. At any given point in time, our 
knowledge of the relevant variables and their interconnections and thus the future state of the system 
is thus incomplete. 
2.4 Consequences for strategic foresight 
This approach to strategic foresight has a number of methodological implications for answering the 
research question posed in this report. Closely related to the above considerations, answering the 
research question necessarily involves the explicit establishment of a number of strategic 
assumptions about: 
1. The relevant variables and interconnections constituting the competitive environment of the 
wind turbine industry, taking into consideration the ambiguity of the boundary and structure 
of this system; 
2. The impact of the forces of change upon the competitive environment over the coming 
decade, taking into consideration the various levels of uncertainty related to these; 
3. The strategic consequences of a changing competitive environment for wind turbine 
manufacturers, taking into consideration the possibility of pre-emption, adaptation and early 
warning. 
Corresponding to these three major tasks, this report has been divided into three parts addressing 
each one in turn: 
 
Part I of this report will thus make explicit assumptions about the relevant variables and 
interconnections constituting the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry. Taking 
strategic theory as its point of departure, Chapter 3 will aim to establish and make explicit a number 
of initial theoretical propositions about competitive environments. Chapter 4 will then be concerned 
with grounding these generic propositions in empirical measurements and analysis specific to the 
competitive environment of the wind turbine industry. Finally, Chapter 5 will be concerned with 
assembling these propositions into an explicit and internally consistent single integrated conceptual 
model of the relevant variables and interconnections constituting the competitive environment of the 
wind turbine industry. 
 
Part II will be concerned with identifying the major known forces of change, which are believed to 
shape the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry over the coming decade. Chapter 6 
will aim to identify the major predetermineds, while Chapter 7 will be concerned with identifying the 
major critical uncertainties influencing the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry 
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over the coming decade. The integrated conceptual model constructed in Part I will form the basis 
against which the impact these forces upon the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry 
is systematically explored. 
 
Part III of this report will be concerned with exploring the strategic consequences of a changing 
competitive environment for wind turbine manufacturers. Chapter 8 will thus be concerned with 
establishing a typology of the strategic groups of wind turbine manufacturers against which the 
strategic consequences of the known forces of change will be assessed, allowing adaptation and pre-
emption. Subsequently, Chapter 9 will consider the strategic consequence of deep uncertainty along 
with the options for early warning of surprising events. 
 
For ease of reference and readability, more specific theoretical and methodological considerations 
connected to each of these tasks are made in the chapters in which they are relevant. 
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- Part I - 
 
Chapter 3: Understanding competitive environments 
 
As the term is understood in the context of this report, the competitive environment is the 
environment with which wind turbine manufacturers interact competitively in order to fulfil the most 
basic premise of their existence: to earn a profit in excess of the cost of capital. Designing a future in 
which this basic premise holds true involves farsighted strategic decision-making. As we have seen, 
such decisions are inevitably based on strategic assumptions about the variables and the 
interconnections between them, which are considered relevant to strategic decision-making. This 
chapter will be concerned with identifying and making explicit the initial theoretical propositions 
about the relevant variables and interconnections constituting competitive environments. This will be 
done on the basis of strategic theory, suggesting how competitive environments should theoretically 
be constructed. These theoretical propositions will be made explicit through the construction of a 
number of influence diagrams. 
3.1 The schools of strategy 
In a Kuhnian sense32, there is no single overarching theoretical paradigm in the field of strategic 
behaviour in competitive industry environments. Numerous opposing and complimentary schools of 
thought exist. The existence of multiple schools of thought reflects disputes about the relevant 
boundaries and structures of the systems constituting competitive environments. As described in the 
previous chapter, the complexity of these real world systems far surpasses that proposed by any 
theory. Additionally, the boundaries and structures of these real world systems are in a constant state 
of flux and differ from industry to industry and from time to time. The ability of any strategic theory 
to adequately describe the operation of such complex and diverse real world systems is therefore 
inherently limited. It is not possible to objectively identify the relevant boundary and structure of 
competitive environments and there are thus a number of different, equally legitimate and plausible 
perspectives on how the problem of strategic decision-making should be conceived. At the outset it 
must be realised that no strategic assumption can possibly contain them all. 
 
Minzberg et al (1998) identifies ten major schools of thought in the field of strategy (see table 3.1 
below). The relevant strategic school can only be determined with respect to the way the problem of 
strategic decision-making is initially framed in the research question posed in Chapter 1. It is in 
relation to this specific approach to the problem of strategic decision-making that considerations of 
relevance must be made. 
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Main focus: Name of school: View on strategy formulation: 
The Design School:  Strategy as conception 
The Planning School:  Strategy as formal process 
How strategies should be 
formulated: 
The Positioning School:  Strategy as analytical process 
The Entrepreneurial School: Strategy as visionary process 
The Cognitive School:  Strategy as mental process 
The Learning School:  Strategy as emergent process 
The Power School:  Strategy as negotiation 
The Cultural School:  Strategy as collective process 
How strategies are 
formulated: 
The Environmental School:  Strategy as reactive process 
Integrative approach: The Configuration School: Strategy as transformation 
Table 3.1: Strategic Schools of Thought. Adapted from Minzberg et al 1998:5-6 
 
The problem of strategic decision-making framed in the research question of this report must be 
characterised as prescriptive in that it is concerned with how strategies should be formulated rather 
than with how they necessarily do form33. It is the aim of this report to improve strategy formulation 
rather than to investigate how they are currently formulated. As illustrated in table 3.1, just three 
schools of thought adopt a prescriptive approach to strategy formulation: the design school, the 
planning school and the positioning school. 
 
The design school emerged in the 1960s and laid the groundwork for the other two schools through 
its view of strategy as a process of informal conception. The planning school developed in parallel in 
the 1960s with its view on strategy as a systematic process of formal design. This school gave birth 
to corporate planning with its reliance upon linear extrapolation along with its predict-and-control 
paradigm, which was briefly mentioned in Chapter 1. The planning school peaked in the 1970s and 
was somewhat displaced in the 1980s by the third prescriptive school: the positioning school34. The 
positioning school retains many of the traits of the two previous schools. It applies the basic 
approach of the design school to the external industry environment and builds on the concept 
strategy as design. The procedures of the positioning school are closely related to those of the 
planning school in that it sees strategy formulation as a systematic and formal process35. The 
breakthrough of the positioning school can be traced directly to Michael E. Porter’s Competitive 
Strategy published in 198036. This seminal work formed (and still forms) the basis of the positioning 
school. In this work, Porter introduces the Five Forces Framework, aimed at explaining the function 
of competitive environments through the concept of industry structure, which is determined by the 
strength of the five determining forces. 
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For the purposes of this report, I have chosen the positioning school as the theoretical basis for the 
initial assumptions about the variables and interconnections constituting competitive environments 
based on the following considerations: 
• The positioning school is prescriptive in that it proposes ways in which to formulate strategy 
rather then investigating how strategies currently form. 
• The positioning school sees strategy as plan intended and thus allows a forward-looking 
viewpoint. In this capacity, the positioning school is compatible with the notion of strategic 
foresight as a basis for design. 
• The positioning school is concerned with business strategy and thus with the question of how 
to compete and thus falls within the scope of the problem addressed by this report. 
• The focus of the positioning school is industry-wide seeking to explain the dynamics of 
multiple competitors rather than that of a single competitor. 
• The positioning school is directly and explicitly concerned with the competitive environment 
of industries through its concept of industry structure. 
 
As explained above, the ability of any strategic theory to describe the operation of the real world 
system is inherently limited. The Five Forces Framework of the positioning school is no exception. 
Following Minzberg et al (1998), several such limitations have been pointed out37: 
• The positioning school is biased toward the role of economic variables rather than political 
variables (the critique of the power school); 
• The positioning school is biased towards matured and established industries rather than 
newly forming industries (the critique of the entrepreneurial school); 
• The positioning school is biased towards the external environment rather than internal 
capabilities (the critique of the cultural school); 
• The positioning school emphasises formal and detached strategy formulation rather than 
personal learning and insight (the critique of the learning school); 
• The positioning school is focused on choosing between generic strategies rather than the 
formulation of unique strategies (the critique of the cognitive school). 
 
In many ways these limitations confirm the view of the differing schools of thought as equally 
legitimate, although inherently partial descriptions of the real world system. In the words of 
Minzberg: 
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“[…] the positioning school has not been wrong so much as narrow.38” 
 
In essence, the main critique raised against the positioning school is its inability to be the other 
schools. What sets the positioning school apart from other descriptions of the competitive 
environment, are the variables and the interconnections between them, which it considers relevant to 
strategic decision-making. These in turn determine the boundary and structure of the model with 
which the theory seeks to describe the real world system. 
 
As I will argue, the practice of strategic foresight in general, and the research question guiding the 
efforts of this report in particular, may nonetheless fit well into the ‘narrow’ focus of the positioning 
school. Firstly, competitors and industries alike are ruled by the economic imperative, stating that 
they must earn a rate of profit in excess of their cost of capital in order to survive. The bias of the 
positioning school toward economic rather than political variables may therefore be well warranted. 
Secondly, the wind turbine industry must, at this point in its development, be considered an 
established industry as opposed to a loose set of entrepreneurial ideas. Thirdly, identifying the forces, 
which are likely to affect this industry over the coming decade, necessarily entails adopting the 
broader view of the external industry environment, from where such forces are likely to origin, rather 
than that of a single competitor and its resources. And finally, accepting the notion - or perhaps ideal 
- of strategy formulation as a formal and detached process rather than an emotional and intuitive one, 
entails an optimistic - perhaps positivist - view of the ability of the strategist to ‘decode the game’ 
just well enough to give meaning to such concepts as conscious pre-emption and design. This is, in 
my view, both intrinsic to the value added through the practice of strategic foresight and the basis of 
any prospect of significant further advancement of this field inquiry beyond its current state. 
 
In choosing the positioning school as a basis for understanding the competitive environment of the 
wind turbine industry, it is nonetheless important to recognize that the inherent limitations, which 
inevitably apply to the positioning school, will also apply to its description of the competitive 
environment of the wind turbine industry. 
3.2 Making theoretical assumptions explicit 
Any theory is essentially composed of a number of variables (usually termed concepts) and a 
network of causalities between them (usually termed relationships), with which the theory proposes 
to adequately describe a part of the real world39. In this respect, the positioning school is no 
exception. 
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The five central concepts with which the positioning school seeks to describe the nature of 
competitive environments of industries are: (1) The threat of new entrants, (2) the intensity of rivalry 
among incumbents, (3) the pressure from substitute products, (4) the bargaining power of buyers and 
(5) the bargaining power of suppliers. The impact of these five forces constitutes the structure of the 
industry and thus the nature of its competitive environment40. From the viewpoint of corporate 
strategy, the collective strength of these five forces determines the ultimate profit potential measured 
as long-term return on invested capital in an industry, and thus the overall attractiveness of that 
industry41. From the viewpoint of business strategy, the five forces determine the ability of individual 
competitors to earn a profit above the industry average and thus the nature of competition in an 
industry. Whether a competitor earns a profit in excess its cost of capital is determined by its ability 
to create a defendable position against the five forces relative to its competitors42. The positioning 
school proposes an explanation for why some industries and competitors are more profitable than 
others and thereby which variables are to be considered strategically relevant. 
 
From this point of departure, the first step in making explicit the initial theoretical assumptions about 
competitive environments is the identification of the variables, with which the positioning school 
seeks to describe competitive environments, thus defining the boundary of the real world system 
proposed by the theory. Variables, in the form of concepts proposed by the positioning school, were 
first and foremost identified from Porter (1980)43, and supported by cooperating texts clarifying, and 
in some cases elaborating, the original theory. In addition to Porter (1980), these supporting texts 
included Porter (1985)44, Grant (1998)45, and Johnson & Scholes (2002)46. 
 
The identification of variables was centred on each of the central five forces and their determinants, 
as they were made explicit in the original theory and supporting texts. Variables were identified 
using an approach developed by Burchill and Fine (1997)47. Exemplifying this process, in the 
following quote, Porter (1980) describes the determinants of the intensity of rivalry between 
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competitors in an industry (one of the five forces constituting the competitive environment of 
industries): 
“Intense rivalry1 is the result of a number of interacting structural factors. […] Numerous or Equally balanced 
competitors2. […] Slow Industry Growth3. […] High Fixed or Storage Costs4. […] Lack of differentiation or 
Switching Costs5. […] Capacity Augmented in Large increments6. […] Diverse Competitors7. […] High Strategic 
Stakes8. […] High Exit Barriers9. […] Entry Barriers10. […].48” 
 
Porter (1985) and Johnson & Scholes (2002) support these original nine determinants of intense 
competition49, while Grant (1998) proposes six major determinants of the overall intensity of rivalry 
in an industry: 
 
“Six factors play an important role in determining the nature and intensity of competition between established firms: 
concentration1, the diversity of competitors2, product differentiation3, excess capacity4, exit barriers5, and cost 
conditions6.50” 
 
Grant (1998) further breaks down ‘cost conditions’ into ‘scale economies and the ratio of fixed to 
variable costs51’, elaborating upon the original nine determinants by adding three more. From these 
descriptions, a total of fifteen generic structural factors are proposed as determinants of intense 
rivalry among incumbent competitors (see table 3.2 below). 
 
Following Sterman (2000), these original terms were modified and in some cases separated for the 
purposes of clarity. Variable names suited for influence diagramming should be nouns or noun 
phrases and must have a clear sense of positive direction. Moreover, as described in the definition of 
variables in Chapter 2; variables are defined by their ability to attain more then one value. Hence, 
variable names must indicate the possibility of an increase or a decrease in its value52. This should 
not alter the meaning or logic of the words as they are used in the context of the original theory, but 
rather capture the implicit logic proposed by the theory. The modification of the variable names 
identified in the above example is shown in table 3.2 below: 
 
Structural determinants of intensity of rivalry 
Original concept name Modified concept name 
1 Intense rivalry 1 Intensity of rivalry 
2 Number of competitors 2 Numerous or equally balanced 
competitors 3 Equality of competitor size and resources 
3 Slow industry growth 4 Industry growth rate 
5 Storage costs 4 High fixed or storage costs 
6 Fixed to variable cost ratio 
5 Lack of differentiation or switching costs 7 Level of product differentiation 
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8 Buyers’ switching costs 
6 Capacity augmented in large increments 9 Size of capacity augments 
7 Diverse competitors 10 Diversity of competitors 
8 High strategic stakes 11 Strategic stakes in the industry 
9 High exit barriers 12 Height of exit barriers 
10 Entry barriers 13 Height of entry barriers 
11 Scale economies 14 Economies of scale in production 
12 Concentration 15 Industry concentration ratio 
13 Excess capacity 16 Excess production capacity 
Table 3.2: Modifying variable names 
 
The language of influence diagramming was used to illustrate the direction and the polarity of the 
interrelationships between the identified variables, again, in accordance with the original theoretical 
propositions. As an example, Porter (1980) describes the relationship between the industry growth 
rate and the intensity of rivalry between incumbent competitors in the following way: 
“Slow industry growth turns competition into a market share game for firms seeking expansion. Market share 
competition is a great deal more volatile than is the situation in which rapid industry growth insures that firms can 
improve by just keeping up with the industry, and where all their financial and managerial resources may be 
consumed by expanding with the industry.53” 
 
Following Burchill and Fine (1997), the direction and polarity of the relationship between the 
industry growth and the intensity of rivalry can thus be captured in the following expression: 
 
 
 
The direction of the relationship is thus made explicit through the direction of the arrow from the 
cause variable (industry growth rate) to the effect variable (intensity of rivalry). The assignment of 
either a positive or negative polarity indicated by a ‘+’ or a ‘–’ respectively illustrates the nature of 
the relationship between the two variables. Following Sterman (2000), the implications of polarities 
can be defined as follows54: 
• A positive causality between two variables means that if the cause increases, the effect 
increases above what it would otherwise have been, and if the cause decreases, the effect 
decreases below what it would otherwise have been (see figure 3.2a)   
• A negative causality between two variables means that of the cause increases, the effect 
decreases below what it would otherwise have been, and if the cause decreases, the effect 
increases above what it would otherwise have been (see figure 3.2b). 
It is important to note that the polarity of the causalities between the variables describe the structure 
of the system, not the behaviour of the variables. That is, they describe what would happen if there 
were a change. In addition, note the phrase ‘above (or below) what it otherwise would have been’ in 
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the definition of polarities. A change in a cause variable does not necessarily mean a net change in 
the effect variable; only a gross change because more than one causality might be influencing the 
effect variable. 
 
In this sense, the causal relationships between the identified variables should 
be seen as hypothetical propositions, meaning that they are theoretical 
statements that specify the connection between the variables informing us 
how variation in one concept is accounted for by variation in another, all 
else being equal55. This form of ceteris paribus experimentation is a central 
feature of causal diagramming. 
 
In addition, a central part of the language of influence diagramming is its ability to capture the logic 
of feedback loops. The concept of feedback was briefly touched upon in Chapter 2. Feedback occurs 
when an initial change in a variable is fed back to itself through one or more relay variables. When 
this occurs, the initial change can either be reinforced or balanced out through several iterations 
around the loop. If the initial change is amplified through the loop, it is called a ‘reinforcing’ or 
‘positive’ feedback loop. Conversely, if the initial change is cancelled out through the loop, it is 
called a ‘balancing’ or ‘negative’ feedback loop. Reinforcing feedback results in exponential growth 
(or decline) as the initial change is continuously reinforced while balancing feedback loops are goal 
seeking, striving to achieve a state of equilibrium as the initial change is decreased through the 
loop56. The existence of feedback loops does not imply that they work without restraints imposed by 
the system in which they operate. Exponential growth will eventually level off as limiting 
mechanisms compensate while states of equilibrium can be disturbed, causing overshoot and 
oscillation. In this respect it is important to see feedback loops as part of the system in which they 
operate. As described in Chapter 2, all dynamics arise from the interaction of these two kinds of 
loops57. Several feedback loops were identified in the relationships between the variables 
determining the five forces. The following proposition from Porter (1980) exemplifies a balancing 
feedback loop in which an initial change in the profitability of an industry is cancelled out through 
negative feedback: 
 
“The threat of entry into an industry can be eliminated if incumbent firms choose or are forced by competition to 
price below [the entry deterring price]. If they price above it, gains in terms of profitability may be short-lived 
because they will be dissipated by the cost of fighting or coexisting with new entrants.58” 
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Following Burchill and Fine (1997), in the language of influence diagramming, the logic of this 
statement can be captured in the expression illustrated in figure 3.3. This balancing loop captures the 
way in which industry profitability is kept in check by the threat of new entrants. An initial change in 
the profitability of the industry is balanced out 
through the loop and equilibrium is found. As it 
can be imagined, more explanatory variables 
could be added to this basic diagram, but in its 
current form, it captures the essential meaning 
of the theoretical proposition. Here, the 
balancing feedback loop is indicated by circular 
arrow surrounding a ‘B’. Conversely, reinforcing loops will be indicated by an ‘R’. This practice will 
be exercised throughout this report. 
Using Vensim PLE59, the relationships between the identified variables were made explicit through 
the development influence diagrams for each of the five forces, showing the relationships between 
these and their determining variables in accordance with the original theoretical propositions as 
described above. These are illustrated in figure 3.4 to 3.8 below. Note that nature and significance of 
the individual variables are elaborated in appendix A related to Chapter 4. 
Causal diagrams like the one above will be dotted throughout this thesis and forms the analytical 
backbone of my chain of reasoning. They are, however, presented as exhibits and do not need to (but 
can) be ‘read’ in any great detail to understand the message of this report. I have taken care to 
comment on the substance conveyed by these diagrams as they are presented. 
 
The first force: The threat of new entrants 
The entry barriers that a potential entrant must overcome to enter an industry along with the 
expected reaction of incumbent competitors determine the immediate threat level posed by would-be 
entrants. Porter (1980) sums up this balance through the concept of the entry deterring price - the 
price which just balances the potential rewards from entry with the expected cost entering the 
industry60. 
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As figure 3.4 illustrates61, a large number of variables determine the threat posed by potential new 
entrants into an industry. The variables determining the height of entry barriers are displayed on the 
left side of the diagram, while the determinants of the threat retaliation to entry posed by incumbents 
are displayed on the right. As it can be seen, the threat posed by new would-be entrants is determined 
by a careful balance between what potential entrants stand to gain from entering the industry and the 
barriers they must overcome to do so. In this way, the threat of new entrants imposes a limit upon the 
overall profitability of an industry. Should profitability rise to significantly higher level than that of 
comparable industries, the potential rewards for entry into the industry will surpass the cost of 
surmounting entry barriers and new competitors will flock to the industry, eventually competing 
down profitability. As described in the example above, this is illustrated by the balancing feedback 
loop between the threat of new entrants, the industry profitability and industry attractiveness. The 
reinforcing feedback loop illustrates how the overall profitability of the industry increases the 
resourcefulness of incumbents and that this in itself is a determinant of the threat of retaliation to 
entry they pose to new entrants. Naturally, potential entrants are not only drawn to industries, which 
are currently profitable, but also by expectations about future profitability. This is captured by the 
influence of the industry growth rate upon the overall attractiveness of the industry62. Notice also the 
how proprietarity of product technology and economies of scale are the main drivers behind the 
overall entry capital requirements faced by entrants63. Again, it is possible to imagine that many more 
explanatory variables could be included, but the above diagram adequately seems to capture the 
essence of the theoretical proposition. 
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The second force: The intensity of rivalry 
Intense rivalry between incumbent competitors significantly drives down industry profitability as 
competitors’ margins are spent on price wars, advertising and jockeying for position within the 
industry. As illustrated on figure 3.5, the intensity of rivalry in an industry is determined by the 
interplay of several variables increasing or decreasing the intensity of rivalry. 
 
As already described in the example of variable identification and clarification above, several 
variables were added from Grant (1998) to those originally proposed by Porter (1980). These 
included level of product differentiation, economies of scale, industry concentration ratio and excess 
production capacity64. Notice here the central role of economies of scale. In addition to being a direct 
determinant of the intensity of rivalry, this variable also influences the fixed to variable cost ratio and 
the industry concentration ratio65 along with the size of capacity augments, which in turn influences 
the excess production capacity. Notice also how the industry growth rate influences the excess 
production capacity and the size of capacity augments66. 
 
The third force: The competitiveness of substitutes 
Competitors in an industry are not only competing amongst themselves within the boundaries of a 
particular industry. In the broader scope, 
they are competing against any product 
capable of performing the same 
function, need or occupying the same 
product category as the product of that 
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particular industry. The competitiveness of substitutes thus limits the overall profitability of an 
industry in that margins earned by incumbents cannot exceed the point at which buyers’ preferences 
switch to a substitute67. Note that the original description in Porter (1980) was elaborated from 
Johnson & Scholes (2002), differentiating between three separate forms of substitution as illustrated 
in figure 3.6 above68. 
 
The fourth force: The power of buyers 
The power of buyers determines the ability of an industry’s customers to demand lower prices and/or 
better quality from incumbents along with their ability to play competitors against each other, 
squeezing the margins and lowering the overall profitability of the industry. As illustrated on figure 
3.7 below, the power of buyers is determined by their price sensitivity and their relative bargaining 
power. This structure is a partial elaboration of Porter (1980) from Grant (1998), suggesting these 
two mediating and explanatory variables through which Porter’s determinants influence the power of 
buyers. Likewise, Grant (1998) suggests the intensity of rivalry among incumbents as a further 
determinant of buyers’ price sensitivity69. 
 
Buyers exercise their power to secure a greater part of the value added through the industry’s 
production chain, thus increasing their own profitability. As the buyers’ profitability is in itself a 
determinant of their price sensitivity, this creates a balancing feedback loop as illustrated above. This 
loop illustrates that the added power which buyers obtain through exercising price sensitivity 
eventually increases their profitability, thus making them less price sensitive all else being equal. 
Conversely, the added power forgone by buyers not exercising price sensitivity will eventually 
decrease their profitability, again raising their emphasis on price all else being equal. The loop thus 
seeks equilibrium. Notice also the interconnections between the determinants of price sensitivity in 
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which the industry’s level of product differentiation influences buyers’ switching costs70 which in 
turn influence the intensity of rivalry among incumbents71. 
 
The fifth force: The power of suppliers 
Like buyers, powerful suppliers can exert their power over an industry through raising prices and/or 
lowering quality of their products to raise their own profitability. As illustrated in figure 3.8, the 
determinants of the power of suppliers are equivalent to those determining the power of buyers, 
capturing the fact that, to its suppliers, an industry is a buyer and that its power as a buyer represents 
one of the five forces in the suppliers’ industry. As above, I adopt the mediating variables industry’s 
price sensitivity and relative bargaining power of suppliers from Grant (1998). 
 
The balancing feedback loop between the power of suppliers, industry profitability and industry’s 
price sensitivity is the inverse of the balancing loop identified in the theoretical proposition about the 
power of buyers. The loop illustrates that the added power which industries obtain through exercising 
price sensitivity eventually increases its profitability, thus making it less price sensitive all else being 
equal. Conversely, the added power forgone by industries not exercising price sensitivity will 
eventually decrease their profitability, again raising their emphasis on price all else being equal. 
Notice that to its suppliers, an industry is in itself a buyer. For this reason the above diagram is 
consistent with the diagram developed for the power of buyers. 
3.3 From words to diagram 
Identifying and making explicit the theoretical assumptions of the positioning school through 
influence diagrams is essentially a process of translation of the proposed variables and their 
relationships expressed in words, into logically consistent influence diagrams. Like most theories 
outside of the natural sciences, the variables and causalities proposed by the positioning school are 
expressed in inexact words rather than exact mathematical equations. As we shall see, this is a 
                                                 
70
 See Porter 1980:9 
71
 See Porter 1980:19 
Figure 3.8: The determinants of the power of suppliers 
Relative concentration of suppliers
Industry's purchase relative to suppliers' sales
Importance of suppliers' input
to industry's product quality
Switching costs between suppliers
Differentiation of supplier groups' products
Suppliers' threat of forward integrationPower of suppliers
Industry profitability
Industry's price sensitivity Relative bargaining power of suppliers
Industry's threat of backward integration
Intensity of rivalry among suppliers
Industry's purchase relative to industry's costs
Industry's information
-
+
+
+
-
-
-
-
-
+
+
-
+
-
Availability of supplier substitutes
+
B
-
+
 31 
necessity arising from the inherent uncertainty and variability of the type of systems the theory seeks 
to describe. 
Describing the total number of variables and relationships constituting competitive environments is a 
daunting task. This number is astronomical and as described in Chapter 2, it is not possible to 
objectively define the boundary and structure of such systems. To adequately describe systems of 
such extreme levels of combinatorial complexity, any description must necessarily be limited to a 
sufficiently high level of abstraction. In this sense, the level of abstraction can be thought of as a 
continuum from the most concrete to the most abstract. The most concrete concepts refer to 
measurable variables of physical objects (height, age, weight, etc.), while highly abstract concepts 
refer to variables that we do not directly observe (bargaining power, intensity of rivalry, speed of 
technological development, etc.) 72. 
 
As a direct consequence of high levels of combinatorial complexity, the description of the system 
proposed by the positioning school is raised to a sufficiently high level of abstraction, in essence 
aggregating whole subsystems composed of variables at lower levels of abstraction. In doing so, the 
theory reduces combinatorial complexity to manageable levels, while remaining relevant to the 
problem under study – in this case, the profitability of industries and firms. The relevant variables 
and relationships proposed by the theory are therefore only able to describe the operation of the real 
world system at the level of abstraction considered relevant by the theory. Also, the high level of 
abstraction imposes serious limitations on the possibility of quantification. As it is clearly evident 
from the highly abstract variables illustrated in figures 3.4 to 3.8 above, these are aggregations of 
numerous variables at lower (and more measurable) levels of abstraction. In essence, there is no 
single ‘unit’ in which the values of highly abstract variables can be adequately expressed. For this 
reason, the positioning school is limited to expressing its variables and causalities in the inexact 
language of words rather than in the exact language of math. 
 
Following Goodman, influence diagramming, as it is used here, constitutes a language with its 
simple set of ‘syntactical’ rules in which complex issues can be expressed73. Influence diagramming 
is a language significantly more precise than that of English although significantly less precise than 
that of math. Influence diagramming of the theoretical variables and causalities thus holds the 
opportunity to use a more exact language than the one in which theory was originally expressed. By 
not aspiring to mathematical exactness, influence diagrams make a trade-off between being able to 
say ‘what’ at the cost of being able to say ‘how much’. Influence diagrams are thus able to indicate a 
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change in the form of an increase or decrease, but can only indicate the size of this change 
qualitatively. By making this trade-off, influence diagramming bypasses the problem of 
quantification of highly abstract variables faced by mathematical models, while retaining the ability 
to capture the logic of complex problems in an explicit and consistent manner. This ability will be 
further explored and exploited in subsequent chapters. 
3.4 From theory to empery 
The theoretical assumptions about competitive environments expressed in the influence diagrams 
developed above do not constitute a valid description of the competitive environment of the wind 
turbine industry. These theoretical propositions are generic in that the variables and relationships 
proposed are meant to describe how competitive environments should theoretically be constructed. 
They are not specific to the unique conditions of any specific competitive environment. It cannot 
therefore be assumed that variables and causalities proposed here are able to mimic the operation of 
the real world system even at the high level of abstraction proposed by the positioning school. This 
problem will be addressed in the following chapter where the theoretical assumptions developed here 
will be empirically grounded in the unique context of the competitive environment of the wind 
turbine industry. 
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- Part I - 
 
Chapter 4: The competitive environment of the wind turbine industry 
 
The competitive environment of any industry is unique. This is no less true about the wind turbine 
industry. A wind turbine is in itself a production technology, producing a highly politically charged 
and increasingly demanded product: electricity. Obviously, theoretical propositions based on a 
generic theory are unlikely to adequately describe the operation of the competitive environment of 
such an industry in the absence of empirical grounding. The aim of this chapter is to ground 
theoretical assumptions about the competitive environment developed in empirical measurements 
and analysis of the operation of the competitive environment specific to that of the wind turbine 
industry. 
4.1 The wind turbine industry 
The aim of the Five Forces Framework of the positioning school is to describe the structure of an 
industry, which determines the nature of competition and thus the competitive environment. A 
relevant initial question in this regard is whether the wind turbine industry can be considered a single 
industry. Significant attention has been given to this topic in strategic literature74. 
An industry can be defined as a group of firms supplying a market. Hence the key to defining 
industry boundaries is defining the relevant market. The boundaries of markets are in turn defined by 
substitutability of products, both on the demand and supply side. The same considerations apply to 
defining whether the wind turbine industry is a single global industry or a series of nationally distinct 
industries. The former is true if customers are willing and able to substitute turbines available on 
different national markets, and/or if manufacturers are willing and able to divert their output among 
different countries to take account of different margins75. 
 
When looking at the wind turbine industry, it is clear that this form of substitution is present in both 
supply and demand, and has been, for quite a number of years. On the demand side, wind turbine 
buyers are indeed capable of substituting turbines on different national markets, taking advantage of 
differing margins, whereas suppliers are equally capable of diverting their output among different 
markets76. This form of substitution must be considered paramount to the nature of the competitive 
environment of the industry. A global view of the competitive environment of the wind turbine 
industry does not entail the assumption that national and regional differences in supply and demand 
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does not exist. Rather, it assumes that the overall structure of competitive environment of the wind 
turbine industry as a whole is the aggregated product of such differences. Also, the global industry 
environment seems the appropriate perspective for strategic considerations over extended time 
horizons as long as a decade. Based on these considerations, the wind turbine industry will be 
considered as a single global market supplied by a single global industry. 
 
Adopting this perspective, the global wind turbine industry currently employs in the vicinity of 
120,000 people worldwide with an estimated annual turnover in excess of €12 billion. It is the fastest 
growing energy technology industry in the world with an annual growth rate of more than 30% over 
the past 8 years77. Continued growth over the coming five years is estimated at around 15-20% 
annually78. Germany and Spain are the key markets, accounting for 75% of the annual growth 
experienced by the industry up until today79. In excess of 85,000 turbines are installed worldwide, 
with a total capacity of around 58,000 MW, meeting the electricity demand of some 25 million 
households. As a whole, the industry is concentrated in Europe, where 70% of this capacity is 
installed80. 
 
On the supply side, the business models of wind turbine manufactures vary significantly. Depending 
on their level of integration, manufacturers are to varying degrees active across the following five 
vertical activities: component manufacturing, turbine assembly, project development, service and 
maintenance and to a lesser extent; project ownership and operation81. Although the term ‘wind 
turbine manufacturer’ includes highly diverse business models, in the context of this report, wind 
turbine manufacturers will be defined as firms supplying grid connectable wind turbines to the global 
wind turbine market. 
 
The competitors performing these activities are highly concentrated around five major suppliers with 
a total market share of some 85-95%. The major players82 are: Vestas (DK), Gamesa (ES), Enercon 
(GE), GE Wind (US) and Siemens (GE/DK)83. At year-end 2004, these five suppliers held a total 
market share of 85.5%84. The industry is thus highly oligopolistic85. In addition to these major 
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internationalised and internationalising players, a host of smaller manufacturers exist; none with a 
market share in excess of 4%. The smaller manufacturers are highly dependent upon single national 
markets where several hold prominent positions86. 
4.2 Grounding theoretical propositions 
In grounding the theoretical propositions developed in the previous chapter, I have drawn extensively 
upon empirical studies and other industry literature covering analysis, empirical measurements, 
observations and assessments about the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry. The 
variables and interconnections suggested by the theoretical propositions developed in the previous 
chapter formed the framework guiding a desk study of existing industry literature87. Through the 
proposed variables and their relationships, the theoretical propositions suggest empirical information, 
which is initially relevant to understanding competitive environments as described in Appendix A. 
The process of grounding the theoretical assumptions will focus on achieving the following two 
principal tasks: 
 
1. Excluding variables and relationships suggested by the positioning school, which are non-
existent in the unique context of the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry. 
2. Including relevant variables and relationships not suggested by the positioning school, which 
are unique in the context of the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry. 
 
In this sense, the empirical grounding of the theoretical propositions is a significantly less rigorous 
process than empirically testing the proposed causalities through linear regression analysis and 
establishing mathematical relationship coefficients. As described in Chapter 3, the high level of 
combinatorial complexity imposes serious limits upon the possibility of such quantification. 
Grounding is thus a process of empirically eliminating, validating and modifying the theoretical 
propositions to suit the specific conditions of the wind turbine industry. The grounded propositions 
developed in this chapter can thus be considered empirically informed but not empirically tested. 
In the following, I will consider each of the five structural forces and their determining variables in 
terms of their influence upon the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry. The 
systematic investigation of each variable can be found in appendix A. 
                                                 
86
 BTM 2005a:16-19 
87
 The desk study initially identified a ‘core body’ of industry literature by a number of consultants and observers of 
the industry such as BTM Consult, Danske Equities, Morgan Stanley and Carnegie Securities Research along with 
The International Energy Agency. Using these sources, the identified variables were assessed in terms of their 
relevance and effect upon the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry. The variables not addressed in 
the core literature formed the basis of lines of enquiry into more specialised literature and empirical studies such as 
Takeuchi and Ancona & McVeigh, addressing the relevance and effect of more specific variables proposed in 
Chapter 3. 
 36 
4.3 The first force: The threat of new entrants 
From the investigation of the variables determining the height of entry barriers, it is clear that the 
entry barriers that a potential entrant must overcome to enter the wind turbine industry are extremely 
high. Economies of scale force potential entrants to enter in force, considerably increasing the height 
of entry barriers, capital requirements and financial risks88. Opportunities for entry are further limited 
by proprietary of product technology and both tangible and intangible switching costs, linking buyers 
of wind turbines to incumbent manufacturers. In addition, the desk study revealed that accessibility 
of inputs is a significant entry barrier around incumbents, as reliable component manufacturers with 
sufficient capacity are scarce89. 
These factors make buying an existing manufacturer the most plausible route of entry into the wind 
turbine industry, offering the opportunity to gain direct access to technology and a proven track 
record of previous successful wind turbine projects. This mode of entry is nonetheless a risky 
venture. Warranty provisions issued by incumbents extend as far as 10-12 years into the future. The 
extent to which an incumbent is bound by such obligations - along with their ability to meet them - is 
largely unknown to a potential buyer of an incumbent manufacturer. Warranties could therefore lead 
to substantial compensation claims and thus present an unknown level of financial risk to potential 
entrants90. 
In addition, competitors in the wind turbine industry must generally be considered highly resourceful 
and pose a credible threat of forceful retaliation. Major manufacturers have significant long-term 
strategic stakes this high-growth and high-expectation industry. This would indicate that incumbents 
pose a highly credible threat of retaliation to potential entrants. However, in light of the current and 
expected growth rate, which has turned part of the global wind turbine market into a seller’s 
market91, the impact of a new competitor entering the industry through buying an incumbent may not 
warrant such costly retaliation - at least not while the industry growth rate remains sufficiently high. 
A further factor discouraging entry into several national markets is various forms of protectionism, 
such as domestic manufacturing content requirements, preferential tax breaks, exclusive or 
preferential access to national R&D funds, favourable treatment by planning authorities and political 
contacts92. 
 
Although the entry barriers to the wind turbine industry are significant, recent history shows that they 
are not high enough to eliminate the threat from potential new entrants. The central theme of entry 
into the wind turbine industry has thus far been large diversified utility companies integrating 
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backwards into wind turbine manufacturing, bringing with them significant financial and 
technological resources. The entry of General Electric through the acquisition of Enron Wind Corp in 
2002, and the entry of Siemens through the acquisition of Bonus Energy in 2004 are recent 
examples93. BTM Consult foresees a continuation of this pattern over the coming years94. It is 
unclear whether outsiders will purchase more incumbents in the near future, but stock market 
speculation about the potential takeover of Vestas Wind Systems by Royal Dutch/Shell reappeared as 
late as February of this year (2006). With Vestas being the only major single-business manufacturer 
in the industry, this company takes up a special position with regard to outside purchase. Although 
analysts question the validity of these rumours, speculation remains95. In spite of significant entry 
barriers, recent examples of successful entry into the industry exist, and as the industry consolidates 
and the technology matures, the threat of entry into the industry remains substantial96. 
Based on the investigation of the determining variables, the theoretical assumptions about the threat 
of entry developed in the previous chapter are modified as shown in figure 4.2 below: 
 
In accordance with the investigation of the significance of the individual variables described in 
appendix A, the following changes were made to the theoretical propositions developed in the 
previous chapter. Firstly the variable Accessibility of distribution channels was eliminated as a 
determinant of the height of entry barriers. As described in appendix A, project developers are the 
only occasional intermediaries between wind manufacturers and the final owners of wind projects, 
and in this role, they are not markedly different from other large buyers of wind projects. Secondly, 
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the variable Extent of warranty provisions was included as a significant determinant of the height of 
entry barriers as warranty provisions significantly raises financial risk of entry as described in 
appendix A. Finally, a relationship was added between Accessibility of inputs and Importance of 
location, as transport costs and the increasing necessity of close development partnerships between 
wind turbine manufacturers have become increasingly significant. 
4.4 The second force: The intensity of rivalry 
It is striking how many variables determining the intensity of rivalry among incumbent 
manufacturers remain latent because of high industry growth. Annual growth rates in excess of 30% 
over the past eight years97 and expected growth rates of 15-20% over the coming five years98 have 
significantly limited the intensity of rivalry in several major markets. Among the latent sources of 
intense rivalry are potentially high exit barriers, high fixed to variable cost ratios, large capacity 
augments, high storage costs along with the potential for significant excess production capacity. 
These are all significant triggers of intense competition in low-growth industries, as described in 
appendix A. In addition, the intensity of rivalry among manufacturers is further kept in check by a 
limited number of highly concentrated competitors protected by substantial entry barriers described 
above. 
 
In spite of high industry growth, current levels of rivalry is spurred by the absence of a clear market 
leader to direct competition and the relative equality in terms of size and resources of the largest 
manufacturers - as least in terms of resources dedicated to wind turbine manufacturing99. Because of 
favourable market conditions, the intensity of rivalry in the wind turbine industry generally remains 
moderate. However, the economic structure of the industry would indicate that should the industry 
growth rate decline; the intensity of rivalry would be fierce as many of the latent variables are likely 
to step into force. 
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Based on the investigation of the determining variables, the theoretical assumptions about the threat 
of entry are thus modified as shown in figure 4.2 below: 
 
As illustrated on figure 4.2 above, empirical evidence could be found supporting the relevance of 
most of the determinants of intense rivalry suggested by the positioning school. With the exception 
of the effect of Diversity of competitors upon the intensity of rivalry between incumbents for which 
no empirical evidence could be found, the investigation of the determinants showed that the 
theoretical proposition developed in the previous chapter seems to adequately describe the 
determinants of intense rivalry among incumbent wind turbine manufacturers. 
4.5 The third force: The competitiveness of substitutes 
Wind technology is only one amongst a wide range of renewable energy technologies, which in turn 
is part of a still wider range of energy technologies, constituting the total energy technology stock 
available to energy suppliers. In principal, any energy technology capable of producing electricity is 
a potential substitute for wind energy. The competitive environment of the wind turbine industry is 
thus subject to various levels of need substitution from three major technology groups: fossil fuels, 
nuclear power and other renewables. The relative competitiveness of any of these substitute 
technologies is subject to significant regional and periodic variation, depending on such factors as 
local resource availability, fuel prices, wind conditions, subsidies, base load flexibility etc. 
 
Fossil fuels currently hold a dominant position with a share of the global electricity market of 67%. 
Of this share, coal is the largest contributor with an estimated market share of 39%, while gas and oil 
hold shares of 21% and 7% respectively. Looking ahead, the IEA estimates that coal and gas will 
take the major share of new capacity installations until 2030; taking up 39% and 28% respectively, 
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while the share of oil in new capacity installations is expected to be some 8%100. The competitiveness 
of fossil fuels relative to wind energy is determined by the two major demand drivers; climate 
concern and security of supply. Many energy markets are highly motivated by environmental 
incentives. Historically, as well as today, government subsidies awarded for environmental 
performance plays a major role in substituting conventional energy technology with renewables101. 
The so-called external cost of power generation has become a key competitive parameter in several 
markets, seriously disadvantaging coal, oil and to a lesser extent natural gas102. The closest 
competitors to wind in terms of environmental performance are hydropower, nuclear and biomass, 
and to a lesser extent; solar and tidal/wave power, as these technologies are either CO2-neutral or 
emit no CO2 during operation103. On other environment parameters, (landscape preservation, waste 
disposal and particle emissions respectively), these substitutes are significantly disadvantaged. Also, 
from the first oil crisis in the early 70s till today, security of supply has become a major issue for 
conventional substitutes to wind such as natural gas and oil, benefiting role of energy technologies 
with stable or no fuel supply demands104. Due to recent increases in gas prices, the generation costs 
of wind is now generally lower than that of gas while comparable to the cost of coal105. 
 
The second major technology group is nuclear power which currently holds a share of the global 
electricity market of some 17%. A share that IEA (2004) expects to decrease significantly by 2030 to 
around 9%. Nuclear power is expected to take up only 3% of new capacity additions over this 
period106. Although benefiting from climate concerns, nuclear power is thus only a minor substitute 
for wind. In addition, nuclear power supplies base-load generation107, a role not suited intermittent 
power sources. The generation cost of wind energy is generally significantly lower than that of 
nuclear power108. 
 
Other renewable energy sources constitute the third technology group. Renewable energy currently 
holds a share of the global electricity market of 18%, which is expected to increase by 2030 to about 
19%. This comparatively small increase should be seen in the light of an average annual increase in 
total electricity demand of some 2.5% over the period. Currently, hydropower is the most 
competitive renewable energy technology with a share of the world renewable electricity market of 
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89%, with biomass as a distant second, holding a share of 7%. Wind takes up a shared third place 
along with geothermal, both with a share of 2%. According to IEA (2004) this picture is expected to 
change significantly by 2030. Hydropower will decline by as much as 20 percentage points to 69%, 
mainly at the expense of wind and biomass increasing to 15% and 10% respectively. Tidal/wave 
energy and solar power are expected to rise from currently insignificant shares to about 1% and 2% 
respectively. In terms of cost developments of renewable energy, the capital and total cost of both 
on- and offshore wind power is expected to decline significantly along with geothermal and biomass, 
which will remain largely cost-competitive with wind energy. Conversely, the cost hydropower is 
expected to increase significantly due to lack of suitable sites109. 
 
Although wind energy is generally cost-competitive with its major substitutes, wind technology 
suffers from a number of unique disadvantages, generally making the technology dependent upon 
favourable energy planning regimes. Wind is an intermittent power source and cannot therefore 
substitute base-load generation technologies. Wind capacity requires flexible backup generation 
capacity for periods of insufficient wind110. In addition, wind turbines are often located in the 
periphery of the energy system and must therefore be connected to the grid at low-voltage levels. 
This adds to the complexity of the energy system, which in turn increases installation costs where 
weak grids must be reinforced111. This requires flexible energy systems and equally flexible energy 
planning112. Also, wind turbines are highly visible and their operation entails considerable noise 
emissions. Due to minimum wind-speed requirements, turbines are often placed rural areas, and thus 
frequently conflict with natural conservation and recreational interests. A major issue for the industry 
is increasingly well-organised local opposition to wind projects113. Several such cases have illustrated 
how dissatisfaction with the placement of onshore wind projects has led to increasingly restrictive 
planning requirements114. 
 
In terms of future competitiveness, the rate at which new products emerge to keep potential need 
substitutes at bay is a significant factor determining the overall competitiveness of wind power 
relative to potential substitutes. However, the rate of new product discovery also increases product-
by product substitution. This form of substitution determines the rate at which existing turbines are 
made obsolete by more cost-effective models. This has a tendency to make buyers more hesitant to 
invest in current models, in the expectation of imminent improvements. In the context of the wind 
                                                 
109
 IEA 2004:192-233 
110
 IEA 2004:235 
111
 Carnegie Securities Research 2005:6 
112
 IEA 2004:235 
113
 See Morgan Stanley 2006 
114
 See BWEA 2006 
 42 
turbine industry, this phenomenon was demonstrated in the mid 80s where rapid up scaling caused 
turbine designs to become obsolete at an unprofitable rate115. This form of substitution is the essence 
of an industrial technology race. Throughout the history of the wind turbine industry, product-by-
product substitution has been synonymous with up scaling, but advances in offshore technology and 
specialised low wind-speed turbines along with new composite materials have likewise become 
important sources of new product discovery116. Neij et al (2003) found that eight successive 
generations (in terms of size) of wind turbines emerged in the period 1980-2000, equalling an 
average time interval of 2.5 years between generations117. Given these figures, the rate of new 
product discovery in the wind turbine industry is a significant factor lowering the competitiveness of 
substitutes - but also the profitability of wind turbine manufacturers. 
 
When investigating the determining variables described in appendix A, it is clear that the 
competitiveness of substitutes significantly influences the competitive environment of the wind 
turbine industry in defining the overall limit to its profitability. In accordance with the investigation 
of the significance of the individual variables, 12 specific variables were identified in addition to 
those suggested in the theoretical proposition developed in Chapter 3. The proposed relationships 
between these variables and the competitiveness of substitutes are illustrated in figure 4.3 below: 
 
As illustrated on figure 4.3 above, significant modifications has been made to the theoretical 
proposition developed in the previous chapter. The major part of these modifications is related to the 
fact that a wind turbine is in itself a production technology. The determinants of Need substitution 
are illustrated on the left side of the diagram, dividing the major substitutes to wind power into three 
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broad categories: Fossil fuels, Nuclear power and Other renewables. The competitiveness of wind 
power relative to these substitutes is in turn determined by the major demand drivers; Security of 
supply and Climate concern, which in turn influences Government subsidies for renewable energy. It 
is important to note that not all types of government subsidies lead to increased competitiveness of 
new technologies as has, to some extent, been the case with fixed feed-in tariffs118. These tariffs have 
lead to considerable capacity instalments, but have not necessarily created an incentive to lessen the 
dependency of the technology upon the subsidy. Other subsidies such as green certificate markets119 
or competitive bidding120 have had greater success in creating incentives for increased technological 
competitiveness, but often at the cost of installed capacity. This goes to say that the causality 
between government subsidies for wind power and the competitiveness of wind power proposed in 
figure 4.3 may be true only in a strictly economic sense and may not lead to lasting technological 
competitiveness. Notice the dual role of industry R&D expenditure upon both need- and product-by-
product substitution. The reinforcing feedback loop illustrates the dynamics of technological rivalry 
(or technology race) between manufacturers - as existing turbines are made obsolete by new designs 
introduced by competitors. Increased R&D expenditure thus becomes a necessary competitive 
parameter, which again increases product-by-product substitution. Notice also the relationship 
between climate concern and the competitiveness of nuclear power further elaborated in appendix A. 
As described in section 3 in appendix A, no empirical evidence could be found supporting the 
relevance of Generic substitution to the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry. This 
variable was thus eliminated as a determinant of competitiveness of substitutes. 
4.6 The fourth force: The bargaining power of buyers 
Historically, the market for wind turbines has been divided into four major buyer segments:  
Individually owned turbines such as single turbines supplying individual farms or businesses; 
turbines held by local investor cooperatives, larger wind farms owned by utility companies, and 
finally developers, functioning as an intermediary between manufacturers and utility companies. The 
importance and market share of each of these four segments has varied periodically and from country 
to country; often in response to changing subsidies and tax breaks. With the increasing globalisation 
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of the industry and still larger wind projects, the two latter segments have by far become the most 
significant121. 
 
Modern wind turbine projects are increasingly seen by buyers as large, long-term investments in new 
generating capacity, increasingly comparable to conventional power plants. As the size of both 
individual turbines and entire wind projects has increased, so has the size of orders relative to both 
manufacturers’ sales and buyers’ costs. The individual order has become more important to both 
manufacturers and buyers. This has increased buyers’ price sensitivity. Although price per MW 
installed is a central competitive parameter; reliability, and thus the quality of the turbines are equally 
important to the operational economy of wind turbine projects. As the size of wind projects have 
increased, manufacturers have been forced to share the risk of serial faults in wind projects through 
extended warranty provisions. This has become an increasingly important part of winning large 
orders122 and wind turbine manufacturers are thus able to differentiate themselves through 
demonstrated performance and turbine reliability123. This opens the opportunity of raising switching 
costs by rewarding repeat buyers through expanding existing service contracts and warranties on 
favourable terms. 
 
As buyers of wind project have become increasingly consolidated, professional and informed, they 
have been able to exert pressure on the profitability of wind turbine manufacturers. The ongoing 
concentration of the wind turbine industry has been matched by rapid concentration among the 
buyers of wind turbines. As described above, large utility companies and developers have by far 
become the most important buyers of wind projects, taking over from smaller private buyers and 
local investor groups. Recent years have likewise seen rapid consolidation among major developers. 
These developments have significantly increased the bargaining power of buyers, leading to 
increased demands on manufacturers to co-invest, co-manage and even operate large projects as a 
requirement to win large orders124. Also, these increasingly sophisticated buyers are better able to 
play manufacturers against each other to lower prices and raise quality through competitive bidding 
for projects125. 
 
The highly competitive substitutes for wind energy described above are a further factor increasing 
buyers’ bargaining power. Any technology capable of generating electricity is a potential substitute 
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for wind power, and utility companied can choose from among a wide technology stock when 
expanding generating capacity. Although additional competitive parameters such as environmental 
performance, security of supply and government substitutes have favoured wind power in some 
markets, the competitiveness of substitutes is a significant factor increasing buyers’ bargaining 
power. 
 
Through the investigation of the determining variables, it is clear that powerful buyers are a 
significant factor shaping the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry. In accordance 
with the investigation of the significance of the individual variables described in appendix A, the 
following changes were made to the theoretical propositions developed in Chapter 3: 
 
As illustrated on figure 4.4 above, empirical evidence could be found supporting the relevance of all 
of the determinants suggested by the theoretical proposition developed in the previous chapter. In 
addition to the variables proposed by the positioning school, the variable Wind turbine demand was 
identified as a significant determinant of the relative bargaining power of buyers. 
4.7 The fifth force: The bargaining power of suppliers 
Today, a wide range of subcontractors is available to the wind turbine industry126. In principle it is 
possible to assemble a turbine entirely from prefabricated components127. In spite of this, all the 
major wind turbine manufacturers are to some extent involved in component manufacturing. None of 
them are, however, producing all the needed components in-house. Wind turbine manufacturers have 
thus struck a balance between being in the business of component manufacturing and wind turbine 
assembly. As described above, the business models of wind turbine manufacturers are highly diverse. 
The degree to which wind turbine manufacturers are vertically integrated varies significantly, as does 
the cost of procuring outsourced components incurred by the individual manufacturer. The most 
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vertically integrated manufacturers are Gamesa, Siemens128 and Enercon129 while GE and Vestas 
have adopted a lighter model130.  
The most expensive components of a wind turbine are the rotor and the nacelle and machinery, 
composing 20-23% and 25% respectively of the total cost of a turbine. Gearbox and drive train 
composes 10-15%, while generator systems and towers compose around 5-15% and 10-15% 
respectively131. Generally, blades, nacelles and control systems are the most specialised and vital 
components in terms of turbine efficiency. These are usually manufactured in-house, whereas 
generators, gearboxes and towers are more often outsourced to suppliers132. 
Although wind turbine manufacturers are generally in a good bargaining position relative to 
component suppliers, they are notoriously sensitive to the high quality and timely delivery of key 
components. Serial faults in components for larger wind projects are equally serious as wind turbine 
manufacturers often bear the financial liability for the quality of turbines through warranty 
provisions133. Delays in component delivery are likewise extremely costly to wind turbine projects134. 
In addition, high industry growth and the relative ‘newness’ of the industry have made component 
shortages commonplace in the industry as a bottleneck high industry growth135. For these reasons, 
component suppliers are often able link a certain manufacturer to them through raising switching 
costs.  If a manufacturer wishes to replace a supplier, this often requires lengthy certification to 
qualify the new supplier’s input along with extensive testing to ensure reliability and compatibility of 
new components. Hence, phasing in a new component is a time-consuming and expensive process 
entailing significant switching costs. Also, due to manufacturers’ differing technical solutions and 
patent rights, components are increasingly customised to the individual manufacturer rather than 
standardised. This further adds to the cost and complexity of switching between suppliers. In 
addition, the physical location of component suppliers near major markets has become an issue. As 
the size of components have grown larger, minimising transport costs have become increasingly 
important and strained the availability of suppliers with sufficient capacity near major markets. Also, 
components such as generators, blades, control systems, towers etc. cannot be directly substituted by 
alternatives. Only Enercon has successfully substituted gearboxes, developing a product range of 
gearless turbines based on its ring generator technology136. In addition to significant switching costs, 
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substantial technological and financial entry barriers around component industries - especially 
gearboxes, generators, blades and control systems - further limit rivalry between component 
supplies137. 
 
In spite of the opportunities for suppliers to raise such switching costs, the relative bargaining power 
of buyers most be considered comparatively weak. This is especially due to the high relative 
concentration of the wind turbine industry, making component manufacturers dependent on only a 
few large customers. Even small changes in a major manufacturer’s sourcing strategy can have 
serious implications for a supplier’s revenue. The increasing size of both turbines and wind projects 
has amplified this dependency. As the size of single orders has increased relative to both suppliers’ 
sales and manufacturers’ costs, the importance of the individual order from a manufacturer has been 
emphasised138. 
Exploiting this advantage, manufacturers are often disloyal to individual suppliers and are reluctant 
to rely too heavily upon any single component manufacturer, favouring various types of hybrid 
sourcing139. Several wind turbine manufacturers are themselves highly active in many areas of 
component manufacturing. This is especially true for diversified manufacturers such as Gamesa, 
Siemens and General Electric, giving these companies hands-on experience with the production of a 
wider range of energy technologies and/or components. Manufacturers are generally least active in 
the production of generators and gearboxes, which are highly complicated to make. In spite of this, 
GE Wind, and Gamesa both have in-house production of generators140 and Vestas recently integrated 
backwards into generator manufacturing in China to ensure accessibility and quality of inputs141.  
The varying degree of vertical integration among turbine manufacturers would likewise suggest that 
wind turbine manufacturers pose a highly credible threat of backward integration into several areas 
of component manufacturing. Such a threat decreases the bargaining power of suppliers in that they 
have to meet the deterring price – the price that just balances out manufacturers’ potential rewards of 
entry142. Generally, technological and financial entry barriers into component manufacturing for wind 
turbines are significant143, but this is only relative to the deterring price, as manufacturers perceive it. 
 
As previously described, the primary threat of new entrants into the wind turbine industry has been 
posed by buyers integrating backwards into wind turbine manufacturing. However, FKI plc., a 
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producer of turbo generators, recently took over the German wind turbine manufacturer Dewind, 
demonstrating that suppliers too are able to pose a credible threat of forward integration144. However, 
because of the significant entry barriers protecting incumbent wind turbine manufacturers, few 
component suppliers pose any credible threat of forward integration and wind turbine manufacturers 
remain highly informed and sophisticated buyers of components. 
 
When looking at the determining variables, it is clear that the power of suppliers is not a major factor 
decreasing the profitability of wind turbine manufacturers. Danske Equities (2003) considers 
component manufacturing the least attractive business model related to the wind turbine industry, 
only protected by substantial entry barriers145. In accordance with the investigation of the 
significance of the individual variables described in appendix A, the following changes were made to 
the theoretical propositions in figure 3.8, Chapter 3: 
 
As illustrated on figure 4.5 above, two major modifications were made to the theoretical proposition 
developed in the previous chapter. The variable Availability of supplier substitutes was excluded as 
no empirical evidence could be found supporting its relevance, while the variable Accessibility of 
inputs was included as a determinant of the relative bargaining power of suppliers. 
4.8 The structure of the wind turbine industry 
Based on the investigation of the determining variables described in appendix A, it is clear that 
powerful, well-informed and price sensitive buyers along with a wide range of highly competitive 
substitute technologies are the main competitive forces currently influencing the competitive 
environment of the wind turbine industry. In spite of the high technical and financial entry barriers 
protecting incumbent manufacturers, the threat of new entrants remains credible although not at a 
level at which the overall industry profitability is significantly decreased. Also, the intensity of 
rivalry among manufacturers is kept moderate by high industry growth rates offsetting many of the 
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potential sources of competitive conflict currently present in the economic structure of the industry. 
Due to high industry growth rates and the relative ‘newness’ of the industry, accessibility of 
components remains a problem for wind turbine manufacturers. In spite of this, the bargaining power 
of suppliers is kept moderate, as the wind turbine industry is highly concentrated around just a few 
major manufacturers, posing a highly credible threat of backward integration into broad areas of 
component manufacturing. 
 
From the viewpoint of corporate strategy, powerful buyers and highly competitive substitute 
technologies are the main factors driving down the profit potential of the wind turbine industry. 
Likewise, from the viewpoint of business strategy, it is the ability of the individual manufacturer to 
create a defendable position against these major forces, which determines its ability to earn a profit in 
excess of its cost of capital relative to the industry average. 
In addition to identifying a number of unique variables, the 
investigation of the five structural forces and their 
determinants revealed, that not all variables and 
relationships proposed by the positioning school apply 
equally well to the specific competitive environment of the 
wind turbine industry. The empirical grounding of the 
theoretical propositions resulted in the elimination of 4 
variables, while 16 variables, specific to the competitive 
environment of the wind turbine industry, were identified 
and added to the original propositions. These are 
summarised in Table 4.1. Through these ex- and inclusions, 
the theoretical propositions have been grounded in a 
number of additional assumptions from empirical 
measurements and analysis of the operation of the 
competitive environment specific to that of the wind turbine 
industry. 
 
In this chapter each of the five structural forces was considered in isolation from one another. 
However, this is clearly not a true representation of the competitive environment of the wind turbine 
industry, in which a change in one structural force or its determinants may affect other structural 
forces and thus the competitive environment as a whole. Taking this into consideration, the following 
chapter will be concerned with the interconnectedness of five structural forces and the way these 
operate in concert as part of the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry. 
Table 4.1: Summary of modifications 
Included variables 
Extent of warranty provisions 
Accessibility of inputs 
Importance of location 
Competitiveness of fossil fuels 
Competitiveness of nuclear power 
Competitiveness of other renewables 
Competitiveness of wind power 
Security of supply 
Climate concern 
Government subsidies 
Government subsidies for renewable power 
Government subsidies 
Industry R&D expenditure 
Wind turbine demand 
Energy system restrictions 
Regional planning restrictions 
Excluded variables 
Accessibility of distribution channels 
Diversity of competitors 
Generic substitution 
Availability of supplier substitutes 
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- Part I - 
 
Chapter 5: Building an integrated conceptual model 
The five empirically grounded propositions about the competitive environment of the wind turbine 
industry developed in the previous chapter are clearly not operating in isolation from one another. A 
change in one structural force or its determinants could potentially trickle through the system, 
causing one or more structural forces to change, thus affecting the competitive environment as a 
whole. Taking this into consideration, this chapter will be concerned with systematically identifying 
and making explicit the interconnections between the five propositions. Consequently, the five 
grounded propositions will be assembled into a single integrated strategic assumption about the 
variables and interconnections constituting the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry 
at the chosen level of abstraction. 
5.1 The interconnectedness of the structural forces 
The first clue to the interrelationships between the five structural forces lies in the fact that several of 
the identified variables appear more than once across the five propositions. The variables displayed 
in box 5.1 appear in more than one of the propositions 
developed in the previous chapter. On the basis of 
these nine variables, the first interrelationships 
between the five structural forces can be 
unambiguously drawn, by simply eliminating 
duplicate variables. These, however, are only the most 
obvious interrelationships between the structural 
forces and their determinants. To systematically take 
into consideration the full number of potential interrelationships between the structural forces and 
their determinants, it is necessary to consider the totality146 of possible relationships between the 69 
identified variables. Following Miles et al (2003), this was achieved by representing the five 
influence diagrams in the form of a single direct influence matrix (DIM) in which all potential 
interrelationships could be systematically explored. See figure 5.1 below. 
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Box 5.1: Variables appearing more than once: 
 
1. Industry profitability 
2. Height of entry barriers 
3. Strategic stakes in the industry 
4. Buyers’ switching costs 
5. Level of product differentiation 
6. Industry growth rate 
7. Economies of scale in production 
8. Intensity of rivalry 
9. Accessibility of inputs 
 
D 
B 
C 
A 
This simple 
system composed 
of four variables 
and eight 
causalities can be 
represented in the 
form of direct 
influence matrix. 
     Direct Influence Matrix 
 A B C D Tot. I 
A  1 1 1 3 
B 0  1 0 1 
C 1 0  1 2 
D 0 1 1  2 
Tot. D 1 2 3 2 8 
 Figure 5.1: Example of the construction of a direct influence matrix. Adapted from Miles et al (2003:52). 
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As it is illustrated in figure 5.1 above, direct influence matrices are representations of causalities 
between variables composed of 1s and 0s. In this context, DIMs are identical to the language of 
influence diagramming, using the same syntactical rules described in Chapter 3, although in a 
different format. A one (1) indicates that a causal relationship is proposed between a pair of 
variables, while a zero (0) indicates that no causal relationship is proposed. 
The sum of a row represents the total direct influence that a specific variable exerts over the system 
(i.e. number ‘3’ at the end of the first row in figure 5 indicates that variable A has three direct causal 
influences over the system). The evolution of highly influential variables will have the greatest 
impact upon the system. On the other hand, the sum of a column represents the total direct 
dependency that a specific variable has on the system (i.e. number one at the bottom of the first 
column indicates that there is one causal relationship through which the system can influence 
variable A). Dependent variables are those that are most sensitive to the evolution of the system147. I 
will return to the significance of the influentiality and dependency of individual variables later in this 
chapter. 
 
The 69 variables contained in the five propositions were thus paired in the DIM and the 107 
causalities already identified in Chapter 4 were plotted into the matrix. Pairing the identified 
variables in this manner yields 4,585 potential causalities in the matrix structure in addition to those 
already identified in the previous chapter (4585 = (69 x 69) - 69 - 107)148. Following Godet (1994), 
the following questions were posed and answered for each blank square149: 
1. Does variable i influence variable j, or is this relationship the other way round, i.e. j to i? 
2. Does i influence j, or does some co-linearity exist, i.e. a third variable k influences both i and 
j? 
3. Is the relationship between i and j direct, or does it operate through another listed variable? 
 
Resulting from this procedure an initial list of 21 potential causalities was identified between the five 
propositions of which the following 17 could be empirically, theoretically or logically substantiated. 
Although rigorous and exhaustive, Godet’s method is obviously not exact. It is, however, explicit and 
leaves a clear audit trail, bringing underlying assumptions to light. The proposed relationships shown 
in table 5.1 are discussed in appendix B. 
Cause variable Polarity Effect variable 
Height of exit barriers + Strategic stakes in the industry 
Industry concentration ratio - Relative concentration of buyers 
Industry concentration ratio - Relative concentration of suppliers 
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Relative bargaining power of buyers + Extent of warranty provisions 
Industry growth rate - Accessibility of inputs 
Extent of warranty provisions + Importance of suppliers’ input to industry’s 
product quality 
Wind turbine demand + Industry growth rate 
Competitiveness of wind power + Wind turbine demand 
Experience curve effects + Competitiveness of wind power 
Threat of new entrants + Buyers’ threat of backward integration 
Threat of new entrants + Suppliers’ threat of forward integration 
Need substitution - Wind turbine demand 
Wind turbine demand + Experience curve effects 
Rate of new product discovery + Proprietarity of product technology 
Rate of new process discovery + Experience curve effects 
Industry concentration ratio + Resourcefulness of incumbents 
Threat of new entrants + Intensity of rivalry 
Table 5.1: Additional causal relationships identified from cross impact analysis 
 
On the basis of the identification of these relationships, it is possible to assemble the five 
propositions about the structural forces and their determinants; creating an integrated conceptual 
model (ICM) of the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry. This model is displayed in 
the form of a single influence diagram illustrated in figure 5.2 below150. Note that the ICM is 
displayed here for illustrative purposes only and is not meant to be ‘read’ in detail. Following Mercer 
(1998), a model can thus be broadly defined as: 
 
“[…] anything which claims to describe the relationships between the factors (the variables) involved or at least a 
set of assumptions about these relationships which it is believed will explain them151” 
 
ICM thus makes explicit the theoretical and empirically grounded assumptions about the competitive 
environment of the wind turbine industry at the chosen level of abstraction. As discussed in Chapter 
2, the boundary and structure of the model are inevitably ambiguous and cannot be definitively 
established. It is clear the variables and interrelationships proposed by the model could be expended 
ad infinitum.
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Figure 5.2: The assembled integrated conceptual model (ICM) 
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Horizontally, the boundaries of the model could be expanded to include competing energy 
technology industries or political systems involved in granting subsidies to renewable energy. 
However, because of the chosen level of abstraction, this would increase the level of combinatorial 
complexity beyond manageable levels. Even if this was accomplished; another ambiguous boundary 
would necessarily have to be drawn at the end of this effort, inevitably leaving other influential 
subsystems outside the scope of the model. This limitation does not mean that changes outside the 
boundaries of the model must be ignored, but rather that such changes appear as external forces 
influencing the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry from outside the scope of the 
model. 
Vertically, each variable contained in the model could be broken down into a larger number of 
variables at lower levels of abstraction or conversely grouped into fewer and more highly aggregated 
variables. A variable such as Intensity of rivalry could be broken down into various types and 
frequencies of competitive efforts between subgroups of manufacturers, while the Competitiveness of 
fossil fuels could be subdivided into the cost structures of various types of oil, gas and coal 
technologies. Again, this limitation does not mean that changes at higher or lower levels of 
abstraction must ignored, but rather that their effects are taken into account at the level of abstraction 
at which the model seeks to describe the competitive environment. 
 
It is important to note that these limitations do not only apply when constructing explicit influence 
diagrams like the one depicted in figure 5.2. Any strategic assumption involves a trade-off between 
(1) its level of abstraction and thus its attention to detail and accuracy and (2) the extent of its 
boundaries and thus what is considered inside the scope of relevance. Depicting strategic 
assumptions in the language of influence diagrams makes these limitations explicit and maintains 
internal consistency. It is thus not the aim of the ICM to look as much like the real competitive 
environment as possible. It would obviously be futile to depict the interaction of hundreds of 
thousands of people, organisations and devices by drawing arrows between lines of text.  
5.2 Analysing the structure of the integrated conceptual model 
As described in the example given in figure 5.1 above, the representation of the ICM, in the form of a 
direct influence matrix, reveals the total number of influences and dependencies of each variable. As 
described, the total number of direct influences of each variable is indicated by the sum of each row, 
while the sum of each column indicates the total number of direct dependencies. 
Following Godet (1994), the influentiality and dependency of each variable in the ICM can be 
represented in the form of a direct influence-dependency chart as illustrated in figure 5.3 below: 
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The influentiality and dependency of each variable can thus be understood from its position in the 
influence-dependency chart. In this respect, the chart itself can be divided into four principal 
regions152: 
 
The top left region of the chart contains determinant variables. These high influence/low dependency 
variables condition the rest of the system. As it can be seen, the presence of economies of scale, 
industry growth rate and industry concentration along with the level of product differentiation falls 
into this region of the chart153. The top right region of the chart contains relay variables. These high 
influence/high dependency variables are unstable by nature, as any change in these variables will 
have repercussions for other variables as the initial change is fed through them and back to the relay 
variables. As it can be seen, no variables fall into this region. The bottom right region contains 
resultant variables. These low influence/high dependency variables are highly dependent upon both 
the determinant and relay variables. As illustrated, the intensity of rivalry among wind turbine 
manufacturers and the height of entry barriers fall into this region. The bottom left region contains 
semi-autonomous variables. These low influence/low dependency variables are less intricately 
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connected to the system than the variables in the three other regions. As it can be seen, the remaining 
63 variables of the ICM fall into this region. 
The distribution of the variables across the four regions of the influence-dependency chart indicates 
that the ICM is a relatively stable system. Following Godet (1994), a low number of relay variables 
confer relative stability to the system. In unstable systems the variables tend to cluster along the main 
diagonal of the chart, while the variables in stable systems tend to distribute themselves in an ‘L’-
shape along the x and y axes154. In terms of direct influences and dependencies of the ICM, the latter 
seems to be the case. 
 
Beyond direct relationships 
In addition to the direct relationships taken into consideration above, the ICM contains numerous 
indirect relationships in which one variable influences, or is influenced by, another over several 
intermediaries. These can be taken into account through a structural analysis. 
Following Godet (1994), the indirect relationships can be taken into account by multiplying the 
original direct influence matrix described in figure 5.1 by itself, thus raising the matrix to a higher 
power. This operation is illustrated in figure 5.4 below: 
Figure 5.4: Example of the construction of an indirect influence matrix. Adapted from Miles et al 
(2003:54). 
 
The direct influence matrix takes into consideration the direct influence and dependency of each 
variable (DIM = A  B). By multiplying the direct influence matrix by itself, all paths and loops of 
length 2 are taken into account in the sum of each row and column as shown in figure 5.4 above 
(DIM2 = A  B  C). By further raising the power of the DIM, paths of increasing length are taken 
into account (DIMn = A  n…  K). Each time the DIM is raised to a higher power, a new 
hierarchy can be deduced in terms of the most influential and dependent variables displayed on an 
influence-dependency chart. When raised to a certain power, a stable hierarchy is found. Godet 
(1994) terms and trademarks this hierarchy; the MICMAC® classification155. 
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Resulting from the structural analysis performed on the ICM illustrated in figure 5.1, a stable 
hierarchy was found when raising the direct influence matrix developed earlier to the 7th power156. 
The MICMAC® classification of the ICM thus illustrates the influence and dependency of each 
variable, taking into account six intermediaries. The resulting influence-dependency chart is 
illustrated below: 
 
As illustrated above, taking the indirect influences and dependencies of each variable into 
account significantly alters distribution of the variables across the chart. In contrast to figure 5.4 
above, R&D-related variables are now the most influential along with several demand drivers 
and important sources of cost reductions. The ICM suggests that these are the determining 
variables conditioning the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry through the five 
structural forces proposed by the positioning school. In terms of relay variables, the 
characteristic ‘L’-shape of the variable distribution again suggests a relatively stable system in 
the absence of relay variables. The most dependent variables are those closely related to the 
profitability of wind turbine manufacturers and thus the industry as a whole. This is not 
surprising, as the drivers of industry profitability is focus of the Five Forces Theory, the logic of 
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which is captured in the ICM. As described above, these are the resultant variables in the sense 
that they are the outcomes of the state of the determining variables.  
 
The structural analysis of the ICM implies that manufacturers controlling one or more of the most 
influential variables are able to influence the competitive environment, thus creating a profitable 
position. From this perspective, wind turbine manufacturers claiming R&D leadership within 
process- and/or product discovery, while attaining sufficient market share to take advantage of 
economies of scale are in the best position to influence the nature of competition. A number of 
tradeoffs naturally limit any one manufacturer from achieving a position of such superiority. 
In a competitive environment, no competitor single-handedly controls the influential variables. 
Instead, these are the major competitive parameters, which incumbents compete to influence. In 
addition, several of the highly influential variables are clearly outside the direct control of wind 
turbine manufacturers. Highly influential determinants such as the competitiveness of wind power 
relative to its substitutes, and thus the level of need substitution and wind turbine demand, along with 
climate concern and the overall industry growth rate, are clearly influenced by forces beyond the 
competitive environment itself. Other determinants such as product-by-product substitution are 
highly contested through technology rivalry to the point where it is outside the control of any single 
competitor. As described in Chapter 2, the evolution of these highly influential variables and thus the 
competitive environment as a whole is subject to various levels of uncertainty. Addressing the 
various levels of uncertainty connected to the development of the competitive environment of the 
wind turbine industry will thus be the topic of the subsequent chapters.  
 
The construction of the ICM concludes Part I of this report. The three preceding chapters have been 
concerned with theoretically and empirically investigating the competitive environment of the wind 
turbine industry and formulating an explicit and internally consistent strategic assumption about the 
variables and the interrelationships between them, considered relevant to strategic decision-making. 
In Part II, the ICM will form the basis against which the impact of the major forces of change 
influencing the competitive environment over the coming decade can be explored. 
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- Part II - 
 
Chapter 6: Predetermineds - what we know (we think) we know 
This chapter will be concerned with identifying the major known predetermineds influencing the 
competitive environment of the wind turbine industry over the coming decade. At the outset, it is 
clear that we cannot limit our view to the variables and interconnections proposed in Part I. The 
competitive environment of the wind turbine industry is an intricate part of other social and natural 
subsystems beyond the boundaries of the explicit strategic assumption developed so far. The 
identification of predetermineds will therefore be explorative, drawing upon theory, industry 
literature and a number of interviews with industry observers and participants. The ICM will then 
form the basis against which the impact of each predetermined upon the competitive environment is 
explored. 
6.1 What is predetermined? 
For reasons described in Chapter 2, very few developments are truly predetermined - in the literal 
sense of the word. In the context of this report, the term predetermined is used with regard to 
phenomena about which we can justify the assumption that we have sufficient knowledge to predict 
their direction over a given time period. As described in Chapter 2, there can be various justifications 
behind such an assumption. The phenomena can be slow-changing, naturally constrained, already in 
the pipeline or downright inevitable157 - given the chosen time period. In spite of such justifications, 
it is almost always possible to imagine low-probability-high-impact events, which could make any 
such assumption wrong. For this reason, predetermineds can be considered developments with a 
single anticipated high-probability outcome or direction. 
6.2 Identifying predetermineds 
As described in Chapter 2, any strategic decision is based upon assumptions about the future in 
which it is to play out. The importance of such expectations to an industry becomes obvious when 
studying industry literature and talking to industry observers and participants – expectations are 
everywhere158. From the viewpoint of the positioning school, the strategic relevance of any 
predetermined is determined by its impact upon the five forces constituting the structure of the wind 
turbine industry. A further assumption is that the impact of any predetermined should be taken into 
consideration at the level of abstraction proposed by the positioning school. These are the underlying 
assumptions embedded in the ICM. As previously described, this does not entail that predetermineds 
identified at comparatively higher or lower levels of abstraction or outside the scope of the model 
                                                 
157
 Schwartz 1998:109-112, see also Heijden 1996:87, and Wack 1985:77 
158
 See Selin 2006 for a recent dissertation on the importance and impact of expectations. 
 60 
must be ignored. Such predetermineds are either taken into account at the level of abstraction at 
which the model seeks to describe the competitive environment, or will appear as external forces 
influencing the competitive environment from outside the scope of the model. 
 
Following Porter (1985), the identification of predetermineds took as its point of departure 
expectations related to the five competitive forces proposed by the positioning school159. Drawing 
upon seven in-depth interviews160 with industry observers and participants from a broad spectrum of 
the industry, a number of loosely formulated expectations were compiled about the development of 
the industry over the coming decade161. These expectations were subsequently specified and 
empirically justified, as described below. Resulting from this process, the following four 
predetermineds could be identified: 
 
1. Buyers of wind projects will become larger, more professional and geographically 
diversified, demanding still larger wind projects. 
2. The wind turbine industry will continue to consolidate around fewer, larger and increasingly 
globalised wind turbine manufacturers, emphasising economies of scale and scope. 
3. Wind power will enter the mainstream of energy technologies as it matures, shifting 
emphasis from product to process discovery as the key source of cost reductions. 
4. Wind turbine manufacturers will become less backward integrated and will increasingly 
emphasise partnerships with increasingly shared, specialised and independent component 
manufacturers. 
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Following Kahn & Wiener (1967), these four predetermineds constitute a multifold trend for the 
anticipated development of the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry over the 
coming decade. As such, these four predetermineds do not operate in isolation from one another, but 
can be seen as part of a common complex trend of interacting elements162.  Moreover, it is clear that 
alternative categorisations of the identified predetermineds at both higher and lower levels of 
abstraction are possible. This should not, however, affect the assessment of the impact of the 
multifold trend upon industry structure as a whole163. The most important consideration with regard 
to each predetermined is the justifiable assumption that it is likely to continue to influence the 
industry for at least another decade164. In the following, I will account for the justification behind this 
assumption for each predetermined, and explore its impact upon the competitive environment of the 
wind turbine industry. 
6.3 The first fold 
The first predetermined assumes that over the coming decade, buyers of wind projects will become 
larger, more professional and geographically diversified, demanding still larger wind projects. The 
assumption about the continuation of this fold is perhaps the most widely held among the industry 
observers and participants interviewed for this report. As we shall see, this belief may be justified 
both in terms of historical precedence and assumptions about the underlying drivers of industry 
development. The increasing size and sophistication of buyers of wind projects have been ongoing 
throughout the history of the industry. Historically, buyers have changed from ideologically 
motivated individuals, buying experimental turbines for farms and businesses, over local investor 
cooperatives exploiting subsidies and tax breaks, to national utility companies responding to 
environmental incentives for cleaner energy production165. Today, this trend continues uninterrupted 
in the form of consolidating international utility companies hedging against global uncertainties of 
supply, increasing climate concerns and CO2 burden sharing166. 
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This development has occurred as a result of the increasing size of both individual turbines and entire 
wind projects. Up scaling of the individual turbine has been the primary source of cost reductions 
both in terms of installed capacity and final cost of electricity production167. The parallel increase in 
the size of wind projects has been spurred by the need to spread fixed costs of installation and 
operation over multiple turbines168, profiting from economies of scale in project size. These 
developments have increased the minimum profitable scale of wind projects and thus driven up the 
initial investments necessary for owning a profitable wind project. As a consequence, the buyer 
segmentation of the wind turbine market has shifted; favouring larger and more professional buyers 
able to handle larger investments and assess financial risks connected to volatile energy markets169. 
The industry observers and participants interviewed for this report expected buyers to become more 
conservative in their assessment of financial risk, considering wind projects on increasingly similar 
terms with traditional energy technologies. An added factor in the increased professionalism of 
buyers is the growing experience and professionalism of utilities handling entire portfolios of 
operational wind projects. These repeat buyers will have a continuously improving basis for 
comparison and assessment of bids from competing wind turbine manufacturers. The trend toward 
major buyers owning large fleets of wind projects is also the basis for anticipations about the 
increasing importance of service agreements170 and repowering171 as future sources of revenue for the 
industry. In addition, a commonly held expectation in industry literature is that, as a function of the 
first fold, developers will eventually disappear as an intermediary between wind turbine 
manufacturers and final owners of wind projects. As the size and professionalism of final buyers 
increase, it is proposed, they will take over the development wind projects themselves; cutting out 
independent developers172. This view is, however, contested by the industry observers and 
participants interviewed for this report. The general expectation is that although smaller developers 
will disappear over the coming decade, the specialised skills of larger developers will continue to be 
in demand. Historically, large utilities have not been sufficiently competent in gaining local and 
political support for large wind projects. This has given rise to organised local resistance to several 
wind projects. Developers specialising in these skills are expected to prosper over the coming 
decade. Current developments are inconclusive on this issue beyond the observation that developers 
follow the general pattern of buyers; undergoing rapid concentration and consolidation into fewer, 
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larger and more professional firms173. The extent to which wind turbine manufacturers will integrate 
further forward into electricity sales remains uncertain as the potentials of this business model is 
largely unexploited among current manufacturers174. The future of private investor groups as large 
buyers of wind projects are expected to be heavily dependent on the ability of wind turbine 
manufacturers to guarantee the quality and decrease financial risks of large projects to a level where 
these less professional buyers feel confident enough to invest. It is still unclear if this will be 
achieved over the coming decade, but as discussed in the third fold below, developments in this 
direction are ongoing. 
 
The assumption behind the continuation of the trend toward larger and more professional buyers, 
demanding still larger wind turbine projects is thus thoroughly based in historical precedence. In 
addition, this trend is based on assumptions about the continued effects of various types of 
economies of scale intrinsic to the physical activities of the industry and its product. These include 
economies of turbine size, economies of project size, economies of scale in production and 
economies of order size. In spite of these powerful economies of scale evident in many activities of 
the industry and its customers, it is clear that these developments will not continue indefinitely, but 
are likely to pass through an inflexion point, following the familiar S-curve. Near saturation of 
economies of turbine size has been predicted for decades but has continuously been proven wrong, as 
still larger turbine designs have proven technological and commercial successes175. Today, onshore 
planning restraints and organised local opposition to the visual impact of wind projects seem more 
likely to limit the size of individual turbines and projects than limits to technological feasibility and 
economic viability176. The general expectation among the industry observers and participants 
interviewed for this report is that such limitations are now visible for most onshore projects. Should 
these restrains seriously limit onshore developments, it is likely that emphasis will shift to the largely 
untapped offshore resource, where diseconomies of turbine- and project-size are not yet in sight177. 
As a function of this development, financial demands on buyers of wind projects are thus assumed to 
increase, continuing the historical trend of larger and more professional buyers – at least over the 
coming decade. 
  
Beyond larger and more professional buyers of still larger wind projects, this fold assumes 
continuing geographical diversification of demand. Historically, small national niche markets and a 
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few, large international markets have driven the growth of the wind turbine industry. The Californian 
market played an instrumental role in the internationalisation of early wind turbine manufacturers 
and later the Spanish and German markets emerged as the main drivers of industry growth. This fold 
of the multifold trend expects this to change significantly over the coming decade, as a wider range 
of large, international markets will become available to the industry178. Outside of Europe, which has 
traditionally been the largest market, India, the US, Japan and China have emerged in recent years as 
new prominent markets and more are expected to join them in the years to come179. 
 
The primary drivers of this development are four-fold. Firstly, environmental concern followed by 
government support favouring environmental performance has penetrated and spurred growth in a 
wider range of national markets worldwide180. Secondly, uncertainty about security of supply, 
especially with regard to oil and natural gas has led to increased emphasis and support for energy 
sources with stable or no fuel demands181. Thirdly, wind power has matured and become increasingly 
competitive with conventional energy technologies and has thus diffused and penetrated the 
mainstream of globally available energy technologies182. And fourthly, global electricity demand is 
expected to rise steadily by some 2.5% annually over the coming quarter of a century183. The 
continuation of the former two drivers - environmental concern and security of supply - may be 
considered highly probable over the coming decade, although far from inevitable184, while the 
growing electricity demand and maturity of wind technology are considered to be predetermined. 
The latter of these will be considered in more detail as part of the third fold of the multifold trend 
later in this chapter. Even if environmental concern or security of supply (or potentially both) 
levelled off in one or more large markets, the trend toward geographical diversification of buyers are 
likely to strengthen rather than stagnate, as the search for alternative markets intensify. It is thus 
assumed that the geographical diversification of major markets will continue over the coming 
decade. 
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Exploring the impact of the first fold upon the competitive environment 
The strategic relevance of the first fold of the multifold trend is determined by its impact upon the 
competitive environment of the wind turbine industry. Using the methodology described in Chapter 
5, the influence of the first fold upon the ICM was systematically investigated using a direct impact 
matrix (Godet 1994). On the basis of the above considerations, the first fold of the multifold trend 
was systematically paired against the variables of the ICM. Resulting from this process, seven 
proposed impacts could be theoretically, empirically or logically justified. These propositions are 
made explicit in figure 6.1 below. Given these proposed first order effects, the ICM proposes a 
number of second and third order effects through the causal tree185. The causal tree does not ‘prove’ 
that these effects will follow from the progression of the first fold, but provides an explicit and 
internally consistent hypothesis based on currently available information. Although the methodology 
allows the exploration of higher order effects, the exploration will be limited to the first, second third 
order effects of each fold186. Also, it is important to note, that as described in Chapter 3, the polarities 
of the causal tree describe the structure - not the behaviour - of the causal tree. As an example, the 
causal tree implies that if the first fold of the multifold trend were to increase (as anticipated), the 
relative concentration of buyers would move in the same direction as the first fold, all else being 
equal. 
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As illustrated above187, seven impacts are proposed through which the first fold of the multifold trend 
influences the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry.  The first three of these imply 
that as the multifold trend progresses, so will Buyers’ purchase relative to buyers’ costs, Buyers’ 
purchase relative to sellers’ sales and the Extent of warranty provisions, all else being equal. These 
three impacts are proposed as a consequence of the anticipated increase in the size of wind projects 
as described above. Secondly, the impact of the first fold upon Buyers’ information and the Relative 
concentration of buyers are related to the expectation of increasing size and professionalism of 
buyers, while the impact upon the Importance of location and Wind turbine demand is related to the 
increasingly geographically diversified buyers. As a wider range of geographically dispersed markets 
become available, wind turbine manufacturers are increasingly required to have a global presence. 
 
Given these seven impacts upon the competitive environment, the ICM proposes that, as a function 
of the first fold, buyers of wind turbines are likely to become increasingly powerful and price 
sensitive over the coming decade. Firstly, as buyers gain experience from several operational wind 
projects, they will be in a better position to compare and evaluate bids from manufacturers, thus 
improving their bargaining position. Secondly, as the size of wind projects increase, the individual 
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order will become more important to wind turbine manufacturers. And thirdly, the ICM suggests that 
this relative improvement in bargaining position is further amplified as buyers of wind turbines 
become fewer and larger over the coming decade. 
As a result of the increasing financial risk related to larger projects, especially with regard to serial 
faults, buyers will become more conservative in their assessment of financial risk. In addition, buyers 
are likely to use their improved bargaining position to limit their financial risk by demanding 
extended warranties from manufacturers. Warranty provisions are therefore likely become an 
increasingly important part of winning orders. This will likewise strengthen the role of warranties as 
a means of increasing entry barriers around the wind turbine industry. The ICM proposes that this 
tendency will increase the dependency of wind turbine manufacturers upon the product quality of 
component suppliers’ input. Wind turbine manufacturers will become less price sensitive when 
dealing with component suppliers; favouring proven reliability, closer cooperation and/or legally 
binding quality guarantees. The first fold illustrates the increasing sensitivity of wind turbine 
manufacturers to serial faults, as they bear an increasing financial risk of defect components 
purchased from outsourced suppliers. 
 
As a function of the first fold, a wider range of geographically dispersed markets will become 
available to the wind turbine industry. The major beneficiaries of this development will be wind 
turbine manufacturers with a global presence. These will be in a better position to decrease transport 
costs and hedge against volatile currency rates and domestic supply content requirements along with 
other forms of protectionism. The ICM proposes that the importance of a global presence will 
increase the height of entry barriers around the industry, as potential newcomers are forced to enter 
globally to avoid competing at a disadvantage. Another effect of the geographical diversification of 
markets is increasing demand for wind turbines from a still wider range of buyers. Potentially to a 
point where accessibility of inputs will continue to be the major bottleneck for manufacturers as new 
markets emerge.  
 
High demand is also likely to moderate the bargaining power of individual buyers in periods where 
demand outstrips supply. The ICM proposes that, higher unit output spurred by increased demand 
will likewise have a positive impact on experience curve effects - and thus the long-term 
competitiveness of wind energy. This in turn will raise the technological standards that a potential 
entrant will have to meet; raising entry barriers around the industry. Conversely, high demand will 
likewise increase the attractiveness of the industry to potential entrants and may likewise hamper the 
willingness of incumbents to retaliate. This sequence of effects indicates that, in spite of high and 
continuously increasing entry barriers, the wind turbine industry remains highly attractive to 
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potential newcomers in periods of high growth. As a further effect, the ICM proposes that continued 
growth is the prerequisite for preventing excess production capacity and limiting the intensity of 
rivalry among manufactures. This sensitivity to demand fluctuations was touched upon in Chapter 4 
and is likely to be amplified over the coming decade as a function of the first fold of the multifold 
trend. 
6.4 The second fold 
The second fold of the multifold trend assumes that over the coming decade, the wind turbine 
industry will continue to consolidate around fewer, larger and increasingly globalised wind turbine 
manufacturers, emphasising of economies of scale and scope. Like the previous fold, the second fold 
of the multifold trend assumes the continuation of well-documented historical patterns of 
development and thus takes historical precedence as its point of departure. 
 
Historical studies of the Danish wind turbine industry suggest that the number of Danish 
manufacturers peaked around 1988, at which time the national market supported as many as 21 
manufacturers. By 1998, that number was reduced to four188. Today that number is further reduced to 
somewhere between one and two189. This development has, to a large extent, been matched 
internationally where, in 1990, some 70 manufacturers existed, of which the top five manufacturers 
held a market share of just 53%190, compared to the present day 85.5%191; the hallmarks of a 
significantly less concentrated industry. The reasons behind this historical development, along with 
the assumption that it is likely to continue over the coming decade, are closely related to the 
mechanisms behind the first fold of the multifold trend described above. 
 
Economies - and thus advantages - of scale can be present at many levels of the activities of an 
industry192. As the size of both individual turbines and wind turbine projects has increased, so has the 
minimum efficient size of wind turbine manufacturers. The presence of economies of scale means 
that there is a positive correlation between the market share of a wind turbine manufacturer and its 
profitability. Increasing minimum requirements to financial strength, production capacity and 
extensive R&D capabilities along with an impressive track record of prior operational wind projects 
have significantly disadvantaged smaller manufacturers faced with larger and more professional 
buyers193. As described in relation to the first fold, the demand for larger and more cost-efficient 
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wind projects is assumed to continue over the coming decade. In terms of continued consolidation, 
the industry observers and participants interviewed for this report considered the current number of 
five large international wind turbine manufacturers a ‘ceiling’, and all interviewees considered lower 
numbers feasible within the coming decade. Many smaller manufacturers not saved by privileged 
home market positions or high growth rates are expected to be bought or go out of business, 
increasing the distance between large and small manufacturers194. This expectation is widely 
supported by industry literature195 and longitudinal studies of industry populations196. A recent theory 
of industry evolution suggests that, if left purely to considerations of economic efficiency, industries 
will eventually reach a state in which only three major competitors have taken over all activities in 
which significant economies of scale and scope exist197. Although this can be considered nothing 
more than a ‘rule of thumb’198, this eventuality cannot be ruled out in the case of the wind turbine 
industry over the coming decade. 
 
Closely related to advantages of scale, a key driver behind the continued consolidation of the wind 
turbine industry is the necessity of a global presence in response to increasingly geographically 
diverse buyers. To fully utilize economies of scale in production, a geographically well-diversified 
customer base is a key requirement for achieving stable operating margins and to avoid dependency 
upon a single market199, particular currency rates and to lower transport costs200. This is currently a 
major risk factor of many smaller manufacturers. The geographical diversification of buyers 
described in the first fold has been matched by increasing globalisation of wind turbine 
manufactures. By 2004, wind turbine manufacturers exported on average 60.5% of their total 
production (measured in MW capacity) outside of their respective home markets201. This figure rose 
from 51.9% in 2002202. Although these figures cover significant variation between individual 
manufacturers, the general tendency moves the industry away from home- and single market 
dependency towards an increasingly globalised industry203. As it is to be expected, the least 
globalised manufacturers are those located in attractive home markets such as Spanish Gamesa 
(12.5% export share), Indian Suzlon (0%) and German Enercon (34.9%). By contrast, Danish Vestas 
                                                 
194
 BTM 2004b:41 
195
 See BTM 2005b:41, Morgan Stanley 2005: 12 and Danske Equities 2003:19 
196
 See e.g. Geroski & Mazzucato 2001 and Geroski & Mata 2001 
197
 See Sheth & Sisodia 2002 
198
 The wind turbine industry is by no means left purely to considerations of economic efficiency in that it markets a 
highly regulated, subsidised product influenced by many distorting factors such a patents and protectionism in 
national markets. Taking such exceptions into consideration, very few industries are left ‘purely’ to considerations 
of economic efficiency. 
199
 Morgan Stanley 2005:12 
200
 See e.g. Vestas Annual Report 2005:21 
201
 BTM 2005a:19 
202
 BTM 2003:19 
203
 See e.g. Morgan Stanley 2005:6 
 70 
(99.9%) is by far the most globalised wind turbine manufacturer204. The assumptions behind the 
continuation of the second fold of the multifold trend are thus based on historical precedence, but 
also on the continued parallel and interacting development of buyers and suppliers of wind turbines 
in response to underlying economies of scale and scope. 
 
Exploring the impact of the second fold upon the competitive environment 
As illustrated in figure 6.2 below, by systematically paring the second fold of the multifold trend 
with the constituent variables of the ICM, two impacts are proposed on the basis of the above 
considerations, through which the second fold of the multifold trend influences the competitive 
environment of the wind turbine industry over the coming decade. 
 
As illustrated above, as a function of the increasing Industry concentration ratio, the ICM proposes a 
number of second and third order effects. The most consistent of these is the decreasing intensity of 
rivalry among fewer and larger wind turbine manufacturers, as cooperation between manufacturers to 
keep prices stable becomes easier. Also, the lower number of dominant manufacturers will be better 
able to exercise direction to the industry and avoid prolonged price wars – at least while growth 
remains stable. As a third order effect, the ICM proposes that the lowered intensity of rivalry and 
improved cooperation between manufactures will lessen buyers’ ability to play manufacturers against 
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each other, lowering buyers’ price sensitivity and increasing the profitability of the industry. This 
effect is further amplified as the concentration of the wind turbine industry increases relative to both 
buyers and suppliers, all else being equal. The ICM also proposes that as the wind turbine industry 
consolidates, more resourceful and consolidated manufacturers will pose a greater threat of forceful 
and coordinated retaliation against potential entrants into the industry. Seen in isolation, the ICM 
proposes that the consolidation of the industry will have a potentially highly beneficial impact upon 
the structure of the industry - especially with regard to countering powerful buyers. From this 
consideration, it is clear that the first and second fold of the multifold trend are highly 
interdependent. 
 
The increasing emphasis on Economies of scale in production similarly produces a number of second 
and third order effects upon the structure of the industry. The first of these is the amplification of the 
industry concentration ratio and thus further emphasises the effects described above. Moreover, the 
ICM proposes that, as a result of this anticipated development, the entry barriers around the wind 
turbine industry are likely to heighten over the coming decade as entry capital requirements are 
increased substantially from their already significant level. As the industry globalises, potential 
entrants will increasingly be forced to enter the industry both in scale and in scope and thus at 
considerable financial risk, or must face a significant disadvantage relative to incumbents. 
Another interesting second order effect of the continuation of this fold of the multifold trend is the 
increasing fixed to variable cost ratio of the industry, combined with the increasing size of capacity 
augments – both spurred by economies of scale. As suggested by the ICM, both of these effects are 
likely to increase the intensity of rivalry in the industry. If currently high industry growth rates are 
not maintained, the heightened fixed to variable cost ratios and increased size of capacity augments 
are likely to lead to excess production capacity coupled with the urgent need to fill this capacity. This 
is the recipe for extended price wars and low profitability and thus increased sensitivity of the 
industry as a whole to volatile demand. This amplifies the sensitivities underlined as part of the first 
fold above. As suggested by the ICM, the increasing emphasis on economies of scale in production 
and thus the transition of wind turbine manufacturing into a volume driven industry is in itself a 
catalyst for more intense rivalry among manufacturers. 
6.5 The third fold 
The third fold assumes that over the coming decade, wind power will enter the mainstream of energy 
technologies as it matures; shifting emphasis from product to process discovery as the key source of 
cost reductions. This fold assumes the continuation of the technological and economic improvement 
of wind technology over the coming decade. This optimistic outlook held by the industry observers 
and participants interviewed for this report is widely supported in industry literature concluding that 
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wind technology has yet to reach its final form and that opportunities for further cost reductions 
through increased industrialisation remain plentiful205. 
 
Historical advancements in wind technology have been impressive. Empirical studies suggest that the 
cost of wind power has declined by as much as 80% since 1980. In terms of learning curve effects, 
this means a cost reduction of some 15% (Price/kWh) every time the accumulative production 
doubles206. The current cost of electricity generation from wind depends on a number of factors 
specific to the individual wind project and any measurement therefore relies on a number of broad, 
and often disputed, assumptions. Historical progress has nonetheless improved the competitiveness 
of wind technology to a point where Carnegie Securities Research (2005) estimates that the 
production cost of wind is now lower than that of gas and fully comparable to the cost of coal207. 
This fold of the multifold trend assumes that, as a function of continued technological advancements, 
over the coming decade, wind power will continue its entry into the mainstream of energy generation 
technologies. 
 
Based on this historically steep learning curve, a number of extrapolations have been made about the 
future cost of wind power. It follows that the future cost of electricity generation depends on even 
greater number of factors than the current one, many of which are inherently uncertain. Based on 20 
years of depreciations, a 6% interest rate and an average wind speed of 5.4 metres per second, Vestas 
estimates the current price per kWh electricity at EUR 0.03, and expects this price to fall to EUR 
0.02 within the next ten to 15 years208 - an impressive, although hardly impartial figure. EWEA 
estimates a cost reduction from EUR 0.05-0.06 from 2002 to around EUR 0.044-0.056 by 2010. This 
is assuming a cost reduction of 9-17% (Price/kWh) for every doubling of cumulative installation and 
an annual growth rate of installation of 7% and a medium sized wind turbine (850-1,500 kW) 
installed in medium wind209. This kind of extrapolation based on experience curves is likewise a 
dubious affair210. It is worth noting the number of fixed assumptions upon which these extrapolations 
are based. As uncertain as these assumptions may be, they are indicators of expectations of continued 
progress. In the context of this fold of the multifold trend, the most important assumption is, that over 
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the coming decade, cost reductions will continue and that wind turbine technology will become 
increasingly comparable with mainstream energy technologies - an assumption widely shared in 
industry literature211. 
 
A widely held notion among the industry observers and participants interviewed for this report is the 
expectation of a shifting emphasis from product to process discovery as the key source of cost 
reductions. This expectation corresponds to the pattern of development first proposed by Abernathy 
& Utterback (1975). This model suggests that as the product technology of an industry matures, a 
dominant design is eventually found and the rate of radical product innovations declines as 
improvements become incremental. As the product design becomes less volatile, the process through 
which it is produced can now be optimised - first through radical process innovations, which 
eventually also decline to incremental ones212. The competition among rival product designs in the 
wind turbine industry has taken place along numerous design parameters: vertical or horizontal axis, 
number of wings, pitch versus stall regulation, fixed or variable speed, etc. The emergence of a 
dominant product design is widely agreed to have taken place in the 1980s, in the form of the three-
bladed, fixed speed, stall regulated turbine. Although wind technology has developed enormously 
since then, this basic design has remained dominant until today213. Because of the powerful 
economies of scale in wind turbine production, along with emerging onshore limits to up scaling this 
fold assumes that, over the coming decade, emphasis will gradually shift to the optimisation of wind 
turbine production. According to Klepper & Simons (1997), this tendency will significantly amplify 
the effects of the first and second fold, in that the value of a reduction in average cost will be 
proportional to a firm’s level of output. Larger firms therefore earn greater returns from process 
discovery than do smaller firms; strengthening the tendency of the wind turbine industry and its 
buyers to consolidate214. This shift is an important factor in changing the wind turbine manufacturers 
to industrialise their means of production and become increasingly volume-driven. As we shall see, 
this development is further related to those proposed in the fourth fold described below.   
 
Exploring the impact of the third fold upon the competitive environment  
As illustrated in figure 6.3 below, by systematically paring the third fold of the multifold trend 
with the constituent variables of the ICM on the basis of the above considerations, four impacts 
are proposed through which the third fold of the multifold trend influences the competitive 
environment of the wind turbine industry over the coming decade. 
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As illustrated above, based on these four impacts, the ICM proposes a number of second and third 
order effects. As a consequence of the assumption of continued technological and economic 
improvement of wind technology it is proposed that, in absolute terms, the Competitiveness of wind 
power will increase over the coming decade. As in the first fold, increasing demand and high 
industry growth will limit the relative bargaining power of otherwise powerful. As a consequence of 
the expected shift from product to process discovery, it is proposed that the Rate of new product 
discovery will decline while the Rate of new process discovery increases. As a fourth effect, it is 
proposed that the Level of product differentiation will decline as the technology matures and the 
product becomes increasingly standardised. 
 
The parallel shift from product to process discovery as a key source of cost reductions will likely 
lead to positive effects on R&D expenditure as the lifetime of products are extended. Also, increased 
focus on improving the production process will have positive impacts experience curve effects as a 
source of competitiveness, as the industry becomes more volume driven. On the other hand, the ICM 
proposes that proprietarity of wind turbine technology is expected to decline as wind turbines 
Figure 6.3: The impact of the third fold upon the competitive environment 
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become increasingly standardised. This is likely to lower the technological entry barriers around the 
industry, giving way to increased licensing and imitation of product technology.  
As a consequence declining product differentiation, the ICM proposes a number of adverse second 
order effects, especially with regard to the industry’s bargaining position relative to buyers of wind 
turbines. Increasingly standardised turbine designs will increase buyers’ price sensitivity while 
lowering switching costs as products become increasingly similar. Closely related to these 
developments is the increasing intensity of rivalry among manufacturers, as price is emphasised and 
the number of competitive parameters decline. 
6.6 The fourth fold 
The fourth fold of the multifold trend assumes that over the coming decade, wind turbine 
manufacturers will become less backward integrated and will increasingly emphasise partnerships 
with increasingly shared, specialised and independent component manufacturers. 
In terms of vertical integration, there is significant variation among the business models of wind 
turbine manufacturers. Among the major manufacturers, the most vertically integrated are Gamesa, 
Siemens215 and Enercon216 relative to GE and Vestas217. Blades, nacelles and control systems are the 
most specialised and vital components in terms of turbine efficiency and are usually manufactured 
in-house whereas generators, gearboxes and towers are more often outsourced218. These general 
sourcing strategies cover significant nuances, especially with regard to so-called hybrid sourcing, in 
which wind turbine manufacturers combine in-house and outsourced production of certain 
components. This allows benchmarking of the manufacturer’s own performance against that of a 
specialised supplier while improving the manufacturer’s bargaining position relative to that supplier. 
To further improve their bargaining position, wind turbine manufacturers actively avoid reliance 
upon any single component manufacturer, often playing suppliers against each other219. According to 
several industry observers and participants interviewed for this report, this has created an atmosphere 
of distrust between manufacturers and component suppliers and has contributed significantly to 
decreasing the attractiveness of specialised component manufacturing for the wind turbine 
industry220. This development has hampered component manufacturers’ commitment to the wind 
turbine industry and may have delayed the development of the industry’s value chain as a whole. 
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The industry observers and participants interviewed for this report proposes that, as manufacturers 
industrialise over the coming decade as a function of the third fold, wind turbine manufacturers will 
generally become less backward integrated. In doing so, they draw upon a historical analogy to the 
development of the automobile industry – a widely held notion throughout the industry. The 
justifications behind this assumption are closely related to the developments proposed in both the 
second and third fold. These two folds assume an increasing emphasis on economies of scale and 
scope, paralleled by shifting emphasis from process to product discovery along with an increasing 
standardisation of wind turbine technology. 
 
As a function of these developments, the fourth fold of the multifold trend assumes that the 
increasing scale of the industry will allow component manufacturers to profitably commit to the 
industry, increasingly customising their components to the needs of the wind turbine industry221. This 
tendency is visible in several areas of component manufacturing today222. Moreover, the increasing 
standardisation of wind turbine technology will allow increasing utilisation of economies of scale 
and scope in specialised component production - beyond those available to any single wind turbine 
manufacturer. As wind turbine manufacturers internationalise with the progression of the second 
fold, component suppliers will increase their market scope by locating production near major markets 
forming so-called supplier parks. Coordinating such efforts will in itself require increased 
cooperation. These advantages are already exploited in several areas of component production, the 
most obvious example being the strategy of the specialised blade manufacturer LM Glasfiber223. The 
expectations of the industry observers and participants interviewed for this report, are widely 
supported in industry literature and are closely connected to the increasing industrialisation of wind 
turbine manufacturing224. Morgan Stanley (2005) assesses that the absence of a network of 
specialised component suppliers has been the primary reason for the adoption of highly integrated 
business models among incumbent wind turbine manufacturers, and goes on to conclude that when 
such a network develops, most manufacturers will become less vertically integrated225. By analogy, 
this proposed pattern of development has been documented in a number of other industries such as 
the automobile industry and IT hardware industries, where the impact of standardisation on vertical 
integration has become apparent226. This fold of the multifold trend thus assumes that the utilisation 
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of economies of scale in component production will lead to less vertical integration and increased 
sharing of a of specialised component suppliers among wind turbine manufacturers. 
 
Exploring the impact of the fourth fold upon the competitive environment 
As illustrated in figure 6.4 below, by systematically paring the fourth fold of the multifold trend with 
the constituent variables of the ICM on the basis of the above considerations, seven impacts are 
proposed through which the fourth fold of the multifold trend influences the competitive 
environment of the wind turbine industry over the coming decade. 
 
The first two impacts are proposed as a function of the increasing specialisation and customisation of 
suppliers’ input to wind turbine manufacturers. The transition from standardised to specialised 
components will increase the Differentiation of supplier group’s products as suppliers will 
increasingly be able to offer components tailored for the needs of the industry. Also, as suppliers 
become increasingly specialised, the Industry’s information about the specialised processes of 
component manufacturing is likely to decline in these areas. The latter five causalities are proposed 
as a function of decreasing vertical integration of wind turbine manufacturers. Firstly the Entry 
capital requirements will decline, all else being equal, as the necessity of entering several stages of 
the supply chain as well as that of wind turbine assembly declines. The second effect is the increase 
of Industry’s purchase relative to industry’s costs as the proportion of outsourced components 
increases. The third impact is closely related to the second - as the proportion of outsourced 
components increases, so will wind turbine manufacturers’ dependency on the input of specialised 
suppliers. Consequently, the Importance of suppliers’ input to industry’s product quality will 
increase. Fourthly, as a function of the general tendency of less vertical integration among wind 
turbine manufacturers, the Industry’s threat of backward integration will decrease in several areas of 
component manufacturing. Finally, the decreasing vertical integration of wind turbine manufacturers 
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into various areas of component manufacturing is assumed to decrease the Fixed to variable cost 
ratio, as the necessary production capacity is now shared with specialised component manufacturers. 
 
Assuming these seven impacts, the ICM proposes a number of second and third order effects. These 
effects would suggest that as a function of the fourth fold, the bargaining power of suppliers would 
improve significantly over the coning decade. As the supply network of the industry develops it may 
no longer be necessary for a new entrant to enter several areas of component manufacturing as well 
as that of wind turbine assembly. This will lower entry barriers around the industry and potentially 
spur increased rivalry among manufacturers.  Also, as suppliers’ products become more specialised 
and differentiated, the opportunities for manufacturers to sustain hybrid sourcing are likely to 
become fewer. The tendency toward more powerful and independent component suppliers is 
emphasised as manufacturers’ price sensitivity declines and switching costs between suppliers 
increase. The ICM further proposes that suppliers’ opportunity to build switching costs through 
product differentiation will lessen rivalry among suppliers and hamper wind turbine manufacturers’ 
ability to play suppliers against each other. In addition, the bargaining power of wind turbine 
manufacturers is further limited as they become less informed about the production costs of 
increasingly specialised suppliers. 
6.7 Summing up: The anticipated structure of the wind turbine industry 
Based on the exploration of the impact of the four folds of the multifold trend upon the competitive 
environment of the wind turbine industry, it is clear that powerful buyers will continue to dominate 
the strategic agenda of wind turbine manufacturers over the coming decade. Large, well-informed 
and price sensitive buyers, placing large orders will be in a continuously improving bargaining 
position relative to wind turbine manufacturers. These buyers will be highly conservative with regard 
to financial risk, demanding extended warranties and will consider wind projects on similar terms 
with conventional investments in electricity generation capacity. Although potentially high demand 
and the parallel concentration of the wind turbine industry will to some extent counter this 
development, powerful buyers will have limit the profit potential of the wind turbine industry over 
the coming decade, especially in the absence of high industry growth. Based on the continuation of 
the multifold trend, rivalry among wind turbine manufacturers to service these powerful customers 
will intensify over the coming decade as manufacturers industrialise and product differentiation 
declines and economies of scale and scope become increasingly important. Large capacity augments 
and high fixed costs will create a powerful incentive to fill excess production capacity in times of 
volatile demand, creating fertile ground for intensified price competition. Although less vertical 
integration will allow wind turbine manufacturers to share this risk with specialised component 
manufacturers, the sensitivity of the industry to volatile demand will increase significantly over the 
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coming decade as a function of the progression of the multifold trend. The major competitive 
parameters emphasised by these developments will be price per installed MW capacity, quality 
guarantees backed by a flawless track record of successful projects, and a global delivery system. 
These requirements will ensure that the barriers around the wind turbine industry will remain a 
significant deterrent to potential entrants over the coming decade. Increasing requirements to a global 
presence, utilisation of economies of scale, a track record of prior projects and increasing size and 
resourcefulness of incumbents are all significant challenges to potential new entrants. The ICM 
proposes that the height of entry barriers will be limited by continued technological standardisation 
and thus decreasing proprietarity of wind technology along with the decreasing vertical integration of 
the industry, allowing new rivals to successfully enter the industry without being vertically 
integrated. In spite of significant barriers to entry, these factors, coupled with periods of high 
industry growth, will sustain the threat posed by new entrants over the coming decade. 
As a further consequence of the multifold trend, suppliers will become increasingly specialised and 
more powerful as manufacturers industrialise their production and outsource components. Their 
opportunity to raise wind turbine manufacturers’ switching costs through increased customisation 
and specialisation of their input will become greater as component suppliers commit to the industry. 
Their bargaining position will be further improved by wind turbine manufacturers’ decreasing threat 
of backward integration. Wind turbine manufacturers will, however, generally maintain their role as 
powerful and price sensitive customers as they become fewer and larger and, as a function of less 
integration, will be placing still larger orders for components relative to their total costs. This 
tendency may be amplified as manufacturers with narrow product ranges become less vertically 
integrated in response to an increasingly developed supplier network. 
In terms of substitutes, the effects of the multifold trend are inconclusive. It is assumed that the 
competitiveness of wind technology will continue to improve and that over the coming decade it will 
enter the main stream of energy technologies. This development merely suggests that current 
competitive pressures will be replaced by others, as wind technology loses its privileged position as a 
new and promising energy technology and enters the more level playing field of conventional 
technologies. 
 
Through this chapter, drawing upon personally held expectations, empirical observations and 
assessments, and theoretical propositions, a complex of explicit and justifiable expectations was 
established in the form of the multifold trend. This exploration was necessarily limited to anticipated 
changes in the competitive environment, leaving the out the major questions about changes that 
might occur. The following chapter will thus be concerned with the impact of major critical 
uncertainties facing the industry over the coming decade. 
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- Part II - 
 
Chapter 7: Critical uncertainty - what we know we don’t know 
 
The previous chapter established a complex of explicit expectations about the forces influencing the 
competitive environment of the wind turbine industry over the coming decade. This chapter will be 
concerned with identifying and exploring the impact of major known uncertainties upon the 
competitive environment. The identification of uncertainties will be explorative, drawing upon 
theory, industry literature and a number of interviews with industry observers and participants. The 
ICM will then form the basis against which the impact of each critical uncertainty upon the 
competitive environment is explored.  
7.1 What is critically uncertain? 
At the outset, it is clear that a very wide range of developments can, to some extent, be considered 
uncertain. From the viewpoint of the positioning school, the degree to which an uncertainty is critical 
is determined by its impact upon the five forces constituting the structure of the wind turbine 
industry. Important strategic questions often fall under this category. In this sense, the question - and 
therefore the uncertainty - is recognised, but the answer remains uncertain. In the context of this 
report, the term critical uncertainty will thus refer to what can be identified as recognised and 
strategically relevant uncertainties.  
7.2 Identifying critical uncertainties 
Following Porter (1985), the identification of critical uncertainties took as its point of departure 
uncertainties and principal questions related to the five competitive forces proposed by the 
positioning school227. Drawing upon the seven in-depth interviews with industry observers and 
participants, a number of loosely formulated questions were compiled about the development of the 
industry over the coming decade228. These uncertainties were subsequently specified and empirically 
justified, as described below. Resulting from this process, the following two critical uncertainties 
could be identified: 
1. Will the growth rate of the wind turbine industry change significantly over the coming 
decade? 
2. Will one or more major new competitors emerge or enter into the wind turbine industry over 
the coming decade? 
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Using the terms of Kahn & Wiener (1967), the principal outcomes of these critical uncertainties can 
be considered canonical variations of the multifold trend229. In this sense, the impact of the possible 
outcomes of these uncertainties should not be assessed against the wind turbine industry as it appears 
today, but against its expected development as captured by multifold trend. Canonical variations 
essentially view the progression of the multifold trend in light of a number of strategically relevant 
contingencies. Other categorisations than the ones chosen here are clearly possible at both higher and 
lower levels of abstraction, but this should not fundamentally alter the assessment of their impact 
upon the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry230. In the following, I will consider 
the principal outcomes of these critical uncertainties and their impact upon the competitive 
environment of the wind turbine industry. The critical uncertainties identified here do not, of course, 
capture the full range of uncertainties faced by the wind turbine industry over the time horizon of a 
decade. Some of these are unknowable in the present. The critical uncertainties investigated here are 
chosen because they address a wide range known uncertainties at their point of impact. That is to say; 
there is a wide range of known uncertainties which may affect the growth rate of the wind turbine 
industry, but that impact of these can be meaningfully considered by examining the effect of volatile 
growth upon the competitive environment. The critical uncertainties investigated in this chapter have 
thus been chosen because they address the major questions about the competitive environment asked 
industry observers and participants interviewed for this report, at their point of impact. Through these 
questions, it is demonstrate how the ICM could be used as an exploratory tool to systematically 
investigate a wider range of critical uncertainties in an explicit and consistent manner.  
7.3 Growth – Stability, fluctuation or stagnation? 
In spite of highly positive, medium-term expectations found in industry literature, some of the most 
serious and widespread concerns among the industry observers and participants interviewed for this 
report are closely related to the long-term stability of growth and major growth drivers. In addition, 
several interviewees expressed concern that the industry may be experiencing somewhat of a 
‘growth-hype’, and that wishful thinking and over-optimism may cloud the judgement of investors as 
well as forecasters. Although interviewees, to some degree, share the short- and medium-term 
optimism of industry analysts, they are uniformly careful when projecting growth rates into the latter 
half of the coming decade and all recognise the possibility of unexpected and prolonged growth 
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fluctuations in major markets. In the following, I will explore a number of potential sources of 
volatile growth, which may influence the wind turbine industry over the coming decade. 
 
Exploring causes of volatile growth 
Using the assumptions of the ICM, figure 7.1 below explores potential causes of volatile industry 
growth through a reversed causal tree. As illustrated, a reversed causal tree proposes the potential 
causes of change by illustrating a number of determinants of a chosen variable231 - in this case, the 
industry growth rate. 
 
As illustrated above, the ICM proposes that the industry growth rate is determined by demand, which 
in turn is determined by the competitiveness of wind power relative to its need substitutes. The first 
three determinants of the competitiveness of wind power are closely related to the dependency of the 
wind turbine industry upon the political sphere. Historically, the growth of the wind turbine industry 
has generally been high, although highly volatile. The most serious fluctuation was the collapse of 
the Californian market, causing demand to drop by as much as 75% over a period of just two years 
from 1985-87232. Since 1992, the annually installed wind capacity worldwide has, on average, grown 
by some 22%233. This figure covers significant variation over the period. The years 1995, 1997 and 
2001 saw growth rates in excess of 40%, while 1996, 1998 and 2004 experienced zero or slightly 
negative growth. The major cause of these fluctuations can be largely attributed to the dependency of 
the wind turbine industry upon the political sphere and the highly politicised nature of the energy 
sector as a whole234. The Californian Fluctuation as well as the emergence of the German and 
Spanish markets, and more recently, the Chinese, Indian and Japanese markets can be ascribed to 
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various forms of political support235. Political intervention through subsidies, tax breaks and other 
forms of support have thus been instrumental in both the emergence and collapse of major markets, 
causing highly volatile growth. This phenomenon is known in the industry as political risk236. The 
volatility of political support was most recently demonstrated by prolonged US indecision about the 
extension of the Production Tax Credit (PTC), causing overall negative growth in 2004237. 
Thoroughly rooted in historical precedence, the industry observers and participants interviewed for 
this report raised significant questions about the long-term stability of political support for wind 
energy in nearly every major existing and emerging market. 
 
The remaining three determinants of the competitiveness of wind power proposed by the ICM are 
related to its continued technological development. These variables were characterised by 
considerable uncertainty during the early development of the technology, where no dominant design 
existed, and where technological failure was frequent. As described in Chapter 6, the continuation of 
technological development, is now presumed to be predetermined, as part of the third fold of the 
multifold trend. The multifold trend assumes that over the coming decade, the emphasis of 
technological development will shift from process to process innovation as the primary source of cost 
reductions, and that wind technology will enter the mainstream of energy generation technologies. 
Although technological failure238 of wind technology, at this stage of its development, must be 
considered highly unlikely, the industry observers and participants considers the continued 
technological development, especially offshore, a potential source of unexpectedly high growth rates 
over the coming decade. 
In accordance with some of the most widely cited critical uncertainties by the industry observers and 
participants interviewed for this report, the ICM proposes the possibility of the emergence - or re-
emergence - of a significant competitive substitute to wind power over the coming decade. The four 
principal determinants of need substitution proposed by the ICM are the competitiveness of fossil 
fuels, nuclear power or another renewable technology. In terms of fossil fuels, coal and natural gas 
are forecast to be the major rivals of wind power over the coming decade. Of these, natural gas is the 
major uncertainty in terms of security of supply239. Due to unstable supply of natural gas and CO2 
reduction policies, the cost of wind power is currently assessed to be lower than that of natural gas240. 
Several industry observers and participants interviewed for this report expressed concern that an 
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improved supply situation, resulting from negotiations with Russia and/or a stabilisation of the 
Middle East, might well bring natural gas prices back down to competitive levels, within a time 
frame of a decade241. The possibility of an unexpected fossil fuel renaissance is thoroughly based in 
historical precedence, as this occurred in the mid 80s with significant implications for the wind 
turbine industry. These uncertainties might of course also decrease the competitiveness of fossil fuels 
over the coming decade, as recent developments in Russia242, the Middle East243 and the widespread 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol would imply, positively affecting industry growth. 
 
In addition to uncertainty about fossil fuels, a widespread concern among the industry observers and 
participants interviewed for this report is the emergence of a competitive nuclear substitute to wind 
power over the coming decade. On the basis of IEA (2004), it is difficult to construct a plausible 
scenario in which nuclear power can be considered a known uncertainty with regard to industry 
growth over a time horizon of just a decade. This is true both in terms of expected cost reductions, 
share of new capacity installations and, perhaps most importantly, diffusion time244. Although 
considerations about a highly competitive nuclear substitute may be prudent over longer time 
horizons, taking this eventuality into consideration over the time horizon explored in this report 
seems overly alarmist. 
In terms of renewable substitutes, the IEA (2004) proposes that biomass and hydropower to be the 
most significant competitors to wind power both in terms of their cumulative capacity, share of new 
capacity instalments and expected cost reductions. This is somewhat contrary to the concerns of 
industry observers and participants, proposing photovoltaic (PV) technology as their main concern. 
According to the IEA, PV will grow from a currently insignificant share of the renewable electricity 
market to a mere 2% by 2030. By comparison, wind power is expected to increase its current share of 
2% to some 15% over the same period245. Although one or more radical breakthroughs or unexpected 
diffusion of a renewable substitute remains a possibility, it is highly uncertain if this will have an 
adverse effect on the growth of the wind turbine industry, as renewable energy technologies are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. Conversely, the lack of a competitive renewable substitute may cause 
unexpectedly high growth rates under generally favourable conditions. 
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In light of these considerations, it is clear that a number of known uncertainties are related to the 
future growth rate of the wind turbine industry. Volatility of political support in one or more major 
markets, potentially spurred by volatile of fossil fuel prices, are the most obvious uncertainties 
influencing the growth rate of the wind turbine industry. In addition, one or more breakthroughs 
and/or rapid diffusion (or lack of same), of a renewable substitute may also affect the growth rate of 
the wind turbine industry. However, given current expectations and diffusion times this must be 
considered significantly less likely eventuality. Having explored a number of potential sources of 
volatile industry growth, in the following, I will consider the impact of unexpectedly high or low 
growth upon the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry. 
 
Exploring the impact of volatile growth 
Figure 7.2 below illustrates a number of first, second and third order effects of industry growth upon 
the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry, as proposed by the ICM. 
 
From the assumptions expressed in the above causal tree, it is possible to explore the low- and high-
growth canonical variations of the multifold trend, and their respective impacts upon the competitive 
environment of the wind turbine industry.  
7.5 The first canonical variation: The impact of low industry growth 
Chapter 4 initially implied that the current economic structure of the industry holds significant 
potential for intense and prolonged rivalry, but that rivalry remains moderate because of high growth. 
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Industry growth rate
Excess production capacity
Intensity of rivalry
Threat of retaliation to entry
Industry attractiveness
Accessibility of inputs
Height of entry barriers
Importance of location
Relative bargaining power of suppliers
(Intensity of rivalry)
Threat of new entrants
Buyers' price sensitivity
Industry profitability
(Excess production capacity)
((Intensity of rivalry))
(Threat of new entrants)
(((Intensity of rivalry)))
((Threat of new entrants))
(Height of entry barriers)
Power of suppliers
(Buyers' price sensitivity)
(Industry profitability)
Buyers' threat of backward integration
((Industry profitability))
Suppliers' threat of forward integration
(Industry attractiveness)
Industry's price sensitivity
Resourcefulness of incumbents
((((Intensity of rivalry))))
((Buyers' price sensitivity))
(((Industry profitability)))
(Buyers' threat of backward integration)
((((Industry profitability))))
(Suppliers' threat of forward integration)
-
-
-
+
-
-
-
+
+
+
-
+
-
+
Power of buyers
+
+
-
+
+
+
-
+
-
+
+
-
+
+
-
-
-
Size of capacity augments+
+
+
-
 86 
Seeing this canonical variation in light of the progression of the multifold trend, it becomes clear, 
that over the coming decade, the industry will become increasingly sensitive to volatile growth. The 
wind turbine industry will shift to more capital-intensive and volume-based means of production. 
This will increase the fixed-to-variable cost ratio of wind turbine manufacturers along with the 
minimum size of capacity augments coupled with powerful incentives to fill excess production 
capacity in times of low growth. This implies that the potential impact of a growth fluctuation will 
increase with the progression of the multifold trend over the coming decade. 
 
As illustrated above, the ICM proposes that a significant change in the industry growth rate will have 
a substantial impact upon the competitive environment. The upper three first order impacts are 
directly related to the fact that low growth is a major catalyst for intense rivalry among 
manufacturers. As excess production capacity increases, while fixed costs remain high, 
manufacturers will be forced to compromise their margins and become more price-competitive. The 
ICM proposes that the major beneficiaries of intense rivalry among manufacturers will be powerful 
buyers. This tendency will be amplified by the progression of the multifold trend, as buyers become 
larger, more professional and geographically diversified, demanding still larger wind projects. This 
will significantly improve their ability to take advantage of rivalling manufacturers during a growth 
fluctuation. 
 
The next two first order impacts of low industry growth are related to the effect of growth on the 
attractiveness of the industry to new entrants, and the likeliness that incumbents will retaliate 
forcefully to such newcomers. In case of low or highly volatile growth, the wind turbine industry will 
become less attractive to potential entrants as its profitability declines. Also, as market share 
becomes scarcer, incumbents become more likely to retaliate forcefully to intrusion. The ICM thus 
proposes that low growth may provide a shield against new or emerging competitors – in essence, 
affecting the second critical uncertainty explored in this chapter. From these considerations, it is 
clear that the two critical uncertainties are somewhat interrelated, in that entry is significantly more 
likely to occur if growth rates are high – and vice versa. The last impact, proposed by the ICM is 
related to the role of the accessibility of inputs as a current bottleneck for high industry growth. The 
ICM proposes that in case of highly volatile growth, the accessibility of inputs is likely to improve, 
strengthening the bargaining position of manufacturers relative to suppliers. Low growth will 
therefore simultaneously strengthen buyers and weaken suppliers of wind turbine manufacturers. 
These effects are likely to be amplified with the progression of the multifold trend. In addition, a 
low-growth variation is likely to speed up the internationalisation of wind turbine manufacturers, as 
access to alternative markets becomes a key competitive parameter. 
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7.6 The second canonical variation: The impact of high industry growth 
This canonical variation can be thought of as a complete reversal of the above. This canonical 
variation is comparatively insensitive to the progression of the multifold trend, as many of its effects 
will be nullified or diminished by unexpectedly high growth. 
In this variation, annual growth rates of 25-40% are commonplace and excess production capacity is 
a near impossibility. Both rivalry among manufacturers and the bargaining power of buyers are kept 
thoroughly in check as demand outstrips supply. Rooted in historical precedence, the ICM proposes 
that accessibility of inputs may continue to be the bottleneck for such extreme industry growth, 
limiting the size of capacity augments and strengthening the bargaining power of suppliers. The 
attractiveness of the industry to potential entrants will increase as its profitability rises. In addition, as 
excess demand and market share increases, the threat of retaliation to entry posed by incumbents will 
decline, as there will be plenty of orders to go around. In this variation of the multifold trend, the 
entrance or emergence of one or more major new competitors is highly probable. A high-growth 
variation may delay the consolidation of the wind turbine industry, as even small manufacturers, 
unable to take advantage of economics of scale, will face little direct price competition in this market 
of plenty. 
As we have seen, periods of unexpectedly high or low growth will significantly impact the 
competitive environment of the industry. Furthermore, the growth rate will also affect the likeliness 
of the emergence or entry of a new major competitor over the coming decade. This critical 
uncertainty will be considered in the following. 
7.7 New competitors: Cooperation or antagonism? 
The other critical uncertainty repeatedly voiced by industry observers and participants interviewed 
for this report, is the possibility and consequences of the emergence246 or entrance247 of one or more 
major new competitors over the coming decade. In spite of substantial entry barriers around the 
industry, recent years have seen the entrance of a number of new and resourceful competitors. 
Industry observers and participants are especially concerned by the prospect of the emergence of one 
or more Asian low-price manufacturers, aided by highly favourable home-market advantages. This 
notion is widely shared in industry literature248. In the following, I will explore a number of potential 
causes of entry. 
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Exploring causes of entry 
Figure 7.3 below illustrates the assumptions embedded in the ICM about potential causes of entry 
into the wind turbine industry through a reversed causal tree. 
 
The ICM proposes that the level of threat from new entrants is determined by the overall 
attractiveness of the industry, the height of the entry barriers to be traversed, and the threat of 
forceful retaliation posed by incumbents. As illustrated, each of these causes is in turn determined by 
a number of second and third order determinants. 
The attractiveness of the wind turbine industry is primarily a result of current and expected 
profitability and growth rates. Looking at profitability, wind turbine manufacturers have not been 
one-sidedly profitable in recent years. The EBIT margin for the major wind turbine manufacturers in 
the period 2001-2004, was on average 13.5%. This figure covers significant variation among 
individual manufacturers (As low as 4.6% for Vestas 2003 to as high as 23.4% for Suzlon in 2001) 
indicating that, at present, the industry is not one-sidedly profitable, compared to similar production 
industries249. Conversely, the growth rate of the wind turbine industry has been high, although highly 
volatile. Expectations to continued growth and future profitability are the major determinants of the 
attractiveness of the wind turbine industry. As we have seen, these determinants are subject to 
considerable uncertainty over the coming decade. The attractiveness of the wind turbine industry to 
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potential newcomers may therefore prove a significant source of either unexpectedly high or low 
threat of entry. 
The height of entry barriers is likewise a significant determinant of the threat of new entrants. As we 
have seen in Chapter 4, incumbent manufacturers are well-protected by both tangible and intangible 
entry barriers. These barriers must be considered very stable and, as a function of the multifold trend, 
the height of entry barriers is expected to increase further as economies of scale become more 
significant and as the industry internationalises. Increasing technological standardisation may, 
however, make the product technology less proprietarity and this weakness may be exploitable by 
resourceful entrants. The entry barriers around the wind turbine industry are likely to remain 
substantial over the coming decade and are unlikely to prove a source of unexpectedly high level of 
entry. Successful entry barriers may, however, prove to be a source of an unexpectedly low level of 
entry into the industry. 
The third major determinant of the threat of new entrants faced by incumbents is their ability and 
willingness to retaliate to potential newcomers. As illustrated in figure 7.3, the industry growth rate 
again plays an important role. Although wind turbine manufacturers will become larger and more 
resourceful over the coming decade, unexpectedly high growth rates could hamper their willingness 
to retaliate forcefully to a resourceful entrant. Several large markets are currently sold out250, and 
under such conditions, it is difficult for incumbents to mount an effective retaliation. New entrants 
may simply absorb excess demand, facing little direct competition from incumbents. Furthermore, a 
determined entrant, sufficiently resourceful to overcome the substantial entry barriers, may 
successfully deter retaliation by convincing incumbents, in advance, that it cannot be forced to exit 
the industry. In periods of volatile or low growth, this is less likely as rivalry intensifies; lowering 
industry attractiveness, while incumbents become more defensive about their market shares. The 
threat of retaliation to potential entrants must therefore be considered a potential source of both an 
unexpectedly high or low threat-level over the coming decade. 
 
In light of these considerations, it is clear that a number of known uncertainties exist with regard to 
the future entrance of emergence of major new competitors into the wind turbine industry. The 
perceived attractiveness of the industry along the credibility of the threat of forceful retaliation posed 
by incumbents must be considered the main sources of uncertainty over the coming decade. In the 
following, I will consider the impact of both a high and a low level of new entrants upon the 
competitive environment of the wind turbine industry. 
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 Figure 7.4: The impact of entrance upon the competitive environment 
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Exploring the impact of entry 
Figure 7.4 below illustrates the impact of entry upon the competitive environment of the wind turbine 
industry as proposed by the ICM. 
 
On the basis of the causal tree in figure 7.4, it is possible to explore the high- and low-threat 
canonical variations of the multifold trend, and their respective impacts upon the competitive 
environment of the wind turbine industry. 
7.8 The third canonical variation: The impact of a high threat level 
Seeing this canonical variation in light of the multifold trend, it is clear that the height of the entry 
barriers around the wind turbine industry will increase substantially over the coming decade. This 
will occur as a function of the progression of the second fold of the multifold trend, anticipating that 
wind turbine manufacturers will continue to consolidate around fewer, larger and increasingly 
globalised wind turbine manufacturers, emphasising economies of scale and scope. Increasing 
minimum size of production and requirements of a global presence will present a significant obstacle 
to all but the most resourceful entrants. Moderating the height of entry barriers, the fourth fold 
proposes that, as the industry becomes less vertically integrated, sufficiently resourceful entrants will 
not necessarily be forced to enter several successive stages of the production chain. In addition, as 
the multifold trend progresses, larger and more resourceful incumbents will be better able to retaliate 
forcefully to newcomers. These consequences of the progression of the multifold trend suggest that 
entrants overcoming the continuously increasing entry barriers over the coming decade will be 
extremely resourceful, potentially enough so to permanently change the competitive environment of 
the industry. 
As illustrated in figure 7.4 above, the ICM first proposes that an increase in the threat of new entrants 
is most likely to apply to existing buyers and suppliers. Before this threat is realised, the buyers or 
suppliers (or potentially both) posing a credible threat of entry, are able to significantly increase their 
bargaining power relative to incumbents. The ICM proposes that, in the case of buyers, this is likely 
to result in demands of increased quality guarantees and extended warranty provisions as well as 
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lower prices. In addition, a generally increased threat of entry is likely to more broadly affect the 
profitability of the industry as a whole. This will occur as threatened incumbents will attempt to price 
below the entry deterring price, in an attempt to lower the attractiveness of the industry – pre-
empting entry. The ICM thus proposes that the in periods of increased threat of entry, the wind 
turbine industry will be significantly less profitable, both as a function of the specific threat from 
buyers and suppliers, but also as a function of incumbents’ expected attempts to lower the general 
attractiveness of the industry to deter entry. Based on historical precedence, resourceful and well-
informed buyers of wind turbines are likely to be the first to seize the opportunity to integrate 
backward into wind turbine manufacturing. This mode of entry is likely to occur by means of a 
takeover of one or more existing manufacturers as described in Chapter 4. As illustrated in figure 7.4, 
the ICM proposes that the entry of a new competitor will increase the intensity of rivalry in the 
industry. This will increase the power of buyers of wind turbines, while lowering the profitability of 
the industry. As illustrated above, increased competition resulting from new entrants will eventually 
lower the attractiveness of the industry to a point where the threat of still more entrants becomes 
insignificant. One or more successful entrants may therefore deter subsequent entrants as industry 
attractiveness finds a new equilibrium. 
These considerations imply that the impact of the high-threat canonical variation upon the 
competitive environment is substantial. Firstly, an increased threat of entry will markedly lower the 
profitability of the industry, whether that threat is realised or not. And secondly, if the threat is 
realised, the increasingly high entry barriers will ensure that successful entrants are highly 
resourceful, having significant long-term implications for the competitive environment of the 
industry. 
7.9 The fourth canonical variation: The impact of a low threat level 
The low-threat canonical variation basically implies the absence of the high-threat variation, and will 
thus be treated in less detail. This variation of the multifold trend assumes that the increasing entry 
barriers around the wind turbine industry will be largely successful in deterring significant entry over 
the coming decade. In this canonical variation, the adverse effects of a high threat of entry described 
above will not markedly affect the competitive environment. 
 
The identification of the four canonical variations and the exploration of their impact upon the 
competitive environment conclude Part II of this report. Through the preceding two chapters, I have 
identified a number of known forces of change in the form of predetermineds and critical 
uncertainties, which will shape the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry over the 
coming decade. The following part of this report will be concerned with exploring the strategic 
consequences of a changing competitive environment for wind turbine manufacturers. 
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- Part III - 
 
Chapter 8: Strategic consequences - adaptation & pre-emption 
The third part of this report will be concerned with exploring the strategic consequences and 
implications of the known forces of change identified in the preceding chapters. In this chapter I will 
develop a typology of the strategic groups in the wind turbine industry against which the strategic 
consequences of known changes in the competitive environment will be explored along with 
opportunities for adaptation and pre-emption. 
8.1 Establishing a typology of strategic groups 
The strategic consequences of any change in the competitive environment will necessarily be unique 
to each wind turbine manufacturer, depending on the particular sensitivities of its business model at 
the time at which change occurs. Ideally, each manufacturer will be the best judge of the particular 
implications of any recognised change in its environment. In the context of an industry-wide strategic 
foresight, it is, however, necessary to resort to useful generalisations, accepting the dangers of 
lumping diverse competitors together into broader explanatory categories. This reasoning lies at the 
heart of the positioning school, assuming that although each competitor has unique features, they can 
be usefully categorised according to the way in which they seek to fulfil the economic imperative – 
dealing with the five structural forces. Each such category is termed a strategic group. A strategic 
group thus works as an intermediate frame of reference between looking at the industry as a whole 
and considering each competitor separately251. There is, of course, no universal distinction between 
competitors in an industry. In the context of strategic foresight, any meaningful distinction between 
strategic groups must aim to provide the greatest explanatory power in terms the strategic 
consequences of known forces of change in the competitive environment. To this end, I will make 
distinctions between competitors in the wind turbine industry based on two basic features: the 
products offered and the market served. Establishing a typology of strategic groups in the wind 
turbine industry necessarily involves choosing meaningful axes illustrating these basic differences. 
Related to the products offered, the first explanatory axis adopted here is proposed by Morgan 
Stanley (2005) emphasising the importance of the following distinction252: 
1. Manufacturers offering a full, differentiated and technologically demanding product range. 
2. Manufacturers offering a narrow, low-priced and technologically standardised product 
range. 
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Often proposed in various guises in strategic theory, this distinction is closely related to the two 
generic strategies; cost leadership and differentiation, proposed by Porter (1980)253 as well as the 
distinction between generalists and specialists proposed by Sheth & Sisodia (2002)254. As is the case 
for many production industries, this distinction seems no less relevant in the context of the wind 
turbine industry. Distributing current top-ten manufacturers255 along this axis, it is clear that Vestas 
Wind systems, followed by Enercon, are by far the manufacturers with the broadest and most 
differentiated product ranges, being represented in all turbine size categories256. Both these 
manufacturers aspire to technological leadership on- as well as offshore, across their product 
ranges257. Also Spanish Ecotécnia and German Nordex offer relatively wide product ranges in spite 
of their small market shares258. German REpower and Indian Suzlon holds positions near the centre; 
REpower with the more differentiated product range of the two, being represented in the mainstream 
segment (with four models)259 and offering the largest turbine (5 MW) on the market260. Suzlon is 
mainly represented in the small-sized segment (four models), with a single model in the mainstream 
segment261. At the opposite end of the axis we find Gamesa Eólica, GE Wind and Siemens, having 
narrow product ranges, gravitating toward the mainstream segment, offering little product 
specialisation262. These manufacturers are often characterised as ‘followers’ in terms of product 
technology263. Mitsubishi constitutes a ‘pole’ on this axis, narrowly offering only two models in the 
small-sized segment264. 
 
I terms of market served, BTM (2005b) emphasises the highly oligopolistic nature of the wind 
turbine industry, distinguishing between global oligarchs and the host of smaller domestic and 
regional players. BTM distributes manufacturers along the following explanatory axis265: 
1. Manufacturers with a global market scope, supplying all major markets. 
2. Manufacturers with a selective market scope, supplying only limited domestic or regional 
markets. 
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Again, this distinction resonates in strategic literature, resembling not only the focus strategies 
proposed by Porter (1980)266, but also Sheth & Sisodia’s (2002) distinction between generalists and 
market specialists267. Among current top-ten manufacturers, BTM (2005b) recognises only a single 
global competitor, Vestas Wind Systems, but emphasises the rapid emergence of Siemens, GE Wind, 
Enercon and Gamesa, into this category. Among the host of smaller selective competitors, BTM 
ranks Nordex AG, Mitsubishi MHI, REpower, Suzlon and Ecotécnia. In addition to these, BTM 
identifies a number even smaller of manufacturers holding highly selective positions on their specific 
national markets268. 
 
When pairing these two axes, it is possible to illustrate the joint positions of the top-ten wind turbine 
manufacturers in the space between them. These are illustrated in Figure 8.1. As it can be seen from 
the ranking of the manufacturers, three principal strategic groups can be distinguished along these 
two axes. From their approximate positions in the chart, I term these groups, narrow-line 
industrialists, full-line differentiators and selective market specialists. 
As it can be seen from the 
distribution of manufactures 
across the chart, the 
distinction between full-line 
and narrow-line 
manufacturers is much 
clearer among global 
competitors than domestic 
and regional market 
specialists. One reason for 
this may be that 
manufacturers limited to 
selective markets will not 
generally see it as an aim in 
itself to offer a wide or narrow product range, but will offer the particular product categories 
demanded by their markets – whatever this may be. Manufacturers with a global market scope, on 
the other hand, can afford a wider degree of specialisation as a full- or narrow-line manufacturer, 
without spreading efforts too thinly or sacrificing volume. I will return to this and other tradeoffs 
between the strategic groups later in this chapter.  
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Figure 8.1 is necessarily a highly idealised picture of competitive strategies, and it is clear that more 
explanatory axes could be added to the analysis, further subdividing the three strategic groups. 
Experimentation with additional explanatory axes; market share and ownership269, however, revealed 
that very little extra explanatory power was added through these efforts270. 
 
In the context of strategic foresight, an additional consideration is needed with regard to strategic 
groups; time. Traditional analysis of strategic groups, for the purposes of strategic decision-making, 
aims to provide a ‘snapshot’ of the positions of competitors in an industry. Over a time horizon of a 
decade, it is possible (and highly likely) that competitors will migrate between these strategic groups, 
perhaps to the extent that one or more groups will be abandoned altogether. This process is integral 
to industry evolution. Over the time horizon investigated in this report, the identified strategic groups 
will therefore be analysed as archetypes. Although no competitor is ever fully archetypical – e.g. 
sharing all the features of a ‘pure’ market specialist - it may, through strategic choice, strive to 
achieve such features. In the following I will consider the characteristics of each strategic group. 
8.2 The full-line differentiator 
The first archetypical strategic group considered here is the full-line differentiator. When looking at 
the current representatives of this group, they are set apart by their wide and differentiated product 
ranges relative to their competitors. Vestas and Enercon are represented in every size category and 
offer a range of highly specialised products outside of mainstream271. These include turbine designs 
optimised for low-wind areas272, inaccessible sites273 as well as offshore sites274. Enercon’s product 
range is further set apart by its ring generator technology, making its entire product range gearless, as 
well as offering specialised diesel-wind off-grid systems275. A key characteristic - and necessity - of 
full-line differentiators, is attaining and maintaining technological leadership to sustain proprietarity 
and product differentiation relative to competitors276. Differentiation is a central advantage of this 
strategic group as a way of dealing with powerful buyers. Facing little direct competition, full-line 
differentiators are able to offer technologically advanced wind projects at inaccessible sites - offers 
not easily imitated by competitors. As ideal onshore sites are gradually exhausted and restrictions to 
size and location increase in major markets, this capability may prove essential. 
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Figure 8.2: Key variables influenced by full-line differentiators 
Attaining and sustaining a position as a full-line differentiator is a demanding task. To sustain 
differentiation and technological leadership, both Enercon and Vestas are integrated backwards into 
many areas of component manufacturing and maintain extensive R&D efforts in a number of core 
component areas. This feature significantly increases the fixed costs of their business models277. 
Furthermore, the downside of technologically pioneering projects is the need to share the increased 
financial risk with risk adverse developers and buyers. This involves issuing extensive warranty 
provisions and a willingness to face substantial liabilities in case of product failure. Vestas is a prime 
example of this, issuing warranties of up to twelve years278 and incurred a loss of some €38 million in 
2002 after a serial flaw in its pioneering offshore installation at Horns Reef, Denmark279. Substantial 
financial risk, high level of backward integration and the need to maintain significant R&D activities 
indicates a high minimum efficient scale - and thus the need for internationalisation. These factors 
also suggests that significant advantages could be obtained from being part of a diversified company, 
lending financial stability to the business model along with the possibility of leveraging technologies 
from other divisions to sustain product diversification. 
Full-line differentiators are thus seeking to influence the competitive environment of the wind 
turbine industry through three principal variables: their level of product differentiation, their rate of 
new product discovery and the extent of their warranty provisions. The strategic consequences of this 
are explored through the assumptions imbedded in the ICM as illustrated in figure 8.2 below: 
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The ICM emphasises the role of product differentiation in dealing with powerful buyers, moderating 
their bargaining power and price sensitivity, while raising switching costs. Also, through their 
emphasis on product innovation, full-line differentiators take up a central role as technological 
pioneers of the industry, increasing the competitiveness of wind power relative to its substitutes. The 
ICM proposes that the highly differentiated and technologically proprietary products along with 
extensive warranties are all sources of substantial mobility barriers280 around this strategic group. 
Although extensive warranties make full-line differentiators financially risky for potential entrants to 
take over, they also increase reliance of this business model upon high quality inputs from suppliers. 
The ICM further suggests that competition among full-line differentiators take the form of 
technological rivalry, as the rapid emergence of new products increases product-by-product 
substitution. This suggests a continuation of the historical pattern of high rate obsolescence among 
existing products within this strategic group. 
8.3 The narrow-line industrialist 
The second strategic group considered here is the narrow-line industrialist. The four representatives 
of this group illustrated in figure 8.1 are characterised by their focus upon a relatively narrow, 
mainstream product range and a fairly broad market scope. Unlike full-line differentiators, the 
primary focus of the narrow-line industrialists is cost - and over time - cost reduction. Low price and 
highly reliable products are the central capabilities through which narrow-line industrialists deal with 
the economic imperative. Perhaps the most important ingredient in achieving cost leadership is 
volume and predictability in production, which would underline the need for either an attractive 
home market or a global presence. Gamesa has achieved the highest volume through a global market 
share of some 18.1% (making it the second largest manufacturer in the world), with an export share 
of a mere 12.5%, giving testament to the attractiveness of its Spanish home market281. Gamesa has, 
however, undertaken successful internationalisation initiatives and is set to increase its export share 
significantly in the years to come282. In terms of volume, Gamesa is followed by GE Wind and 
Siemens, holding market shares of 11.3% and 6.2%, and export shares of 75.8% and 98.8 
respectively. Mitsubishi has, so far, attained the least volume among current narrow-line 
industrialists, with a market share of just 2.6%. A significant share, 65.6%, of this output is exported 
outside its Japanese home market283. The most obvious advantage of volume is economies of scale in 
production, which is a significant factor in wind turbine manufacturing284. A second advantage is the 
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benefits of cost reductions attained through process innovation, which are proportional to a firm’s 
level of output. Spreading an average cost reduction over a large production volume yields the 
greater absolute benefit285. For this reason, process innovation as a means of sustaining cost 
leadership is a major feature of this strategic group. 
Unlike full-line differentiators, the manufacturers in this group are followers in terms of product 
innovation; favouring reliable and standardised mainstream turbines286. This lessens the need to issue 
extensive warranties and thus the financial risk shared with buyers. 
In terms of backward integration, Gamesa seems to be the exception, being active across all main 
components categories, while the remaining narrow-line industrialists favour significantly lighter 
models than those of the full-line differentiators287. 
Narrow-line industrialists are thus seeking to influence the competitive environment of the wind 
turbine industry through two principal variables: Attaining economies of scale in production and 
maintaining a high rate of process innovation. The strategic consequences of this are explored 
through the assumptions imbedded in the ICM as illustrated in figure 8.3 below: 
 
The ICM emphasises the determining role of economies of scale in production as a means of building 
mobility barriers around this strategic group and in setting minimum standards for the size of narrow-
line industrialists. Size in particular is essential in dealing with powerful buyers as a means of 
lessening the importance of individual orders. The ICM also proposes that competition between 
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manufacturers in this strategic group takes the form of struggles for market share to achieve volume, 
and aggressive price wars in times of failing demand. Through the emphasis of narrow-line 
industrialists upon process discovery and product reliability, this strategic group takes up the role of 
‘mainstreamers’ in the industry, improving the price competitiveness of wind turbine technology 
relative to substitutes. 
8.4 The selective market specialist 
The third strategic group considered are the selective market specialists. These manufacturers are 
characterised by their limited market scope and their ability to tailor their product range to the needs 
of their selective domestic or regional market(s). It is important to note that more manufacturers exist 
in this strategic group than illustrated in figure 8.1, accounting only for top-ten manufacturers288. 
When looking at the top-ten representatives of this group, it is clear that Indian Suzlon, Chinese 
Goldwind and Spanish Ecotécnia are the most outspoken examples of selective market specialists. 
These manufacturers’ presence is exclusive to their home markets, holding domestic market shares of 
42.8%, 20.1% and 9.4% respectively289. Both Suzlon and Goldwind focuses on narrow product 
ranges favouring the smaller turbines traditionally demanded in their home markets, while Ecotécnia 
offers a wider range of models on its selected market290. REpower and Nordex are based in the 
attractive German market, where the larger part of their turbines is sold291. Both these manufacturers 
have product ranges focused on the mainstream segment292, which may account for their ability to 
attain minor market shares in a number of other - primarily European - markets293. If these two 
manufacturers continue to increase their market scope to attain volume, they may eventually migrate 
out of this strategic group and become narrow-line industrialists. 
As the name implies, careful selection of markets and the attainment of ‘home court’ advantage is the 
instrument through which selective market specialists deal with the economic imperative. Beyond the 
technological and economic necessity of a specialised product range ideally suited for the conditions 
of the selected market(s), various forms of protectionism are likewise part of creating home market 
advantages. Domestic manufacturing content requirements, preferential tax breaks, exclusive or 
preferential access to national R&D funds, favourable treatment by planning authorities and political 
contacts are all part of the competition in various national wind turbine markets294. Such policies 
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present significant mobility barriers to potential entrants into this strategic group295. Also less 
tangible factors, such as seniority with buyers, cultural insight, etiquette and linguistic skills may 
equally play a role when locally based buyers decide between bids for wind projects. 
Selective market specialists are thus seeking to influence the competitive environment of the wind 
turbine industry through three principal variables: importance of location, exclusivity of government 
subsidies and exclusivity of government policies. The strategic consequences of this are explored 
through the assumptions imbedded in the ICM as illustrated in figure 8.4 below: 
 
As illustrated in figure 8.4, the ICM suggests that the variables influenced by selective market 
specialists all have the same essential effect: to raise entry barriers around their selective market(s). 
In the absence of highly differentiated products or full price competitiveness, selective market 
specialists seek to lower the intensity of rivalry in their home markets, while keeping potential 
entrants at bay. 
8.5 The strategic consequences of the forces of change 
It is clear that the strategic groups identified here are – and will be – in very different positions with 
regard to dealing with the challenges posed by industry change over the coming decade. The strategic 
consequences of change upon the strategic groups are illustrated in figure 8.5 below. 
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In figure 8.5, the four folds of the multifold trend and the two critical uncertainties are symbolised by 
arrows 1-4 and 5-6 respectively. The first fold towards more conservative, professional and 
geographically diverse buyers of large wind projects will cause a gradually widening market scope 
over the coming decade (arrow 1). The second fold towards increasing importance of scale and scope 
in wind turbine manufacturing, is a separating force (arrow 2) increasing the gap between the few 
truly globalised wind turbine manufactures and their regionally and nationally based competitors. 
The third and fourth folds of the multifold trend (arrows 3 and 4) are depicted along an additional 
axis which will be of growing importance to wind turbine manufacturers; industrialisation. 
Increasing standardisation and maturity of wind technology and the development of an increasingly 
specialised and independent supplier network will push the strategic groups toward serial rather than 
order production and increased outsourcing. These two forces are likely to be instrumental in the 
final phase of the transition of the wind turbine industry from entrepreneurial order production to 
industrial serial production as described in chapter 6. The major critical uncertainties are likewise 
represented in figure 8.5 above. During the coming decade, volatile industry growth could cause 
unexpected drops or increases in market scope as new or existing markets develop or stagnate (arrow 
5). Also, the possible entry or emergence of new competitors (arrow 6), can occur as existing 
competitors fortify their position within their strategic group through a strategic alliance or buyout by 
another company and/or if they decide to abandon their current group and enter into another. 
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In the following I will consider these strategic consequences in light of the circumstances of each 
group. Such explorative considerations must necessarily be speculative, and for the individual 
manufacturer the options outlined here will naturally involve many more considerations specific to 
their particular circumstances. 
 
Strategic consequences for full-line differentiators 
The progression of the multifold trend and the canonical variations pose a number of unique 
challenges to this strategic group. A major issue for full-line differentiators is maintaining product 
differentiation in the face of increasingly conservative buyers and ongoing technological 
standardisation. 
Professional buyers will increasingly consider investments in wind large wind projects on similar 
terms with other long-term investments in generating capacity. These buyers will likely not pay a 
premium for wind projects because they are differentiated (gearless, offshore, large, etc.), but 
because they are cheaper or more reliable through technological differentiation. The trade-off 
between proprietarity and reliability of differentiated and pioneering projects has been, and is likely 
to remain, an important issue for full-line differentiators dealing with powerful buyers. In this 
context, extensive warranty provisions will continue to be imperative as a way for full-line 
differentiators to offer to share increased financial risk with risk adverse buyers. 
With the ongoing standardisation of wind turbine technology and the development of an independent 
supplier network, full-line differentiators may benefit from rethinking their relationship with 
component suppliers. An obvious opportunity for full-line differentiators is to lower both cost and 
fixed costs by outsourcing components which do not directly contribute to product differentiation. In 
doing so, it will be vital to retain in-house production of a selected number of R&D-heavy and 
proprietary core components to maintain differentiation and technological leadership. The line 
between in-housed core components and outsourced standardised components need not be sharply 
defined. Development partnerships between manufacturers and independent component suppliers 
will become more common over the coming decade as multifold trend progresses. Such partnerships 
may prove an important instrument for full-line differentiators, not only as a means of sharing R&D 
expenditures and risk with suppliers, but also in improving product quality. Because of extensive 
warranties, full-line differentiators have a strong incentive to induce a ‘culture of accuracy’ upon 
component suppliers – as well as upon themselves. 
Although full-line differentiators are highly sensitive to periods of low or volatile growth - because 
relatively high fixed costs - they do, however, have a number of unique options open to them. 
Because of their wide product ranges, they have the option to shift emphasis from one product 
segment to another, or alternatively; adapt their product range to the conditions of a more promising 
 103 
market. Also, in periods of high growth they are able to fully utilise a seller’s market across their 
entire product range. One interviewee commented that the recent stagnation of the offshore market 
was in fact caused by growth in the onshore/mainstream segments. The ‘safer’ onshore projects are 
usually preferred by manufacturers in times of high growth. Should this situation be reversed; 
manufacturers with broad product ranges and offshore capabilities are able to shift their emphasis, 
while narrow-liners are stuck. The ability to retain flexibility across wide product ranges and markets 
is likewise an important instrument in hedging against emerging or entering competitors. As one 
product segment or market becomes unprofitable, full-line differentiators has the option to last it out 
using profits from other segments or markets - or by shifting emphasis altogether. Seen in this light, 
there is little doubt that the technologically challenging offshore potential is the major opportunity 
for full-line differentiators over the coming decade - a market that highlights the relative advantages 
of this strategic group. The offshore segment is an opportunity to continue the historical up scaling of 
the turbine and to maintain focus on product discovery - in spite of ongoing standardisation. 
Full-line differentiators are perhaps the strategic group with the most to gain from integrating 
forward into project development - a possibility remaining largely unexploited among wind turbine 
manufacturers today296. Being a developer opens the possibility to demonstrate pioneering 
technology in self-developed projects, which can then be sold on under warranty then (if) reliability 
and profitability has been demonstrated. A further option is hedging against cancelled orders – an 
attractive option for manufacturers with high fixed costs – by installing these turbines in ones own 
projects. It is clear that influencing the competitive environment through rapid product discovery, 
product differentiation and warranties will become increasingly challenging over the coming decade. 
 
Strategic consequences for narrow-line industrialists 
It would seem that narrow-line industrialists are the major beneficiaries of the progression of the 
multifold trend. Powerful, professional and conservative buyers will emphasise price and reliability 
over other criteria, and this is what narrow-line industrialists are designed to deliver. The 
geographical diversification of wind turbine markets and the increasing size of orders are likely to 
emphasise advantages of scale in wind turbine manufacturing as wall as continued 
internationalisation. These tendencies are both opportunities and requirements for narrow-line 
industrialists. Market share and market scope will be imperative in achieving volume of production 
and reliability of demand, while hedging against currency rate fluctuations and low or volatile 
growth. Also, the ongoing standardisation of wind turbine technology will allow narrow-line 
industrialists to reduce cost and streamline assembly and production. 
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Outsourcing components and R&D expenditures to independent component suppliers is likewise an 
opportunity to lower fixed- and capital costs. This may be especially relevant for narrow-line 
industrialists seeking to internationalise without the necessary means to build their own production 
facilities abroad. As narrow-line industrialists exploit the opportunity to become ‘efficient 
assemblers’ of mainstream wind turbines, an important issue will be dealing with increasingly 
powerful component suppliers. Placing large single orders, while maintaining partial in-house 
component production, will be important tools with which to improve their bargaining position. 
As a consequence of the progression of the multifold trend, the most significant opportunity for 
narrow-line industrialists over the coming decade may be a partial or full shift from order production 
to serial production297. Crossing this barrier may prove a cardinal shift in the history of the wind 
turbine industry as new ‘unbeatable’ cost records are set. The risks involved in this form of 
production are related to storing large amounts of turbines in the expectation of future sales. Product-
by-product substitution may render stored turbines obsolete, or a low-growth canonical variation may 
cause storage costs to rise to unacceptable levels. In both events, serial producers will be forced to 
sell the stored turbines at a discount. This is the prototype for the initial stages of a prolonged price 
war. As price is already a central competitive parameter in the main stream segment, narrow-line 
industrialists are particularly sensitive to prolonged price wars as an instrument to defend market 
share in periods of low demand or against new competitors. In terms of the latter, increasingly 
standardised technology and the development of an independent supplier network are perhaps the 
most important factors allowing new major competitors to enter or emerge into the wind turbine 
industry over the coming decade. 
Another opportunity for narrow-line industrialists over the coming decade lies in their role as 
‘mainstreamers’ of the industry. By emphasising standardised and reliable products, they gain the 
confidence of less professional and more risk adverse buyers such as private investor groups, not 
available to full-line differentiators and selective market specialists. 
Industry evolution seems to favour narrow-line industrialists seeking to influence the competitive 
environment through process discovery and achieving economies of scale.  
 
Strategic consequences for selective market specialists 
At face value, the challenges posed by the progression of the multifold trend and the canonical 
variations seem to present the greatest threats and the fewest opportunities to the selective market 
specialist. During the coming decade, manufactures in this strategic group will have to meet the 
challenge of maintaining a home court advantage in the face of increasingly global competition. The 
                                                 
297
 Order production is scheduled after incoming orders, while serial production aims at a constant or otherwise 
optimal production flow. 
 105 
forces of change identified in this report would indicate that this will become significantly more 
difficult in the years to come. 
As buyers become increasingly professional, economic considerations, rather than national 
affiliation, will likely play a greater role in placing orders. This may disadvantage selective market 
specialists as their ability to utilise economies of scale and scope will be limited to the confines of 
their home market. Also, as large wind turbine manufacturers globalise; the risk of entry into the 
home markets of selective market specialists increases. This consideration will especially relevant for 
market specialists located in highly attractive markets, experiencing a prolonged high-growth 
canonical variation – or the mere expectation of one. Also, the increasing size of orders - in financial 
terms as well as MW capacity - will disadvantage smaller manufacturers relative to their global 
competitors. Many of these may find that they lack the financial backing and production capacity to 
complete for them. The most lucrative - and most demanding - buyer segments may thus move out of 
reach and revenues will have to be generated from what remains. Discovering and specialising to the 
requirements of such remaining demand – segments considered too small, special or otherwise 
inaccessible for global manufacturers – are likely to be primary opportunities for selective market 
specialists facing global competition. Pre-empting entry may require selective market specialists to 
emphasise political lobbyism as a means of maintaining entry barriers around their domestic markets. 
Several governments have explicitly expressed their desire to sustain national wind turbine industries 
in the face of global competition. Although direct industry support is usually prohibited, various 
indirect forms of protectionism and preferential treatment are already advantages commonly 
exploited by selective market specialists. Systemising efforts to maximise this advantage seems a 
natural response to increased global competitive pressure. 
From the viewpoint of selective market specialists, the increasing standardisation of wind turbine 
technology and the ongoing development of the component supplier network are more positive 
developments. As more components, customised for the needs of the wind turbine industry, will 
become available from independent suppliers; backward integration into several areas of component 
manufacturing will be less of a requirement. Outsourcing R&D and capital intensive components, 
such as blades and control systems presents an obvious opportunity for smaller manufacturers to 
lessen capital requirements as well as fixed costs. Likewise, cancelled orders may well be ‘wiped off’ 
on suppliers with positive effects on the financial risks of small manufacturers undertaking uncertain 
or large projects. Emphasising wind turbine assembly rather than production will allow increased 
focus on locating and serving selected market segments - which is where the competitive advantage 
of this business model lies. The ability to bargain with independent component suppliers to achieve 
these advantages will likely be an important issue for small manufacturers over the coming decade. 
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A low-growth variation is a particularly serious event for any selective market specialist, as they are 
less able to ‘retreat’ to more attractive markets. Volatile or low demand may, however, have some 
longer-term positive effects for this strategic group. Deterring global competitors from entering their 
market(s) is a key priority for a selective market specialist. Volatile or low growth keeps potential 
entrants at bay and is likely to make future entrants more hesitant if uncertainty about growth is 
prolonged or perhaps even permanent. Taking advantage of uncertain demand, while deterring 
competitors may be achieved if market specialists are able to last out a low-growth period and take 
advantage of a subsequent upswing, facing less competitive pressure. Hedging against a low-growth 
canonical variation is a primary reason for this strategic group to lower fixed costs by outsourcing 
components. This eventuality also highlights the potential benefit for small manufacturers of 
engaging in a supplementary business, which may generate survival revenue in low-growth periods. 
Nonetheless, influencing the competitive environment through a favourable home market, while 
enjoying exclusivity of government support and policies will become increasingly challenge over the 
coming decade. 
8.6 Pre-emption: Fortification, mobility or exit? 
Thus far, I have considered strategic consequences for wind turbine manufacturers determined to 
defend status quo. A perfectly valid conclusion, however, of a wind turbine manufacturer, having 
considered the forces of change, may be to pre-empt and abandon its current strategy. In this event, a 
number of options present themselves to each strategic group. 
 
Because of the substantial capital requirements, financial risk and extensive R&D activities needed to 
maintain product proprietarity, discovery, differentiation and warranties; some full-line 
differentiations will likely see it as an opportunity to become part of a larger diversified company. 
Vestas is an obvious candidate for this possibility. Conversely, this would indicate that large 
diversified narrow-line industrialists, such as GE Wind and Siemens, are obvious candidates for 
entry into this strategic group. Because of their versatile skills, a number of more direct mobility 
strategies are likewise open to full-line differentiators seeking to abandon their strategic group. The 
most obvious of these would be to spin off peripheral product lines, streamline production, cut back 
on R&D expenditure and outsource component production - and become a narrow-line industrialist. 
Investigating the option of redirecting R&D and know-how to process discovery and taking 
advantage of scale may in all cases be time well spent for full-line differentiators. Conversely, it is 
more difficult to imagine an already globalised manufacturer intentionally limiting its market scope 
to become a selective market specialist - this option is nonetheless available. Another option open to 
backward integrated manufacturers with large existing R&D competences, is to become an 
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independent component supplier in an area of particular competence. The particular capabilities of a 
full-line differentiator failing to be profitable in the face of change may be well suited for this role. 
 
In spite of the relative attractiveness of this strategic group, some narrow-line industrialists may feel 
that their capabilities are more fully utilised elsewhere. As described above, this may particularly be 
the case for large, diversified firms which are able to leverage extensive R&D resources across many 
divisions. A widely held notion in the industry is that if GE Wind and Siemens decide to commit 
fully to the wind turbine industry, they will expand their existing product lines; perhaps to the point 
where they could more rightfully be considered full-line differentiators. Developing proprietary, path 
breaking product technology while using their financial strength to bear the risk may grant these 
manufacturers greater relative advantages than the in the ‘dogfight’ among industry mainstreamers. 
As is the case for full-line differentiators, it is difficult to imagine internationalising narrow-line 
industrialists intentionally limiting their activities to a few selective markets in order to become 
selective market specialists. This option seems particularly prohibitive for narrow-line industrialists 
seeking to achieve advantages of scale in production. 
 
Mobility or exit strategies seem a particularly worth wile consideration for selective market 
specialists seeking to improve their prospects in the face of unfavourable change. A selective market 
specialist may attempt to internationalise to more fully utilise advantages of scale and scope, and 
seek to become a full-line differentiator or a narrow line industrialist. These options naturally require 
substantial resources and, as the oligopolistic nature of the industry would suggest, there is only 
room for a very limited number of global manufacturers. In a decade from now, there may well be 
room for fewer than today. Although these options will prove prohibitively resource demanding for 
the majority of small manufacturers, it may be a relevant option for selective market specialists 
supported by an attractive home market and backed by a larger parent company. Establishing a 
strategic alliance with a larger company may be forces upon many selective market specialists 
seeking to internationalise. Suzlon is an obvious example of a candidate for becoming a narrow-line 
specialist. It seems much harder to identify likely candidates for entry into the full-line 
differentiators’ strategic group. More realistic strategies for most selective market specialists may be 
to retreat vertically into either project development or component manufacturing. The former option 
seems the most obvious way for a selective market specialist to redeploy its proprietary knowledge 
of its selected market by becoming a domestic developer. Local knowledge of legislation, regional 
planning, public perception and culture are much needed skills for international utility companies 
seeking public backing for wind projects. Backward integrated selective market specialists may 
likewise exploit proprietary knowledge to become an independent component supplier. In either of 
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these positions, the firm would no longer be a direct competitor to global wind turbine manufacturers 
in its domestic market – but a potential customer. 
 
In this chapter I have considered a number of strategic consequences of the progression of the 
multifold trend and of the canonical variations established in Part II. At this point, it is important to 
realise that these forces of change represent only the major anticipations and questions which are 
known, or believed to be known, in the present. In fact, it would be highly surprising if no surprising 
changes occurred in the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry over the coming 
decade. In the following chapter, I will consider the strategic consequences of the forces of change 
which we have yet to recognise. 
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- Part III - 
 
Chapter 9: Deep uncertainty - what we don’t know we don’t know 
This chapter will concern itself with all the strategically relevant information that was missed, 
forgotten, wrongfully omitted, not recognised, or otherwise ignored so far. Because of the influence 
of combinatorial and dynamic complexity, sensitivity to initial conditions, and self-altering prophesy, 
this report is likely to have merely scratched the surface of how the future will unfold over the 
coming decade. Strategic foresight must necessarily be limited to what is known or believed to be 
relevant at the time at which the foresight is made. In this chapter I will consider the possibility of 
mitigating the strategic consequences of such unrecognised uncertainty through monitoring and early 
warning. 
9.1 What is known, and what is not 
As we progress toward some future point in time – roughly the year 2016 in the context of this report 
– more information about the final state of the system at that time is gradually made available. 
Immediately before transpiration of that point in time, information about the final state of the system 
will be near-perfect and we can regard nearly all process of change as deterministic. As we pass that 
point in time, the state of the system finally becomes history and is rendered utterly unalterable. This 
is a gradual process through which expectations are confirmed or disconfirmed, questions are 
answered, and previously unrecognised issues are introduced. As the point in time considered in the 
context of this report is still a decade away, it is clear that much information about the state of the 
competitive environment is inaccurate, uncertain or unknown. In recognition of this, it is the purpose 
of monitoring and early warning efforts to discover new, strategically relevant information as the 
earliest possible time at which it becomes available. 
9.2 Monitoring and early warning 
The perpetual question arising when searching for signs of change, which have yet to be recognised, 
is what to look for. Some common answers have been unfocused environmental scanning298, various 
forms of sensitivity and risk analysis299 and competitor monitoring300. An alternative to these 
approaches is presented by the explicit establishment of the multifold trend and its canonical 
variations. Having made recognised expectations and major questions about the future explicit 
provides a natural focus for obtaining new, strategically relevant information. 
 
                                                 
298
 See Van Wyk 1997 
299
 See Gilad 2004 
300
 See Porter 1980 
 110 
Monitoring the progress and pace of the individual folds of the multifold trend provides a systematic 
basis for continuously verifying and updating strategic expectations about the competitive 
environment. As new information becomes available, folds that are no longer strategically relevant 
can be excluded from the multifold trend, while new expectations can be included. Folds progressing 
unexpectedly (reversing, oscillating, changing pace, etc.), proving the initial expectation wrong, can 
be reconsidered as a canonical variation. Conversely, monitoring canonical variations provides a 
systematic basis for continuously verifying and updating strategically relevant eventualities worth 
hedging against. Clarified canonical variations can thus be included in the multifold trend as 
predetermineds, while outcomes of new strategic questions can be taken into account as new 
canonical variations. 
 
In recognition of the existence of deep uncertainty, the multifold trend and the canonical variations 
identified and explored in this report are not static constructs which will remain equally relevant for 
strategic decision making throughout the coming decade. Rather, they form a basis for strategic 
decision making in the present, and provide a framework for systematically and explicitly verifying 
and updating assumptions about forces of change and their strategic consequences over time. This 
concludes Part III of this report. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusions & Perspectives 
Through Part I of this report, I first made explicit a number of assumptions about the variables and 
interconnections relevant to strategic decision-making in the competitive environment of the wind 
turbine industry. Part II identified a number of known forces of change assumed to influence the 
competitive environment over the coming decade. Part III then explored the strategic consequences 
of these forces for wind turbine manufacturers. On that basis, this chapter will be concerned with 
answering the research question posed in Chapter 1, as well as discussing the perspectives of 
strategic foresight in general and the one contained in this report in particular. 
10.1 Answering the research question 
So, what forces will shape the competitive environment in the global wind turbine industry over the 
coming 10 years and, what will be the strategic consequences for wind turbine manufacturers? 
Briefly, the known forces of change identified in Part II can be summarised as a number of 
challenges posed to wind turbine manufacturers over the coming decade. These include: 
 The challenge of concentrated, conservative, professional and international buyers of still larger 
wind projects 
 The challenge of increasing importance of scale and scope in wind turbine manufacturing 
 The challenge of increasing standardisation and maturity of wind technology and the increasing 
emphasis on process discovery 
 The challenge of the increasingly specialised and independent supplier network 
 The challenge of volatile industry growth and market scope 
 The challenge of entry or emergence of new competitors 
 
As described in Part III, wind turbine manufacturers are – and will be – in very different positions 
with regard to meeting these challenges and their strategic consequences over the coming decade: 
 Full-line differentiators must maintain cost advantage through product differentiation and 
technological leadership in the face of an increasingly mature technology and standardised 
components. Exploiting the emerging offshore market while seriously considering becoming part 
of a larger differentiated company, are the key opportunities for this type of manufacturer. 
Failure to do this can be favourably pre-empted by becoming a narrow-line industrialist or by 
retreating backward into component manufacturing. 
 Narrow-line industrialists must streamline their production to cut cost and increase reliability, 
taking advantage of the developing supplier network, while seeking scale, scope and volume in 
production. Achieving full serially optimised production is the key opportunity for this type of 
manufacturer. Narrow-line industrialists with extensive R&D capabilities may favourably pre-
empt by becoming a full-line differentiator. 
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 Selective market specialists must maintain entry barriers around their selected national and/or 
regional markets in the face of increasing global competitors exploiting superior advantages of 
scale, scope and technological capability. Identifying and specialising to market segments which 
are unattractive or inaccessible to larger competitors, while forming protectionist alliances with 
governments, are the key opportunities for this type of manufacturer. Selective market specialists 
can pre-empt this development by increasing their market scope and become a full-line 
differentiator or a narrow-line industrialist. Alternatively, the proprietary market knowledge 
possessed by selective market specialists may be redeployed through becoming a developer. 
10.2 Perspectives 
A valid question, first posed in Chapter 2, is whether the research question of this report can even be 
answered in any meaningful way. Given the constraints imposed by the major sources of uncertainty 
on any attempt to consider the long-term future, it is clear that no current answer to the research 
question can be exhaustive. Hence, the findings of this report are necessarily incomplete - but are 
they meaningful, and to whom? 
 
It is implicit to the findings that they should, in some manner, be meaningful to decision-makers 
faced with the problem of designing business or governance systems over the coming decade. In 
saying this, it should be noted that this report is subject to academic standards appropriate to that of a 
master thesis, and would no doubt have looked very different if written directly to specific industry 
decision-makers. Although theoretical and methodological considerations would have been 
marginalised and practical use of the findings emphasised and specified, the substance of the report 
would have remained. 
 
Through the somewhat experimental method employed here, the substance of this report is a 
systematic exploration of the strategic consequences of the expectations and major questions 
currently held by industry observers and participants about the future of their industry. Imbedded in 
such an exercise is both a principal strength and a weakness. On the one hand, the expectations and 
major questions explored are the industry’s own, and must therefore hold intrinsic meaning and 
relevance to that industry. On the other hand, for the very same reason, the expectations and major 
questions may be inherently rooted in the existing mental models of the industry, and therefore be 
firmly ‘inside the box’. 
The same argument can equally be directed at the rigorousness of the method employed in the 
systematic exploration of expectations and major questions. The ICM too is firmly rooted in a 
specific – and inherently limited – mindset; that of the five forces framework. A valid, question is 
weather five forces are enough to meaningfully describe a competitive environment as complex as 
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the wind turbine industry - an industry firmly set in political systems as well as economic ones. 
Likewise, there may well be a trade-off between the systematic rigorousness of the method and the 
intuitive imagination, which would otherwise take its place. Unstructured participatory methods or, 
more commonly, unaided intuition does not, however, guarantee an unlimited and sufficiently 
imaginative mindset. Rather, as it is often the case, the reasoning remains implicit, leaving no audit 
trail and little internal consistency. 
 
Failing to take into consideration the truly unexpected events for which business and governance 
systems are unprepared, and which is currently considered ‘off design’, is a danger implicit to all 
assumptions about the long-term future. Such assumptions are nonetheless an unavoidable part of 
decision-making, whether made implicit and intuitively or explicit and systematically. As I will 
argue, it is the role of strategic foresight to provide a rationally defendable basis for thinking 
imaginatively and playfully about strategic choices over the long-term future.
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Appendix A: Variables, terms & descriptions 
 
This appendix accounts for the desk study through which the variables identified in Chapter 3 was 
empirically grounded in Chapter 4. The desk study initially identified a ‘core body’ of industry 
literature by a number of consultants and observers of the industry such as BTM Consult, Danske 
Equities, Morgan Stanley and Carnegie Securities Research along with The International Energy 
Agency. Using these sources, the identified variables were assessed in terms of their relevance and 
effect upon the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry. The variables not addressed in 
the core literature formed the basis of lines of enquiry into more specialised literature and empirical 
studies such as Takeuchi and Ancona & McVeigh, addressing the relevance and effect of more 
specific variables proposed in Chapter 3. Throughout the desk study, variables considered important 
to the competitive environment but not proposed in Chapter 3 were considered and included. As 
described in Chapter 4, the aims of this process of empirical grounding were two-fold: 
 
1. Excluding variables and relationships suggested by the positioning school, which are non-
existent in the unique context of the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry. 
 
2. Including relevant variables and relationships not suggested by the positioning school, which 
are unique in the context of the competitive environment of the wind turbine industry. 
 
In the following, each of the variables considered in the context of this report are outlined in order of 
their impact upon each of the five forces. 
1. Determinants of the threat of new entrants 
 
 
Economies of scale in production: The existence of economies of scale implies that the cost of a 
product, operation or function declines as the absolute volume per period increases301. Like many 
manufacturing industries, economies of scale are significant in wind turbine manufacturing, making 
market share a central prerequisite for long-term profitability302. In addition to advantages of joint 
operations and specialisation, the sheer size of the orders to be filled puts minimum requirements on 
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the viable size of turbine manufacturers. Economies of scale therefore present a significant entry 
barrier to potential entrants and smaller incumbents303. 
 
Level of product differentiation: Differentiated products imply product familiarity and thus a certain 
degree of product loyalty to incumbents’ products. This can present a significant entry barrier to 
potential entrants. In wind turbine manufacturing, the main parameters of differentiation identified 
were: turbine size, reliability, deployment (onshore/offshore), wind speed specialisation, warranties 
and after sales service. Of these parameters, reliability has proven especially important. Although the 
entry barriers for assembling wind turbines from prefabricated components bought from 
subcontractors are low; product reliability and a proven track record of prior successful projects are a 
key selection criteria among the increasingly informed and sophisticated buyers of wind turbines. In 
the absence of a solid track record, buyers will be reluctant and financing will be considered risky 
and therefore expensive. For these reasons, product differentiation is an effective entry barrier around 
the industry304. See also switching costs below. 
 
Entry capital requirements: An entry capital requirement is the initial investment necessary to enter 
an industry in absolute terms. High entry capital requirements lower the number of potential entrants 
willing and able to make the necessary investments for successful entry into the industry305. 
Economies of scale (described above) and propriety of capitel requirements (described below) 
significantly increases capital requirements for successful entry, forcing potential new entrants to 
enter the industry in force, thus limiting the number of potential entrants and increasing financial 
risk. Entry capital requirements for successful entry into the wind turbine industry must be 
considered a very significant entry barrier around the industry. 
  
Buyers’ switching costs: The total costs borne by buyers; including time, effort, capital, risk etc. 
involved in switching between competing sellers of a product. As already mentioned, demonstrated 
performance and turbine reliability are major competitive parameters in wind turbine 
manufacturing306. These are the major sources of brand identification and customer loyalty. In 
addition to these ’intangible’ switching costs, a loyal buyer can obtain a number of negotiating 
advantages through repeated orders to the same manufacturer. Utilising the same turbine technology 
opens the possibility of economies of scale in monitoring and maintenance of the turbine fleet. 
Existing service contracts and warranties with a manufacturer can often be extended on favourable 
terms in connection with subsequent orders. Tangible and intangible switching costs related to 
changing manufacturer and thus turbine technology, presents a significant barrier to potential 
entrants. 
 
Accessibility of distribution channels: Logistical access to points of distribution to the final buyer. 
Occasionally, third party project developers act as a mediating link between wind turbine 
manufacturers and the final owners of wind projects. Project developers locate suitable sites for wind 
projects and negotiate with wind turbine manufacturers and develop the project307. When operational, 
the wind project is finally sold off to the final buyer/utility companies308. However, in this respect, 
developers are no different than other large buyers of wind turbines. For this reason, accessibility of 
distribution channels cannot be considered in isolation as an entry barrier. 
 
Proprietarity of product technology: The difficulty (total effort) involved in imitating the features of 
a product for commercial benefit. A single modern wind turbine is estimated to contain more than 
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10.000 highly specialised components309. Modern wind farms are composed of multiple turbines 
required to operate as a single power plant with minimum maintenance for up to 25 years. This 
requires specialised knowledge in many fields of science not easily found in adjacent industries310. 
Experiences with new entrants into the industry suggest that developing cheap and reliable turbine 
technology from scratch to a level where it is competitive with current standards is implausible. All 
recent entry into the industry was done through purchase of existing manufacturers (GE bought 
Enron Wind Corp, Siemens bought Bonus Energy) or by creating a joint venture with existing 
players (Gamesa set up a venture with Vestas)311. Proprietarity of product technology must therefore 
be considered a major entry barrier around the wind turbine industry. 
 
Accessibility of inputs: The outsourcing options available to an industry or a firm. Today, a wide 
range of subcontractors is available to the wind turbine industry312, and in principal it is possible to 
assemble a turbine entirely from prefabricated components313. This, however, is not sufficient to 
guarantee accessibility to required inputs. Because of high growth rates in the industry as a whole, 
component shortages are commonplace. The wind turbine industry is notoriously sensitive to the 
quality and timely delivery of key components. Delays in component delivery are extremely costly to 
wind turbine projects314. Type faults in components for larger wind projects are equally serious as 
wind turbine manufacturers bear the financial responsibility for the quality of turbines through 
warranty provisions315 (see below). Accessibility of inputs is a significant problem for experienced 
incumbent competitors316, especially those with a lesser extent of vertical integration such as Vestas 
and GE Wind317, and must therefore also be considered a significant entry barrier to potential 
newcomers. Access to components also significantly affects the importance of location (see below) 
for wind turbine manufacturers. As components increase in size along with continued up scaling of 
turbines, transport costs has become an increasingly important component in the cost of large 
components. In addition, a close physical location to major component suppliers is also an advantage 
in terms of R&D cooperation and partnerships between subcontractors and wind turbine 
manufacturers318. 
 
Exclusivity of government subsidies: The degree to which one or more national governments, through 
subsidies, are able to exclude or disadvantage non-domestic firms. Although government subsidies 
provided for the production of renewable energy in national markets are not directly exclusive to 
incumbents, research grants, and resources of government institutions such as research centres and 
educational facilities can significantly influence an incumbent’s competitiveness in its home market. 
This was to a large extent the case in Denmark where the resources of Risø National Laboratory 
played a central role in the development of the industry319. 
 
Exclusivity of government policies: The degree to which one or more national governments, through 
policy or legislation, are able to exclude or disadvantage non-domestic firms. Local manufacturing 
content requirements, preferential tax breaks for domestic manufacturers, exclusive or preferential 
access to national R&D funds, favourable treatment by planning authorities and political contacts are 
all part of the competition in various national turbine markets320. Such policies present a significant 
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barrier to potential entrants321. This picture is confirmed when looking at the dominant position 
attained by certain manufacturers in their home markets such as Gamesa in Spain, Enercon in 
Germany and Suzlon in India322. 
 
Experience curve effects: The relative cost reduction per unit for every doubling of accumulative 
production. Empirical studies suggest that the cost of wind power has declined by 80% since 1980. In 
terms of learning curve effects, this means a cost reduction by as much as 15% (Price/MWh) when 
the accumulative production doubles323. This finding is backed by studies of the historical 
importance of experience curve advantages in the wind turbine industry324. Powerful experience 
curve effects significantly benefits experienced incumbents and constitutes a significant entry barrier 
not easily overcome by potential entrants. 
 
Importance of location: The relative competitive advantage of locating the activities of a firm in a 
specific geographical location. Domestic manufacturing content requirements, import restrictions and 
other forms of protectionism along with varying currency rates and transport costs are important 
incentives for turbine manufacturers to locate production facilities in or near certain markets. This 
has been a long-standing issue for European manufactures seeking access to Asian and American 
markets325 and must be considered a significant entry barrier for potential entrants, placing extended 
requirements on where to locate production facilities. Being located near major component 
manufacturers is also a significant advantage in terms of accessibility to inputs (see above) and R&D 
partnerships. 
 
Height of entry barriers: The total effort involved in entering an industry. As illustrated in figure 3.4 
Chapter 3, the height of the entry barriers around the industry is determined the interplay of the 
eleven variables described above. Economies of scale and experience curve effects forces potential 
entrants to enter in force considerably increasing entry capital requirements. Opportunities for entry 
are further limited by proprietarity of product technology and switching costs, which forces potential 
entrants into buying existing manufacturers to gain access to technology and a proven track record of 
previous successful wind turbine projects. For these reasons, the entry barriers around the wind 
turbine industry must be considered extremely high. 
 
Industry growth rate: The industry growth, measured as the difference in percentage between one or 
more growth indicators (total revenue, MW installed etc.) from one year to the next. Industry growth 
may thus be negative. All else being equal, high growth industries are more attractive to potential 
entrants than low growth industries. In addition, the industry growth rate determines an industry’s 
ability to absorb new entrant without depressing incumbent’s sales and financial performance326. As 
described above, the wind turbine industry is a high-growth industry, which over the past eight years 
grew by more then 30% annually327 and with an expected growth rate of 15-20% over the coming 
five years328. High industry growth must therefore be considered a significant contributing factor to 
the ability of the industry to absorb potential new entrants and therefore also a limiting factor in 
terms of incumbent’s threat of retaliation. This picture is confirmed in some of the fastest growing 
markets such as the U.S. where several vendors are reported to have sold out329. Incumbent’s threat 
of retaliation to entry in such market conditions must be considered limited. 
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Resourcefulness of incumbents: Incumbent’s threat of retaliation to new entrants is significantly 
enforced if incumbents can deploy substantial resources to counter would-be entrants. Such resources 
could include excess cash, unused borrowing capacity, adequate excess capacity to meet all future 
needs or great leverage with distribution channels or customers330. As described above, the wind 
turbine industry is a highly concentrated industry dominated by a few large competitors. This would 
in itself indicate that should determined retaliation occur, it could involve significant resources. In 
addition, several of the major incumbents are part of larger diversified energy companies. These 
include GE Wind, Siemens, Enercon and Gamesa with the noticeable exception of Vestas. The 
resourcefulness of these diversified competitors are increased by the fact that they have the option of 
drawing resources from their parent companies. Incumbents in the wind turbine industry must be 
considered resourceful. 
 
Strategic stakes in the industry: In the broadest sense; incumbents’ commitment (emotional, financial 
etc.) to the industry. Incumbent’s threat of retaliation to new entrants is increased if incumbents are 
highly committed to succeeding in the industry. High expectations to future growth and profitability 
of the wind turbine industry significantly contribute to heightened strategic stakes. This in turn 
increases the determination among competitors to defend or strengthen their position in the industry 
and this increases the intensity if rivalry. Although the specific strategic stakes in the wind turbine 
industry vary between individual competitors, the overall stakes in the industry is closely related to 
the high future growth prospects of the wind turbine industry331. 
 
Threat of retaliation to entry: Potential entrants’ knowledge of the probability that incumbents will 
expend resources to actively defend market share against a newcomer. The threat of retaliation to 
entry is determined the interplay of the three previous variables described above. Incumbent 
competitors in the wind turbine industry must generally be considered resourceful and their long-
term strategic stakes in this high-growth industry are significant. This would indicate incumbents 
pose a credible threat of retaliation to potential entrants. However, in light of the current and 
expected growth rate, turning part of the global wind turbine market into a seller’s market, the impact 
of a new competitor entering the industry by buying a smaller incumbent may not warrant a forceful 
retaliation. At least not while the industry growth rate remains sufficiently high. 
 
Industry attractiveness: The assessment of a potential newcomer about the size of the entry deterring 
price relative to the size of its expected benefits of entering the industry. The attractiveness of an 
industry is determined by its current and future profitability. Profitable industries work like a magnet 
for potential entrants. The same is true for industries expected to become profitable. The EBIT 
margin for the major wind turbine manufacturers in the period 2001-2004 was on average 13.5%. 
This figure covers significant variation among individual manufacturers (As low as 4.6% for Vestas 
2003 to as high as 23.4% for Suzlon in 2001) indicating that, at present, the industry is not one-
sidedly profitable compared to other production industries332. The expectation of future industry and 
market growth described below, and thus the potential future profitability, is a significant incentive 
for potential entrants to overcome entry barriers. 
 
In addition to the variables included in the theoretical propositions suggested by the positioning 
school, the following additional variables were identified: 
 
Extent of warranty provisions: The number of turbines under warranty and the time period covered 
by warranties. As described above, based on the history of entrants to the wind turbine industry, the 
most likely route of entry would be to buy an incumbent manufacturer. A significant barrier to 
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buying incumbent wind turbine manufacturers is the assessment of long-term risk of such a venture. 
Many incumbents have issued long-term warranties on wind turbine projects extending as much as 
10-12 years into the future. The extent to which an incumbent is bound by such obligations along 
with their ability to meet them is unknown to potential entrants. Extensive warranties could therefore 
lead to serious compensation claims and thus presents an unknown level of risk to potential 
entrants333. 
 
2. Determinants of the intensity of rivalry 
 
 
Number of competitors: The number of significant competitors in an industry. Industries populated 
by numerous competitors are more prone to intense competition, driving down profitability334. 
Cooperation to keep prices stable and to avoid prolonged price wars is difficult to sustain among 
many competitors. Also, competitors’ ability to keep track of each other is usually lower, increasing 
the incentive to make covert moves to undercut competition, thus igniting competitive wars. As 
described above, the wind turbine industry is oligopolistic and highly concentrated among only a few 
truly global players. The major part of the wind turbine market is divided between five main 
competitors; Vestas (34.1%), Gamesa (18.1%), Enercon (15.8%) GE Wind (11.3%) and Siemens 
(6.2%)335. From the point of view of the positioning school, this is significant factor limiting the 
intensity of rivalry in the wind turbine industry. 
 
Diversity of competitors: Strategically diverse competitors with highly different backgrounds, goals 
and assumptions about the industry in which they compete, are more prone to intense competition for 
similar reasons as industries populated by numerous competitors. It is more difficult to read 
intentions and cooperate to keep prices stable among highly diverse competitors336. Although the 
diversity of business models is high in the wind turbine industry, no empirical evidence could be 
found that this factor contributes significantly to the intensity of rivalry among incumbent wind 
turbine manufacturers. 
 
Strategic stakes in the industry: As described above, competitors’ strategic stakes in the wind turbine 
industry are related to the promising future growth prospects of the industry. High strategic stakes 
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must be considered a significant contributor to the commitment of incumbents to the industry and 
therefore also to the intensity of rivalry between them. 
 
Height of entry barriers: As described above, the entry barriers around the wind turbine industry are 
very significant by any standards. Although they do not completely eliminate the threat posed by 
potential new entrants, they do ensure that entry into the industry is rare and that the number of 
competitors is kept relatively low and that potential entrants are forced to enter in force and usually 
by means of buying an incumbent. The height of the entry barriers is a significantly limiting factor 
for the intensity of rivalry in the wind turbine industry. 
 
Height of exit barriers: The total cost involved in leaving the industry. High exit barriers indicate that 
excess capacity is slow to leave the industry, thus raising the probability of extended price wars 
among competitors as supply exceeds demand337. Given current expectations to industry growth of 
around 15-20% over the coming five years338, along with the history of buy-outs as a means to 
entering the industry, leaving the wind turbine industry is not likely to be costly as long as growth 
prospects remain high. According to BTM Consult, several potential entrants would be prepared to 
buy their way into the industry should such an opportunity present itself339. General Electric’s 
takeover of Enron Wind is a recent example. High exit barriers cannot be considered a major 
contributor to the intensity of rivalry. 
 
Equality of competitor size and resources: The diversity of the resourcefulness of incumbents (see 
above). Equal competitors are more prone to intense competition because they have yet to establish a 
clear balance of power. Equal competitors mutually have the resources for sustained price 
competition, prolonging price wars until equilibrium is found340. Although Vestas is usually 
considered the market leader in the wind turbine industry, based on its higher market share and first 
mover status, a balance of power has yet to be found among the major competitors in the industry341. 
Equality of size and resources among the largest competitors in the wind turbine industry is therefore 
likely to be a major factor contributing to the intensity of rivalry in the wind turbine industry.  
 
Level of product differentiation: As described above, the main parameters of differentiation identified 
were: turbine size, reliability, placement (onshore/offshore), wind speed specialisation, warranties 
and after sales service. Although some level of differentiation exists along these parameters342, the 
overriding factor is price per MW installed343 and for this reason, product differentiation is not likely 
to be a major limiting factor in terms is rivalry, as product-by-product substitution remains high (see 
below). 
 
Storage costs: The total cost of storing a product per time unit. High storage costs create a powerful 
incentive to sell products as soon as they are produced. In times of overcapacity, this leads to price 
wars to avoid storage. The sheer size of wind turbines make them expensive to store, making storage 
costs a significant contributing factor for the intensity of rivalry in case of low demand. 
 
Buyers’ switching costs: As described above, buyers are faced with both tangible and intangible 
switching costs in the form of demonstrated performance, reliability, brand identification and 
decreased bargaining power when changing between manufacturers. In terms of intensity of rivalry, 
this must be considered a limiting factor. 
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Industry growth rate: High industry growth offsets competition because it turns competition into a 
plus-sum game. Wining an order does not necessarily mean that competitors will have to loose it. 
This is most clearly exemplified by the recent transition to a seller’s market in the U.S., where 
several vendors are reported to have sold out and manufacturers have successfully raised prices in 
response to increased demand344. As described above, the wind turbine industry is a high growth 
industry, a fact that contributes significantly to lowering the intensity of rivalry among manufacturers 
and in effect offsetting many of the contributing factors outlined here.   As described above, this has 
significantly lowered the risk of price competition and thus the intensity of rivalry in the industry345. 
 
Fixed to variable cost ratio: The size of fixed costs (costs that cannot readily be reduced) relative to 
variable costs. High fixed operating costs creates a powerful incentive to fill capacity, which leads to 
price wars when excess capacity is spent346. This is also true for the wind turbine industry, where 
fixed production costs are high, increasing manufacturers’ sensitivity to timely component delivery 
(as described above) along with their sensitivity to seasonal variations in demand. Increased demand 
at the end of the year, in response to the winter season, remains a capacity utilisation problem for 
several manufacturers347. High fixed to variable cost ratios of wind turbine manufacturers must 
therefore be considered a significant contributor to the intensity of rivalry, should wind turbine 
demand decline. 
 
Industry concentration ratio: In this context of this report; the total market share held by the top-five 
manufacturers relative to the rest. Closely related to the number of competitors described above, 
highly concentrated industries are less prone to intense competition because coordination of pricing 
decisions are more easily maintained among fewer competitors. Dominant competitors can thus 
exercise direction and avoid prolonged price wars348. As previously mentioned, the wind turbine 
industry is highly concentrated around five major competitors. 
  
Size of capacity augments: The size of the increments in which new production capacity is added. 
Competitors adding production capacity in large increments run the risk of creating a situation of 
temporary overcapacity and thus price-cutting to fill capacity349. This must be considered a 
significant factor in wind turbine manufacturing, where economies of scale and capacity utilization 
both play a major role. Although a potential catalyst for intense rivalry, this variable is largely offset 
by industry growth rates as high as 15-20% annually, meaning that large capacity augments are 
necessary just to follow the market. This might significantly change should the industry growth rate 
decline. 
 
Excess production capacity: The production capacity in excess of a firm’s market share. Due to 
economies of scale and high fixed to variable cost ratios described above, wind turbine 
manufacturers are highly sensitive to excess production capacity. Like the size of capacity augments, 
this variable could be a serious catalyst for intense rivalry should the industry growth rate decline. In 
this situation, manufacturers have a powerful incentive to increase capacity utilisation through 
lowering prices. 
 
Economies of scale: The strength of the correlation between incumbents’ market share and profits. 
Economies of scale may create a powerful incentive compete on price and market share to attain 
                                                 
344
 Carnegie Securities Research 2005:20 
345
 Carnegie Securities Research 2005:20 
346
 Porter 1980:18 
347
 See e.g. Vestas Annual Report 2005 
348
 Grant 1998:61 
349
 Porter 1980:19 
 127 
greater volume in production350. The need for market share along with strong incentives for efficient 
capacity utilisation must be considered a significant factor contributing to increased rivalry among 
wind turbine manufacturers. However, as it is the case with the size of capacity augments and excess 
production capacity, economies of scale as a catalyst of intense competition is limited by high 
industry growth. 
 
3. Determinants of the competitiveness of substitutes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Product-by-product substitution: This form of substitution occurs when a product is substituted by 
another performing the same function, only cheaper or better351. As wind turbines are the only 
plausible means by which electricity can be generated from wind, product-by-product substitution 
happens when one turbine generation substitutes another. Due to the high rate of new product 
discovery, this form of substitution is a significant factor determining the profitability of the industry 
as a whole. See industry R&D expenditure and rate of new product discovery below. This 
phenomenon was demonstrated in the mid 80s where rapid up scaling caused turbine designs to 
become obsolete at an unprofitable rate352. 
 
Need substitution: This form of substitution occurs when a new product or service fulfilling the same 
need renders an existing product or service redundant353. The primary function of wind turbines is the 
generation of electricity, and in this sense, wind technology is only one amongst a wide range of 
renewable energy technologies, which in turn is part of a still wider range of energy technologies, 
constituting the total energy technology stock available to energy suppliers. Depending on the 
context, any energy technology capable of producing electricity is a potential substitute for wind 
energy. This is the primary form of substitution with which wind turbine manufacturers should be 
concerned. 
 
Generic substitution: This form of substitution occurs where products or services compete for the 
same portion of buyers’ disposable income354. As wind projects are in themselves considered objects 
of investment, rather than a portion of disposable income, generic substitution is not relevant in terms 
of the wind turbine industry. 
 
In addition to the variables included in the theoretical propositions suggested by the positioning 
school, the following additional variables were identified: 
 
Competitiveness of wind power: The degree to which wind power is preferred over its substitutes. 
The major need substituting technologies to wind include coal, oil, gas, nuclear, biomass and 
hydro355. The relative competitiveness of any of these substitute technologies is subject to significant 
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regional and periodic variation, depending on such factors as local resource availability, fuel prices, 
wind conditions, subsidies, base load flexibility etc. Due to significant increases in gas prices, the 
generation costs of wind is now lower than that of gas and fully comparable to the cost of coal356, 
while significantly lower than that of nuclear power357. Although wind power enjoys substantial 
advantages along the major competitive parameters identified here, it is clear that significant 
competitive pressures exist from a wide range of substitute technologies. In terms of price 
competition between energy technologies, IEA (2004) notes that although total costs remain 
comparable, the cost structure varies significantly. In terms of cost structure, wind power generally 
has high transmission costs and carries the need for backup capacity (see energy planning restriction 
below)358.  
 
Rate of new product discovery: The rate at which new products emerge to keep potential need 
substitutes at bay is an important factor determining the overall competitiveness of substitutes. 
However, the rate of new product discovery also increases product-by product substitution, making 
existing turbines obsolete.  Throughout the history of the wind turbine industry, this has been 
synonymous with up scaling, but advances in offshore technology and specialised low-wind turbines 
along with new composite materials have become equally important sources of new product 
discovery359. Neij et al (2003) found that eight successive generations of wind turbines emerged in 
the period 1980-2000, equalling an average time interval of 2.5 years between generations360. Given 
these figures, the rate of new product discovery is a major factor lowering the competitiveness of 
substitutes. 
 
Rate of new process discovery: The rate at which new processes emerge to improve the production of 
the product. This variable is closely related to economies of scale and experience curve effects 
described above. New production processes has significantly contributed to cost reductions and thus 
to the competitiveness of wind turbine technology361. 
 
Industry R&D expenditure: Usually measured as the percentage of revenues used for research and 
development. The rate of new product and process discovery described above is in turn determined 
by the industry’s R&D expenditure. In addition to competitors’ own R&D expenditures362, 
considerable public R&D funds have been channelled onto the wind turbine industry throughout the 
history of the industry363 contributing significantly to the technological development and cost 
reductions of wind technology. 
 
Government subsidies for renewable- and wind power: The extent to which government subsidies 
influence the competitiveness of renewable power. Historically, government subsidies for renewable 
energy production have been a major factor in creating an emerging market for wind technology364. 
Price/KWh electricity generated is still the major competitive parameter in electricity production and 
in this respect; wind power does not enjoy undisputed cost leadership365. Various forms of 
government subsidies continue to be an important factor in the competitiveness of wind power, 
especially relative to conventional energy technologies such as coal, gas and to some extent 
nuclear366. 
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Competitiveness of fossil fuels: The degree to which fossil fuels are preferred over their substitutes. 
When looking at the global market for electricity production, fossil fuels hold a dominant position 
with a total market share of 67%. Of this share, coal is the largest contributor with an estimated 
market share of 39% in 2002, while gas and oil held shares of 21% and 7% respectively. Looking 
ahead to 2030, coal and gas will hold the major share of new capacity installations, taking up 39% 
and 28% respectively, while the share of oil in new capacity installations is expected to be around 
8%367. The competitiveness of fossil fuels is therefore likely to remain a major contributor to need 
substitution in the global energy market. In terms of cost structure, combined cycle natural gas has 
the lowest investment costs but the highest variable costs, as the price of natural gas varies 
significantly (see security of supply below). The investment cost of coal plants is relatively high but 
fuel costs account only for a smaller part of the total costs. In addition, coal prices are significantly 
more stable than gas prices368. 
 
Security of supply: The perceived probability of the conditions of energy supply remaining within 
acceptable limits. The price of fuel is a critical parameter in the competitiveness of substitutes to 
wind power. From the first oil crisis in the early 70s till today, security of supply has become a major 
issue for conventional substitutes to wind such as gas and oil, emphasising the role of energy 
technologies with stable or no fuel supply demands369. Guaranteed security of supply is a major 
competitive advantage of wind power in that it required no fuel. The closest substitute technologies 
with respect to high supply security are coal, hydro and biomass technologies370.  
 
Competitiveness of nuclear power: The degree to which nuclear power is preferred over its 
substitutes. Nuclear power currently holds a share of the global electricity market of around 17%, 
which is expected to decline significantly to 9% by 2030. Nuclear power thus takes up only 3% of 
new capacity installations. In terms of cost structure, the investment cost for nuclear power is high 
although running costs are very low371. In addition, nuclear power has almost zero CO2-emmissions, 
which could become an increasingly important competitive parameter (see climate concern below). 
As a substitute for wind power, however, nuclear power supplies base-load generation372, a role not 
suited intermittent power sources like wind, limiting the role of nuclear as a need substitute for wind 
energy. 
 
Competitiveness of other renewables: The degree to which renewables are preferred over their 
substitutes. Renewable energy has a share of the global electricity market of 18%, which is expected 
to increase to 19% by 2030. Currently, hydropower is the most competitive renewable energy 
technology with a share of the world renewable electricity market of 89% with biomass as a distant 
second with a share of 7%. Wind takes up a shared third place along with geothermal, both with a 
share of 2%. According to IEA (2004) this picture will change significantly to 2030 as hydropower 
will decline to 69%, mainly at the expense of wind and biomass increasing to 10% and 15% 
respectively. Tidal/wave energy and solar power are expected to rise from currently insignificant 
shares to 1% and 2% respectively373. In terms of cost developments, the capital and total cost of both 
on- and offshore wind power is expected to decline significantly along with geothermal and biomass 
which will remain largely cost-competitive with wind energy, while the cost hydropower is expected 
to increase significantly due to lack of suitable sites374. 
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Climate concern: The perceived importance of potential changes in the climate. Many energy 
markets are highly motivated by environmental incentives mainly linked to climate concerns about 
continued CO2 emissions. Government subsidies supplied for environmental performance plays a 
major role in substituting conventional energy technology with renewables375. The so-called external 
cost of power generation from has become a key competitive parameter in several markets376, 
seriously disadvantaging coal, oil and to a lesser extent natural gas. The closest competitors to wind 
in terms of CO2 emissions are nuclear, hydropower and biomass, claiming comparatively high 
performance377. 
 
Regional planning restrictions: Physical and legal constraints to the design of wind projects. Not 
only is wind power highly dependent upon favourable energy planning, but also on favourable 
landscape planning regimes. Wind turbines are highly visible and their operation is connected with 
considerable noise emissions. Due to minimum wind speed requirements, turbines are often placed 
rural areas, and thus frequently conflicts with natural conservation and recreation interests. Several 
cases have illustrated how dissatisfaction with the placement of onshore wind projects has led to 
increasingly restrictive planning requirements378. This is a major reason for the further development 
of offshore wind technology, where continued up scaling of turbines is possible. 
 
Energy planning restrictions: Physical and legal constraints to the integration of wind power into the 
broader energy system. Compared to most substitute technologies, wind power suffers from a 
number of unique disadvantages making the technology highly dependent upon favourable energy 
planning regimes. Wind is an intermittent power source and cannot therefore substitute base-load 
generation technologies and thus requires flexible backup generation capacity for periods with 
insufficient wind. IEA (2004) estimates the additional cost of backup capacity to be in the range of 
$5 to $10 per MWh379. In addition, wind turbines are often located in the periphery of the energy 
system and must therefore be connected to the grid at low-voltage levels. This adds to the complexity 
of the system, which in turn increases installation costs where weak grids must be reinforced380. This 
requires flexible energy systems and equally flexible energy planning. IEA (2004) estimates added 
grid costs to be $2.5 to $4 per MWh381. Grid connection has been a major obstacle in Spain, one of 
the most important wind power markets382. In spite of these disadvantages, recent studies have 
indicated that it is possible to integrate considerable wind capacity in national energy systems 
without any fundamental alterations in the existing grid structure383. 
4. Determinants of the power of buyers 
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Buyers’ switching costs: As described above, it is possible for wind turbine manufacturers to impose 
both tangible and intangible switching costs when buyers change between wind turbine 
manufacturers. Switching costs therefore decrease the bargaining power of buyers. 
 
Intensity of rivalry: The proportion of profits absorbed by various competitive activities. As 
discussed above, the intensity of rivalry among wind turbine manufacturers remains moderate 
because of high growth. However, large orders for wind turbine are won or lost in a process of 
competitive bidding and negotiation384 in which price per installed MW capacity is the major 
competitive parameter. Although the intensity of rivalry among manufacturers is decreased by high 
demand, the intensity of rivalry, especially for larger projects, must be considered a significant factor 
increasing the bargaining power of buyers. 
 
Buyers’ purchase relative to sellers’ sales: The proportion of total sales attributed to a single buyer 
over a given time period. As the size of turbines, wind projects and buyers of turbines has increased 
so has the size of orders385. As this trend continues, the individual order has become increasingly 
important to manufacturers thus increasing buyers’ price sensitivity. 
 
Buyers’ purchase relative to buyers’ costs: The proportion of a buyers’ total costs attributed to a 
single purchase over a given time period. A buyer, who considers a wind turbine project a major 
investment relative to other investments, will demand more in terms of lowering risks and 
guaranteeing returns. In this respect, the wind turbine industry has seen two simultaneous 
movements. Buyers have changed from individuals to major power companies while wind projects 
have gone from single KW size turbines to marks of multi MW turbines. In spite of the changing size 
of customers, a modern wind turbine project is a significant long-term investment. Consequently, 
such an investment will be subject to the scrutiny and increased demands of a major investment, 
increasing bargaining power of buyers. 
 
Level of product differentiation: If buyers can purchase the same product everywhere their 
bargaining position is significantly improved as they can easily switch between competitors. As 
described above, differences between manufacturers are marked enough to create significant 
switching costs between manufacturers. Additional differences in terms of turbine size, reliability, 
placement (onshore/offshore), wind-speed specialisation, warranties and after sales service means 
that product differentiation decreases the bargaining power of buyers. 
 
Importance of industry’s input buyers’ product quality: The degree to which buyers’ profits are 
affected by the quality of an industry’s products. When the quality of buyers’ product is affected by 
the industry’s product, buyers’ are generally less price sensitive386. The quality and thus the 
reliability of wind turbines are of primary importance to the operational economy of wind projects. 
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As wind projects have grown bigger, wind manufacturers have increasingly been forced to share the 
risk of serial faults in wind projects through extended warranty provisions387. The importance of 
quality to buyers has therefore lowered buyer’s price sensitivity only at the expense of extended 
warranty provisions. 
 
Buyers’ profitability: Buyer’s gains minus buyers’ losses. Lower profits increase buyers’ price 
sensitivity as they attempt to cut costs388. In recent years, major energy markets in Europe and the 
U.S. has been deregulated and privatised and competition between power suppliers has increased 
significantly389, driving down the profitability of buyers’ of wind turbines. Also, the introduction of 
government subsidies directly or indirectly rewarding the cheapest renewable technologies has made 
buyers increasingly price sensitive. 
 
Buyers’ price sensitivity: The degree to which buyers’ value price over other product features. When 
taking the seven determining variables investigated above into consideration, buyer’s price 
sensitivity is a major factor increasing the power of buyers. Modern wind turbine projects are 
increasingly seen as large, long-term investments purchased by highly concentrated and informed 
buyers. These in turn market renewable energy on increasingly competitive power markets, price 
sensitivity of buyers is further increased390. 
 
Relative concentration of buyers: The size and number of buyers. The ongoing concentration and 
consolidation of the wind turbine industry has to a large extent been matched rapid concentration on 
the buyers’ side. As described above, large utility companies and developers have become by far the 
most important buyers of wind projects, taking over from smaller private buyers and local investor 
groups. In addition, recent years have seen consolidation among major developers and increased 
attention from major utility companies starting to take wind power seriously391. These developments 
have significantly increased the concentration of buyers, increasing their relative bargaining power, 
leading to increased demands on manufacturers to co-invest, co-manage and even operate large 
projects in order to win large contracts392. 
 
Buyers’ information: The accuracy of buyers’ information about the production cost of their 
purchase. As described above, the increasing sophistication of buyers also increases their ability to 
play manufacturers against each other to lower prices and raise quality through competitive bidding 
for projects393. Buyers with significant experience with a wide range of energy technologies 
including past wind projects are better informed when choosing one energy technology over another 
and also when choosing one turbine manufacturer over another. This increases the emphasis on the 
operational characteristics of the wind project such as price, durability and the extent of production 
and operational guarantees the manufacturer is willing to issue with the project. The increasing 
sophistication of buyers increases their and their ability to play manufacturers against each other to 
lower prices and raise quality through competitive bidding for projects394. 
 
Buyers’ threat of backward integration: Wind turbine manufacturers’ knowledge of buyers’ 
assessment of the entry deterring price relative to the actual benefits of integrating backwards. As 
described above, major buyers integrating backwards into wind turbine manufacturing have been the 
primary mode of entry into the industry and therefore also the primary threat. Due to the significant 
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entry barriers around the wind turbine industry, this is a threat posed by only a very small minority of 
buyers and can therefore not be considered a general means by which buyers can increase their 
bargaining power with regard to the individual project. 
 
Industry’s threat of forward integration: Buyers’ knowledge of wind turbine manufacturers’ 
assessment of the entry deterring price relative to the actual benefits of integrating forward. In the 
business of wind turbine manufacturing, it is worth differentiating between two levels of forward 
integration: integration in to wind project development and wind turbine operation and ownership. In 
terms of project development, Gamesa is the most highly active of the major manufacturers, but also 
GE Wind and Vestas have development activities. Involvement in project development may become 
significantly more common for wind turbine manufacturers in the years to come, although not as a 
function of the threat manufacturers pose to established developers, as described above. In terms of 
project ownership, only Gemesa has significant activities, indicating that the threat of forward 
integration posed by wind turbine manufacturers does not significantly decrease the bargaining 
power of buyers395. 
 
Competitiveness of substitutes: In the broadest sense of the word; the degree to which substitutes are 
preferred over of wind power. As described above, any technology capable of generating electricity 
is a potential substitute for wind power. Although additional competitive parameters such as 
environmental performance, security of supply and government substitutes narrow the range of 
potential substitutes in some markets, this must be considered is a significant factor empowering 
buyers. 
 
Relative bargaining power of buyers: The degree to which buyers’ are able to demand lower prices 
or better quality from sellers. As described above, the relative bargaining power of buyers of wind 
turbine is substantial. As buyers of wind project have become increasing consolidated, professional 
and informed they have been able to exert significant pressure on the profitability of wind turbine 
manufacturers. In addition, as wind turbine projects have increased in size, winning individual large 
orders has become increasingly important, further increasing buyers’ bargaining power.  
 
In addition to the variables included in the theoretical propositions suggested by the positioning 
school, the following additional variables were identified: 
 
Wind turbine demand: The number or value of turbines demanded by a market over a give time 
period. Closely related to high historic and expected industry growth rates, rapidly increasing 
demand due to political support for renewable energy, especially in the U.S. market has turned it into 
a seller’s market as several vendors in the U.S. are reported to have sold out for 2006, effectively 
raising prices396. High demand is thus a factor decreasing both the bargaining power and the price 
sensitivity of buyers. 
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5. Determinants of the power of suppliers 
 
Switching costs between suppliers: The total costs involved in switching from one supplier to 
another. Wind turbine manufacturers are highly dependent upon their suppliers due to high 
sensitivity to timely delivery and high product quality, as described above. Switching between 
suppler and thus components often requires certification to qualify the supplier’s input along with 
significant testing to ensure reliability and compatibility. Phasing in a new component is a time 
consuming and expensive process entailing significant switching costs397. Also, due to 
manufacturers’ differing technical solutions and patent rights, components are often customised the 
rather than standardised398, further adding to the cost and complexity of switching between suppliers. 
In addition, the physical location of component suppliers near major markets have become 
increasingly important as the size of components have grown larger adding to transport costs. This 
has made available suppliers with sufficient capacity scarcer399. Switching costs between suppliers 
must be considered a significant factor decreasing the price sensitivity of wind turbine 
manufacturers. 
 
Intensity of rivalry between suppliers: The proportion of supplier’s profits absorbed by competitive 
activity. As described above, the opportunity to create substantial switching costs for manufacturers 
lessens the intensity of rivalry among component suppliers. Also, because of high industry growth, 
reliable component suppliers and sufficient capacity is a scarce resource resulting in prolonged 
component shortages for wind turbine manufacturers. In addition, both technological and financial 
entry barriers around component manufacturing (gearboxes, generators, blades, control systems etc) 
are substantial400. Although these factors decrease the intensity of rivalry among component 
suppliers, wind turbine manufacturers are often disloyal to individual suppliers and are reluctant to 
rely too heavily upon any single component manufacturer401. Also, because of the high level of 
concentration of the wind turbine industry, component suppliers are highly dependent upon only a 
few customers and are therefore also highly sensitive to changes in manufacturers’ sourcing 
strategy402. 
 
Industry’s purchase relative to suppliers’ sales: Suppliers will experience more price sensitive 
customers when large orders are placed relative to the suppliers’ total sales. As the concentration of 
the wind turbine industry is increased along with the size of wind projects, manufacturers’ purchase 
relative to suppliers’ sales have likewise increased significantly. This development has made the 
individual order more important to suppliers, thus increasing the industry’s price sensitivity. 
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Industry’s purchase relative to industry’s costs: The proportion of an industry’s total costs attributed 
to a single purchase over a given time period. As above, suppliers’ customers will be more price 
sensitive when suppliers’ input is a large portion of buyers’ total costs. As discussed above, the 
degree to which wind turbine manufacturers are vertically integrated varies significantly and so does 
the cost of procuring outsourced components. The most vertically integrated manufacturers are 
Gamesa, Siemens403 and Enercon404 while GE and Vestas have adopted a lighter model405. In 
addition, some components represent a larger proportion of the total cost of the turbine than others. 
Wind turbine components can be grouped in the following way: Rotor (20-30% of total cost), 
Nacelle and machinery (25%), Gearbox and drive train (10-15%), generator systems (5-15%) and 
tower (10-15%)406. Blades, nacelles and control systems are the most specialised and vital 
components in terms of turbine efficiency and are usually manufactured in-house whereas 
generators, gearboxes and towers are often outsourced407. Manufacturers’ purchase relative to their 
total costs must therefore be considered a significant factor influencing manufacturers’ price 
sensitivity. 
 
Differentiation of supplier group’s products: The substitutability of the products from particular 
suppliers. As described above, wind turbine manufacturers manufacture the most highly specialised 
components themselves, while outsourcing more standardised components to suppliers. However, as 
we have seen, customisation of components to the suit the needs of individual manufacturers are not 
uncommon, allowing suppliers to differentiate themselves from their competitors408. Also, product 
quality and reliability along with timely delivery are important parameters of differentiation valued 
by manufacturers. Differentiation of suppliers’ products must therefore be considered a significant 
factor influencing manufacturers’ price sensitivity. 
 
Importance of suppliers’ input to industry’s product quality: The degree to which an industry’s 
profitability is affected by the quality of suppliers’ products. As described above, quality and 
reliability of components are essential to the quality of the final turbine. Because of extended 
warranty provisions, wind turbine manufacturers bear a significant part of the financial risk 
connected to serial faults. Suppliers’ input is therefore of very high importance to the quality of 
manufacturers’ product quality significantly decreasing the price sensitivity of manufacturers. 
 
Industry’s price sensitivity: The degree to which an industry values price over other features of 
suppliers’ products. Based on the investigation of the six above variables, the price sensitivity of 
wind turbine manufacturers are significantly limited by high switching costs and the importance of 
suppliers’ input to manufacturers’ product quality. The price sensitivity of manufacturers is however 
improved as the size and thus the importance of the individual order increases. The low price 
sensitivity of wnd turbine manufacturers must therefore be considered a significant factor decreasing 
their profitability. 
 
Relative concentration of suppliers: The size and number of suppliers relative to the wind turbine 
industry. The wind turbine industry is highly concentrated around only a few major manufacturers 
and so is the demand for components. The relatively low concentration of suppliers means that 
component manufacturers have only a few customers and that even small changes in a single 
manufacturer’s sourcing strategy can have major implications for demand and thereby suppliers’ 
earnings409. In addition, manufacturers may demand component specifications suited to their specific 
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turbine models, which cannot therefore be sold to other manufacturers in case of failing demand. The 
low relative concentration of suppliers is a significant factor decreasing suppliers’ bargaining power. 
 
Industry’s information: The accuracy of the wind turbine industry’s information about the production 
cost of outsourced components. As described above, several wind turbine manufacturers are partially 
or wholly vertically integrated into component manufacturing. This is especially true for diversified 
manufacturers such as Gamesa, Siemens and General Electric giving them hands-on experiences 
with the production of a wide range of energy technologies and components. Manufacturers’ are 
generally least informed about generators and gearboxes, which are highly complicated to make and 
where only a few reliable suppliers exist. In spite of this, GE Wind and Gamesa both have in-house 
production of generators410. Wind turbine manufacturers must therefore be considered highly 
informed buyers. 
 
Suppliers’ threat of forward integration: The knowledge of the wind turbine industry about the 
assessment of suppliers of the entry deterring price relative to the actual benefits of entering 
integrating forward. As described previously, buyers integrating backwards into manufacturing have 
posed the primary threat of entry into the wind turbine industry. However, FKI plc, a producer of 
turbo generators recently took over the German Wind turbine manufacturer Dewind, demonstrating 
that suppliers too pose a credible threat of forward integration411. Because of the significant entry 
barriers protecting wind turbine manufacturers, this cannot generally be considered a major leverage 
for suppliers in terms of bargaining power. 
 
Industry’s threat of backward integration: Suppliers’ knowledge about wind turbine manufacturers’ 
assessment of the entry deterring price relative to the actual benefits of integrating backwards. The 
varying degree of vertical integration among turbine manufacturers also suggests a credible threat of 
backward integration posed by manufacturers into several areas component manufacturing. Such a 
threat decreases the bargaining power of suppliers in that they have to meet the deterring price, being 
the price that just balances out manufacturers’ potential rewards of entry412. Generally, technological 
and financial entry barriers into wind turbine component manufacturing (gearboxes, generators, 
blades, control systems etc) are considered rather high413, but this is only relative to the deterring 
price, as manufacturers perceive it and as we have seen, wind turbine several wind turbine 
manufacturers have significant know-how in many areas of component manufacturing. The threat of 
backward integration is a significant factor decreasing the bargaining power of suppliers. 
 
Availability of supplier substitutes: The ability of wind turbine manufacturers to substitute suppliers’ 
inputs with a principal alternative. Components such as generators, blades, control systems, towers 
etc. cannot be directly substituted with alternatives. Only Enercon has successfully substituted 
gearboxes, developing a gearless turbine based on ring generator technology414. In spite of this, in the 
sense that this term is used in Porter (1980), it is not meaningful to discuss supplier substitutes in the 
context of the wind turbine industry. 
 
In addition to the variables included in the theoretical propositions suggested by the positioning 
school, the following additional variables were identified: 
 
Availability of inputs: Wind turbine manufacturers’ ability to purchase outsourced components. As 
previously described, component shortages are commonplace in the wind turbine industry. Wind 
turbine manufacturers are notoriously sensitive to the quality and timely delivery of key components. 
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Delays in component delivery are extremely costly to wind turbine projects415. Type faults in 
components for larger wind projects are equally serious as wind turbine manufacturers bear the 
financial responsibility for the quality of turbines through warranty provisions416. Accessibility of 
inputs is a significant problem for experienced incumbent competitors417, especially those with a 
lesser extent of vertical integration such as Vestas and GE Wind418 
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Appendix B: Relationships 
 
This appendix contains descriptions and consideration of the 17 additional causal relationships 
proposed through the cross impact analysis in Chapter 5. The ceteris paribus argumentation used 
here is elaborated in Chapter 3. 
 
Height of exit barriers  + strategic stakes in the industry: This relationship is proposed by Porter 
(1980). From the viewpoint of the positioning school, the exit barriers around an industry is a 
determinant of the price of failure and thus the need to succeed in an industry. High exit barriers thus 
imply high strategic stakes, all else being equal. 
 
Industry concentration ratio  - Relative concentration of buyers: This relationship is proposed on 
the grounds of the inevitable logic that, as an industry concentrates into fewer and larger firms, the 
relative concentration ratio of its buyers are bound to decrease, all else being equal. 
 
Industry concentration ratio  - Relative concentration of suppliers: As above, this relationship is 
proposed on the grounds of the inevitable logic that as an industry concentrates into fewer and larger 
firms, the relative concentration of its suppliers are bound to decrease, all else being equal. 
 
Relative bargaining power of buyers  + Extent of warranty provisions: As the size of wind projects 
have increased, so has the bargaining power of individual buyers relative to wind turbine 
manufacturers. As a consequence, manufacturers have increasingly been forced to share the risk of 
serial faults in wind projects through extended warranty provisions as an increasingly important part 
of winning large orders419 as described in Chapter 4. 
 
Industry growth rate  + accessibility of inputs: Unexpectedly high industry growth rate coupled 
with high sensitivity to component shortages has been the principal cause of industry wide 
component shortages as described in appendix A above – see accessibility of inputs in section 1 in 
said appendix. 
 
Extent of warranty provisions  + importance of suppliers’ input to industry’s product quality: As 
described in appendix A above, wind turbine manufacturers are notoriously sensitive to the quality of 
components because they bear the financial risk of type and serial faults through warranty provisions. 
Extended warranties thus increase the importance of the quality of components as manufacturers bear 
the financial risk of technical flaws. 
 
Wind turbine demand  + Industry growth rate: Logically, an increase in the growth rate of an 
industry presupposes an increase in demand, all else being equal. 
 
Competitiveness of wind power  + wind turbine demand: Under normal market conditions, an 
increase in the competitiveness of a product will lead to an increase in demand, all else being equal. 
Wind turbines are considered no exception. 
 
Experience curve effects  + Competitiveness of wind power: Experience curve effects are felt 
through cost reductions as a function of cumulative output. Cost reductions will improve the 
competitiveness of a product, all else being equal. 
 
Threat of new entrants  + Buyers’ threat of backward integration: As described in Chapter 4, 
buyers have posed the principal threat of entry into the wind turbine industry. As the general threat of 
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entry changes, so does the threat posed by buyers, all else being equal. The causes of the general 
threat level are presented in Chapter 7. 
 
Threat of new entrants  + suppliers’ threat of forward integration: Following the same logic as 
above, as the general threat of entry changes, so does the threat posed by suppliers, all else being 
equal. 
 
Need substitution  - wind turbine demand: As described in Chapter 4, the level of need substitution 
indicates the degree to which a substitute is able to fulfil the same need as the product of an industry. 
Need substitution is thus a determinant of demand, all else being equal. 
 
Wind turbine demand  + experience curve effects: As experience and thus cost reductions are 
gained as a function of cumulative output, it follows that demand is a determinant of experience 
gained, all else being equal. 
 
Rate of new process discovery  + Experience curve effects: An increased or decreased rate of new 
process discovery will affect the progress ratio of a conventional experience curve420 and thus the 
effect of experience gained as a function of cumulative output, all else being equal. 
 
Rate of new product discovery  + Proprietarity of product technology: A rapidly advancing 
product technology is more proprietary and visa versa. New product discovery produces the need to 
‘keep up’. This involves specific costs borne by innovators and imitating followers that would not 
have existed otherwise. These costs increase proprietarity of the product technology, all else being 
equal. 
 
Industry concentration ratio  + Resourcefulness of incumbents: As an industry consolidates around 
fewer and larger competitors, it follows that the resourcefulness of each of these competitors in terms 
of retaliatory power to a new entrant will increase, and visa versa. The market power of a competitor 
is thus equal to its relative market share. 
 
Threat of new entrants  + Intensity of rivalry: Any threat of new entrants faced by incumbents is 
ultimately the threat that more competitors will enter the industry with which they must share profits 
and market share as described in Chapter 7. The threat level is thus equal to the potential profits 
forgone by entry multiplied by the probability of entry in a given time period. Threatened industries 
have a higher probability of an increasing the intensity of rivalry than do none-threatened industries, 
all else being equal. 
                                                 
420
 See Neij et al 2003 
 140 
Appendix C: Interviews – considerations, interviewees & questionnaire 
 
This appendix accounts for the interviews conducted as part of Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
Selection of interviewees 
The industry observers and participants interviewed for this report were selected to represent the 
broadest possible spectrum of the industry given the limited resources available for the project. The 
larger part of interviewees represents major wind turbine manufacturers, willing and able to share 
their knowledge with the author. In addition to wind (a) turbine manufacturers, it was the aim of the 
selection of interviewees to cover representatives from (b) suppliers, (c) buyers in addition to (e) 
outside industry observers. These groups are represented in (X) interviewees listed below. 
 
The protection of interviewees 
Overcoming potential obstacles to openness and honesty about expectations to industry 
developments involved a trade-off against accountability. In the context of this report, interviewees 
are not quoted directly or indirectly in a manner, which allows statements to be linked to a particular 
interviewee. Nor are their views to be interpreted as the ‘official policy’ of their respective 
organisations but as their personal assessments only. It was found that these conditions greatly 
improved the quality of the interview data at the cost of a clear audit trail. 
 
The interview process 
With two exceptions, the interviews were conducted by phone in sessions lasting from half an hour 
to an hour and a half. Bjrane Lundager Jensen and Peter Niels Hauge Madsen were interviewed in 
person in one hour sessions. Notes were taken during the interviews and a full summary (usually one 
normal page) was returned to the respondents by e-mail. The interviewees were given the 
opportunity to correct, clarify and amend these summaries, aligning them with their expressed views, 
before final approval. Two thirds of the interviewees used this opportunity to modify the summaries 
before approval. 
 
The interviewees 
For the purposes of this report, the following 7 industry observers and participants were interviewed: 
 
• Adrian Cronin, International Policy Advisor, Vestas wind systems 
 
• Bjarne Lundager Jensen, Director of the Danish Wind Industry Association 
 
• John Thomas Olesen, Assistant Vice President, Vestas Wind Systems 
 
• Niels Møller Jensen, Manager, Technology & Projects, Vattenfall Generation Nordic 
Countries, Wind Power 
 
• Per Hornung Pedersen, Managing Director, Suzlon Wind, Denmark 
 
• Peter Niels Hauge Madsen, Consultant, Risø National Laboratory, and former long-term 
employee of Siemens Wind 
 
• Steen Broust Nielsen, Head of Corporate Communications, LM Glasfiber 
 
The interview considerations 
The interview guide was designed on the basis of the principles outlined in Kvale (1996), Schwartz 
(1998), Heijden (1998) and Porter (1985). The aim of these principles are summarised in the 
following: 
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• To ensure that, although the interview necessarily has a point of departure, it remains open-
ended and avoids prefixed conclusions; 
• That the interviewee, to the widest possible extent, sets the agenda; 
• That the questions are general and minded on free-flowing conversation; 
• To ensure that the interviewer, to the widest possible extent, responds only in a reactive 
mode, restricted to elaborating questions, clarifications, and feedback to the interviewee; 
• To allow the interviewee to reflect, contemplate and rephrase responses; 
• To create an informal and relaxed atmosphere allowing, to the widest possible extent, free 
thinking and imagination in the absence of convention. 
 
In spite of the efforts made to create an atmosphere inductive to ‘free thinking’, and selecting  
interviewees from heterogeneous institutions and relations to the wind turbine industry, situational 
bias is likely to have played a significant role among even the most liberal-minded interviewees. The 
interviewees necessarily form part of the general mindset and established conventions of the 
industry, inevitably creating blind spots and presupposed and unquestioned ‘truths’ about the future 
development of the industry (Heijden 1998). In scenario literature, it is still far from clear how to 
address this problem. A common answer is seeking out ‘remarkable people’ with a unique outlook 
upon future developments (Schwartz 1998). This approach, however, raises the issues of how to 
identify such individuals and if these unique outlooks have any special legitimacy other than the fact 
that they differ from consensus. No such attempt has been made in this report and I thus accept 
situational bias as an inherent weakness of the method. 
 
The interview guide 
Based on the above principles, the following questions were posed to interviewees in the order 
described below421: 
 
1. What, in your opinion, will be the most important differences among the buyers of wind 
turbines over the coming decade compared to today, and what will be the consequences for 
wind turbine manufacturers? 
 
2. What, in your opinion, will be the most important differences between what is required for 
winning an order over the coming decade compared to today, and what will be the 
consequences for wind turbine manufacturers? 
 
3. What, in your opinion, will be the most important differences between the wind turbine 
manufacturers occupying the industry over the coming decade compared to today, and what 
will be the consequences for wind turbine manufacturers? 
 
4. What, in your opinion, will be the most important differences between the subcontractors to 
the wind turbine industry over the coming decade compared to today, and what will be the 
consequences for wind turbine manufacturers? 
 
5. What, in your opinion, will be the most important differences between the competitive 
pressure from substitutes to wind power over the coming decade compared to today, and 
what will be the consequences for wind turbine manufacturers? 
 
6. What, in your opinion, are the most important uncertainties faced by the wind turbine 
industry over the coming decade – what could make you wrong? 
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7. If you were to pose three questions to an oracle about the development of the wind turbine 
industry over the coming decade, what would they be? 
 
As described above, these general questions were each followed by elaboratory questions, probing 
the details and rationale of the general answer. 
 
 
